Intersections 5. by unknown
East European Journal of Society and Politics
Enforcing Equality? 
Promises and Limits of Legal
Responses to Systemic Inequalities




















Attila Bartha, Nóra Kovács, Miklós Könczöl, 






The current issue was supported by:
PUBLISHED BY:
Centre for Social Sciences




Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics 
is an Open Access, double blind peer-reviewed online journal.
When citing an article, please use the article’s DOI identifier.
 










ANDRÁS LÁSZLÓ PAP 
Harassment: A Silver Bullet to Tackle Institutional Discrimination, But No 
Panacea for all Forms of Dignity and Equality Harms 11 
 
ALEXANDER OSIPOV 
Agendas of Non-discrimination on Ethnic Grounds in the Post-Soviet Space: 
The Cases of Russia and Ukraine 36 
 
ESZTER KOVÁTS 
Limits of the Human Rights Vocabulary in Addressing Inequalities – 




Narrating Roma Rights Activism for the American Public.  
Timmer, Andria D. (2017) Educating the Hungarian Roma: Non-governmental 
Organisations and Minority Rights. Lanham, Boulder, New York and London: 
Lexington Books. xxxvii, 163 pages. 
Bhabha, Jacqueline, Mirga, Andrzej and Matache, Margareta (eds.) (2017) 
Realizing Roma Rights. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. viii, 308 
pages. 
LILLA FARKAS 81 
 
Fábián, Katalin and Korolczuk, Elżbieta (eds.) (2017) Rebellious Parents: 
Parental Movements in Central-Eastern Europe and Russia. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press. 376 pages. 




BÁLINT MADLOVICS AND BÁLINT MAGYAR 
From Petty Corruption to Criminal State: A Critique of the Corruption 
Perceptions Index as Applied to the Post-Communist Region 103 
 
DIANA MARIANA POPA 
New versus Established Migrants in a Competitive Labor Market: A Focus 




INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 5(2): 4–10. 
ZSOLT KÖRTVÉLYESI
  
Enforcing Equality? Promises and Limits of Legal 
Responses to Systemic Inequalities 
 
                                                        
 [kortvelyesi.zsolt@tk.mta.hu] (Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences, Budapest) 
Intersections.EEJSP            
5(2): 4–10.                          
DOI: 10.17356/ieejsp.v5i2.566 
http://intersections.tk.mta.hu
Inequalities are rising, with social divisions being increasingly presented as cultural, 
ethnic, religious or racial, as resulting from unchangeable traces and/or deep historical 
roots, revolving around essentialist visions of groups of people. The call for 
recognition of diversity has been transformed to identitarian nativism.
1
 At times, what 
surfaces is an anti–Enlightenment vision that seeks to reverse the long march towards 
the equalizing universal ideal of shared humanity. The impact of this trend on law 
could not be more pronounced. It seems timely to revisit law’s potential in fighting 
inequalities, assess what has been achieved and what innovative solutions can help 
equality struggles. The present thematic section focuses on law’s potential in fighting 
systemic inequalities, taking a wide approach that considers not only problems of 
implementation but also wider questions of political mobilization. 
Views diverge on what law is contributing to equality. I will briefly refer to two 
accounts to illustrate the spectrum. The traditional critical view, usually of a Marxist 
bent, treats law as the language that power speaks.
2
 When power was to make 
concessions, it is essentially a tool to sweeten the pill, make law enforcement more 
efficient by voluntary rule–following. Many critical accounts continue to voice this 
view. Others argue that the very logic of law or, more specifically, of the rule of law 
has some basic equalizing effect. Marxist historian E. P. Thompson went as far as 
stating that ‘the rule of law itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions upon power and 
the defence of the citizen from power’s all–intrusive claims, seems to me to be an 
unqualified human good.’ (Thompson, 1990 [1975]: 266.) Remarkably, he reached 
this conclusion in a book discussing particularly harsh anti–poor legislation history. 
Law does seem to have a universalizing potential.
3
 It pushes decision–makers in 
the direction of transparent and general rules (also assuming their capacity to achieve 
this) combined with the control by independent judges. Fighting arbitrariness also 
means that decisions should be justified and held against other comparable decisions. 
Justification and comparison call for a basic notion of non–discrimination: departure 
                                                        
1
 The term was earlier used to describe (critically) the view on the united voices of the oppressed natives 
that can only be really understood and expressed by natives themselves. See, e.g., Kuper (1994: 543, cited 
in Werbner, 2012: 158). In the sense that I use it here, with similar overtones of unity and oppression, 
covers a wide range of (changing) ideologies. On the trend of what he calls a move from nationalism to 
‘civilizationism’, including Christian identitarian elements but also liberal features, see Brubaker (2017). 
2
 See, most famously, Marx (1975 [1842]). 
3
 On a basic level, laws should be cast in general terms (targeted laws would undermine the separation of 
powers doctrine), applied in a uniform matter (lack thereof would undermine the idea of one unified 
legal system and impartial application). This also means that grounds of (legal) inequality have to be 
spelled out, making contestation easier. For an account of the underlying morality, see Fuller (1969, esp. 
Ch. II). 
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from earlier precedent requires justification. It remains true, however, that the 
legitimizing effect formal rules have can also be detrimental to mobilizing resistance 
and political challenge, sometimes outweighing the said rule of law benefits: people 
tend to accept the legitimacy of law, and are less likely to act against it, partly because 
of the ceremonial force of formal state norms.
4
 The relationship between legal 
challenges to existing practices, e.g. in the form of human rights litigation, and political 
mobilization continues to be contested when discussing contemporary equality 
struggles (see later). 
In a more specific field within the realm of equality, minority rights protection, 
one point of contention is the inherent tendency of Western legal systems to neglect 
claims that are not easy or possible to be individualized, i.e. presented as a matter of 
individual rights or individual harm (with prominent exceptions as collective claims 
made by states, corporations, or churches). While this can be a feature and important 
guarantee for liberal accounts seeking protection for individual freedom — and there 
are good arguments for limiting law to what law is good at doing and constraining our 
expectations
5
 — from other angles it seems to be a shortcoming. In the case of claims 
made on behalf of wronged indigenous communities, it presents itself as a cultural 
bias, often preventing non–individualized claims to proceed. More relevant for the 
Central and Eastern European region, for ethnic and national minorities, the 
individualist filter makes it hard or impossible to counter systemic injustices. The 
practical requirements of providing proof and establish actual violations can make it 
prohibitive to challenge discriminatory patterns through litigation. 
It is this insight that motivates the on–going research — hosted by the Centre for 
Social Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and funded by the National 
Research, Development and Innovation Office — on how procedural instruments can 
bridge the gap between minority claims and legal guarantees.
6
 The hypothesis is that 
aggregating minority claims on the procedural level, even if the underlying rights are 
purely individual ones, can go a long way towards providing remedies for wider 
inequalities and systemic wrongs. More specifically, class action type collective 
procedures can aggregate minority claims, even if these are cast in purely individual 
terms, which would in itself make these cases more likely to succeed, resulting in a 
more minority–friendly legal and, as a result, political and social environment. To 
bring an example for why procedural aggregation matters, when the United States 
Supreme Court ruled in 2011 on not certifying the class of 1.5 million women 
employed by Walmart at the time or earlier, alleging discrimination in promotion and 
pay, that effectively shut down the road to effective remedy for the victims and robust 
incentives for reform.
7
 A lot will depend on non–procedural elements, e.g. the actual 
standards of discrimination (outcome–based or requiring intent), but procedural rules 
can also play a key role in bringing about change. 
                                                        
4
 For a classical account, see Max Weber (1978: 37): ‘the most common form of legitimacy is the belief in 
legality, the compliance with enactments which are formally correct and which have been made in the 
accustomed manner.’ 
5
 See a recent account by Hannum (2019). 
6
 For more information, see https://jog.tk.mta.hu/en/enhancing–minority–rights–using–group–litigation. 
7
 For a more recent account on the current state of affairs, see Saniato (2019). 
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The power of numbers can boost the transformative potential of law (as 
opposed to its strong potential to preserve the status quo), as exemplified by cases in 
the wake of the #MeToo movement. Charges against Bill Cosby went unnoticed and 
remained moot for decades, up to the point where a critical mass of women decided 
to speak up and present their cases not as isolated allegations but part of a pattern, 
changing public perceptions, prominently including those of criminal justice officials. 
It is this line of inquiry that the first study in this special section addresses. 
András László Pap inquires about the potential of the harassment–based anti–
discrimination approach, focusing mostly on cases from Hungary. He argues that the 
legal instrument which is part of the European anti–discrimination field, while not a 
magic solution for all ills that members of minority communities face, can go a long 
way in addressing cases of institutional discrimination. The approach extends the 
reach of anti–discrimination litigation and brings benefits in areas such as providing 
evidence. By the same token, however, the approach is also fraught with dangers: 
lowering the standards of proof creates due process concerns on the other side, for 
the alleged perpetrators, and it can also end up putting too much of a constraint on 
free speech. Pap illustrates these threats with how US universities have been dealing 
with campus rape and campus speech cases. Applying specific measures outside of 
their original intended scope where deviation from general rules is warranted can lead 
to solutions that are seemingly beneficial for the original goals of addressing equality 
and dignity based concerns. At the same time, however, the same approach might 
violate other human rights considerations, rearranging the field in an undesired way 
and ultimately undermining the cause, not only legally, but also politically, leading to 
public backlash. 
A more basic limitation of anti–discrimination legislation is under–
enforcement. Alexander Osipov in his study of Russia and Ukraine documents how 
what should be legal guarantees remain empty declarations. The anti–discrimination 
framework that, in many jurisdictions, sustains a rich field of case law, remains largely 
sterile both in Russia and Ukraine. This underlines the well–known but rarely 
followed–through observation from comparative law literature on the low success rate 
of copy–paste solutions (see, e.g., the critique in Legrand, 1997). The practice of 
resolving disputes in informal ways rather than through formal legal procedures means 
that a key (extra–legal, cultural, social) precondition is missing, which renders 
discussions around the subtleties of definitions and approaches to a great extent futile. 
Equality as a legal principle can play out very differently in authoritarian regimes that 
employ ethnicity as a ground for fighting extremism (often excessively) and co–opting 
minorities (in fact, minority leaders) through patronal relationships. Where fear of 
repression or just governmental influence discourages private actors to challenge state 
(sanctioned) policies, anti–discrimination enforcement might be limited to isolated 
instances of non–state discrimination. This limited approach might risk avoiding 
addressing deeper, structural forms and causes of discrimination and might amount to 
little more than window–dressing, yielding some successes at the margins while 
maintaining larger discriminatory patterns unchallenged. This means that the 
transformative potential of enforcing equality is not only lost, but is transformed to a 
pacifier, supporting the status quo instead of challenging existing power relations. The 
state–controlled ethnic space, inherited from the Soviet times, blocks the emergence 
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of a decentralized instrument — i.e. a tool that can be used by non–state actors to 
enforce equality — like anti–discrimination litigation. It plays, rather, into the common 
authoritarian reflex that seeks to relegate ethnic inequality claims to the field of 
‘fighting extremism’ to isolated cases threatening ‘social peace’, as opposed to 
structural causes undermining equality. This is in line with centrally declared ‘national 
programmes’ and a criminal law approach where centralized filtering is secured 
through public prosecution. Civic engagement and civil society organizations that are 
so central to a functioning democracy prove also essential for rights enforcement in 
the field of ethnic discrimination. These are the contextual elements that can end up 
turning a minority–protection instrument into a tool suppressing pluralism instead of 
helping diversity, and democracy can suffer as a result.
8
 All this is aptly illustrated by 
the case of Lidiya Bainova who was accused of extremist activities (a crime under 
Russian law) for speaking out exactly against the type of discrimination that equality 
measures should seek to remedy. If anything, this approach seems to be replicated in 
other countries in the Eastern and Central European region, a worrying trend. 
Our third study, by Eszter Kováts, tracks a regional trend equally worrying for 
the proponents of equality. The study documents the political context of what is 
usually interpreted as anti–gender and even anti–human rights engagement, through 
discussing the Hungarian cases of government attacks on gender studies (practically 
banning the discipline as a university programme) and the Council of Europe 
Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic 
violence (‘Istanbul Convention’). She argues that under the surface, these 
controversies are not proxies for voicing genuine anti–women’s rights convictions, but 
serving the goal of demonstrating a wider threat, of presenting the image of an enemy, 
and of an on–going cultural war. This explains how usually uncontroversial topics like 
fighting domestic violence can become politically controversial and the basis of 
ideological attacks. The direct lesson is that focusing on direct messages while 
accepting the ‘culturalist’ framing of anti–human rights attacks merely reinforces the 
sense of the threat, easily undermining the goals of human rights activism. 
An approach that can be helpful in challenging this framework is what Nancy 
Fraser calls ‘perspectival dualism’, the recognition of both the cultural and the 
economic aspects as well as their interrelations. This approach also challenges the 
individualist approach to/of human rights (see earlier) and the universalist language 
that tends to hide the centre–periphery power asymmetry (a point also raised by 
Farkas, see below). The proposed perspective probably questions the legal approach 
in a more fundamental way as well. If, along Fraser’s critique of grounding recognition 
claims in the human psyche, the psychological foundations of identifying harm and 
rights violations might be misleading – and in many respect this is reproduced in 
human rights debates about the usability of the concept of vulnerability
9
 – that may 
undermine the notion of psychological harm that is a routine part of legal remedies, in 
many cases sanctioning rights violations. 
                                                        
8
 Also confirming Will Kymlicka’s insight that securitizing always undermines minority rights (Kymlicka, 
2007: 119—120). In the current Russian case, the twist is that seemingly minority–focused measures do 
the trick. 
9
  For a short account, see Andorno (2016), as against, among others, Ricoeur (1996) or Turner (2006). 
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Fraser’s insight into recognition/redistribution is an important reference point 
in the contribution of Lilla Farkas (who adds that the redistributive, class–aspect had 
been raised earlier by Júlia Szalai
10
), reviewing two volumes that discuss Roma rights. 
Crucially, the overview raises what often goes unchallenged, the very notion of ‘Roma 
rights’. Not simply the theoretical debate, but the question of who defines what 
qualifies for funding, advocacy and litigation. Farkas stresses the importance of local 
stakeholders and even local contribution to funding, as a guarantee of sustainable 
efforts, but also notes how, in reality, Western donors have played a crucial role in 
shaping the agenda. This raises questions of independence from the domestic political 
context, a double–edged sword considering domestic responsiveness, or even 
responsiveness to local actors, and also of the limits of ‘importing’ anti–discrimination 
law. To put it bluntly, the question is to what extent Brown (the leading racial 
desegregation case in the US) can be replicated in Europe (D.H. v. Czech Republic, 
the most cited European desegregation case). This goes back to debates about the 
correct understanding of what role court cases like Brown played in bringing about 
change (adding the current – devastating – state of school segregation in the US
11
), but 
also about the question we addressed earlier on the possibility of what have been often 
termed ‘legal transplants’. For instance, the two countries in Osipov’s study, Russia 
and Ukraine are usually perceived as having different attitudes towards international 
human rights standards. While the findings there might not question agendas of 
external equality promotion altogether, it raises important questions about the 
possible short–term effects as well as about the right instruments to further equality. 
Similarly, in the case of Roma rights, the decision to focus on certain rights and certain 
approaches to promote these (in this case school desegregation litigation) should be 
reflective of the domestic and local context, not (or not primarily) on higher–level 
agendas. 
It is this context that the final contribution to the special section focuses on. 
Lídia Balogh reviews a book that presents a rich field of civil activism in the Central 
and Eastern European region, where some movements could be labelled as anti– 
while others as pro–human rights, e.g., mobilizing against the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child in Russia, making gender–equality claims on behalf of Polish 
fathers, or the home birth movement in Hungary. While Balogh raises doubts 
whether these movements are rightfully presented as examples of the same 
phenomenon, the overview of this diversity itself seems useful in that it challenges the 
reader to think through the advantages of the political, grassroots approach to claim–
making, often used as platforms for middle class privileges, illustrated with the 
example of the anti–vaccination movement in the Czech Republic. 
To finally return to the critique of law, Farkas also hints at how far the critique 
of the legal approach can go, raising the existential question of human rights whether 
                                                        
10
 See also our special issue from last year: ‘Recognition, Rights, Redistribution. In Honor of Júlia Szalai’, 
Intersections, 2018/1, https://intersections.tk.mta.hu/index.php/intersections/issue/view/13. 
11
 On the changing legal landscape: ‘After decisive breakthroughs in the 1960s and early 1970s […b]y the 
1990s the courts were ending desegregation plans and segregation began to creep up year after year after 
year. Since the early 1980s, few federal funds were available to support voluntary integration and even 
those voluntary local efforts were undermined by the Supreme Court’s decision in the 2007 Parents 
Involved case.’ Orfield et al. (2019: 33). 
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there are ‘more political, emancipatory’ approaches with more potential that could 
and should be used. Proceeding with more caution, even if political approaches are 
proposed as alternatives, would we not risk too much by giving up on the role that 
human rights have undeniably played in mobilization so far? While the human rights 
approach to equality has serious limitations — some of which we have seen above — 
and it might even prove to be counterproductive at times, there is no guarantee that 
giving up on the rights focus will lead to gains on other levels. 
Law is but one of the tools to raise and voice issues, present them as salient, 
shape public discussions and political agendas, but it is far from bringing about change 
in itself. Sustained extra–legal activity is necessary sometimes even before litigation 
starts, and it is key to actual structural changes. The call in the articles for a broader 
view of equality can be read as in line with the calls for the emancipation of social–
economic rights and for a more sensitive approach to social and economic inequalities 
when making and applying law — a claim that remains controversial but is nevertheless 
backed up by key UN and EU human rights instruments. But the same call, less 
controversially, can also remind us to acknowledge the limits of law:
12
 to see more 
clearly what law can realistically achieve, what activists can aim at through law and 
human rights enforcement, and where equality struggles should look beyond the legal 
realm. There are merits to the wilful ignorance of law, but we should all the while be 
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Using Hungarian case law, this essay first explores the singular 
potential in the anti-discrimination legal concept of ‘harassment’, as it 
is perceived under EU law, to tackle institutional discrimination. 
Following this, the author turns to the risks and limitations of the 
practical operationalization of institutional discrimination in human 
rights litigation, as well as the uniqueness and subsequent challenges 
the subjectified standards of evidence for harassment may pose for 
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This essay is structured as follows: After proposing a set of definitions concerning 
‘structural inequalities’, ‘structural discrimination’, ‘institutional and institutionalized 
discrimination’ and ‘harassment’, I turn to exploring the unique potential in the anti-
discrimination legal concept of ‘harassment,’ as it is perceived under EU law, to tackle 
the phenomenon of institutional discrimination, that is, exclusion rooted in 
institutional culture, or operational patterns. I will argue that the peculiarity of 
‘harassment’ is that it is focused on the existence of an ‘intimidating, hostile, 
degrading, humiliating or offensive environment’, but it does not require a comparator 
and it allows entire organizations or subunits to be sanctioned along with individuals. 
Using Hungarian case law (NGO actio popularis litigation), I will show that the 
flexibility of anti-discrimination law, its unique terminology and conceptualization 
enables an activist interpretation to broaden its scope to cover novel, subtle and 
complex inequalities and grievances such as police raids, ethnic profiling, banning 
pride events and even hate speech. The cases cover a broad range of discrimination in 
terms of grounds and protected characteristics. 
The second part of the article investigates the conceptual complexity, as well as 
the limitations and risks involved with the concept of harassment. While arguing that it 
indeed can be a silver bullet to tackle institutional discrimination, I will argue that it is 
no panacea for all forms of discrimination and social injustice: not every form of 
institutional discrimination can be conceptualized as harassment, not every form of 
discriminatory harassment will lead to institutional discrimination, and not every form 
of harassment amounts to discrimination. 
A separate discussion is focused on the conceptual and procedural features of 
harassment, pointing out that legal standards relying solely on the subjective feeling of 
the complainant in regards of an intimidating and humiliating environment are not 
without risk. While it is a powerful and empowering tool for victims and members of 
marginalized communities, it can lead to lawlessness if there are no constraints to 
sanctioning based on declarations of feelings. Hence, if a petitioner can assume 
standing, that is, a protected personality trait or characteristic (for which in several 
instances of anti-discrimination legislation there is an open-ended list) it is a daunting 
task for the judiciary and equality bodies to set up standards and due process/fair trial 
guarantees. 
Pointing to the confusing feature of harassment which blends discriminatory, 
criminal and labor law transgressions, the article discusses the specific case of a 
gender-based (sexual) discrimination in the #MeToo-era in this context, with a special 
focus on American higher education cases, which are arguably the frontline for 
(sexual) harassment cases. 
The article concludes that no systemic concerns have been raised in regards of 
harassment charges applied in regards of other protected characteristics. Sexual 
harassment related occasional backlashes dominate, if not monopolize public 
discussion and both shift the attention from other forms of harassment, and reduce 
and misguide the perception of harassment, a truly unique analytic concept and a legal 
term which binds dignity, equality and identity claims in a complex and unique 
fashion, able to sanction simultaneously discrimination, employment law and criminal 
transgressions. The article also adds that the complexity of harassment may prove to 
be its self-limiting weakness, as if direct or indirect discrimination can be argued in a 
case, counsels would likely have it easier with any judge going down those roads. 
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1. Institutional, institutionalized and structural discrimination,  
and harassment: terms and definitions 
 
Before turning to the analysis of the intricacies of the legal concept of harassment and 
its potential to offer remedies for various forms of social injustice, an exploration of 
terminology is in place. 
In social science literature, there are dozens of definitions for conceptualizing 
structural inequalities, marginalization, discrimination, etc. This assessment focuses on 
law and legal conceptualization and terminology. Structural discrimination is the most 
general phenomenon or process, and it is also the one least feasible to encapsulate in 
legal terms. Hence, structural discrimination is not a legal term, it is used in social 
sciences to describe general, systematic forms of exclusion that goes beyond the actual 
workings of individual organizations and institutions. It calls attention to the fact that 
exclusion is based on forms of social communication, constant and recurrent habits 
and patterns that appear in the shape of attitudes, norms, value systems and choices 
that result in the exclusion and systematic disfavoring of certain groups. It does not 
require intentional behavior, fault or intent, and might not even be apparent in formal 
rules of social institutions. Consider segregated housing, the negative and biased 
media representation of minorities, the low number of women in political bodies or 
senior positions in the business world or academia.  
Moving to ‘institutional’ and ‘institutionalized’ discrimination, which I use as 
synonyms, several definitions are available in the literature, but so far there has been 
no conclusive, generally acceptable theoretical and analytical differentiation between 
the two terms. Dovidio (2010) emphasizes that institutional discrimination is a rule, a 
convention or practice that systematically represents and reproduces group-based 
inequality. McCrudden (1982) argues that the gist of the phenomenon is that 
exclusion has become so institutionalized that there is no further need for individual 
decisions and actions to make an institution’s operation effectively exclusive. The 
point is that due to operational mechanisms, the system itself discriminates, and there 
is no need for specific decisions for exclusion, intention or bias. According to Haney-
López (1999: 1717), and what has been termed as new institutionalism, a trend that 
goes beyond the rational choice theory of institutional sociology, institutional 
discrimination is a practice that directly or indirectly confirms the social status of 
disadvantaged groups, and ‘institutions’ are not necessarily organizations, but can be 
social practices, as well. 
In the social sciences conceptualization institutional discrimination is simply 
used as a synonym for structural or institutionalized racism. For the purposes of this 
essay, the most important aspect of institutionalized discrimination is that it is not 
necessarily a result of deliberate discriminatory procedures or attitudes, but that of an 
institutional culture, an operational pattern that in effect disfavors certain social 
groups. 
As for harassment: it is a truly unique concept in law. It may refer to a wide 
variety of behavior which can be sanctioned both by civil and criminal law. Criminal 
harassment usually entails targeting someone else with behavior which causes alarm or 
distress, or what is meant to alarm, annoy, torment or terrorize, and creating 
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reasonable fear in the victim for their or their family’s safety. Commonly referred to as 
stalking, criminal harassment may include the repeated following of a person, or 
communication in a way that could arouse fear. Criminal harassment also includes 
uttering threats. 
But harassment is also part of the anti-discrimination legislation. Anti-
discrimination law habitually relies on the distinction between direct and indirect 
discrimination. Consider for example the EU’s Race Directive: 
Direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is treated less 
favorably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable 
situation on grounds of racial or ethnic origin; indirect discrimination shall be 
taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice 
would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage 
compared with other persons, unless that provision, criterion or practice is 
objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are 
appropriate and necessary. (Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 
implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of 
racial or ethnic origin) 
 
Although strictly speaking no actual disparate treatment is taking place, in order to 
broaden the concept of discrimination, harassment is usually also included within the 
legal conceptualization. According to the aforementioned EU Directive, ‘harassment 
shall be deemed to be discrimination […] when […] conduct related to racial or ethnic 
origin takes place with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person and of 
creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.’ 
Thus, harassment is a distinct type of discrimination. Its gist is that the harasser 
creates or tolerates an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating, offending 
environment that violates the human dignity of the victim. The phenomena of 
mobbing (harassment at the workplace) and bullying (used in connection to school 
and educational environments) are also recognized as such. One of the distinctive and 
most important features of harassment is that it is (also) the employer or a 
(representative of a) collective entity that can be held responsible for providing a 
harassment-free environment or procedure, thus it is not (only) individuals, such as 
police officers or employees, who can engage in this form of discrimination, but the 
employer, and even an entire organization as well. 
There is also a third dimension how harassment surfaces, and due to its 
massive media representation and presence in public discourse, one of such areas will 
be in the center of the last section of this essay: when employers conduct disciplinary 
proceedings against employees or terminate contracts based on allegations of various 
forms of sexual harassment, following internal guidelines or policy decisions that are 
only indirectly connected to or based on legislative frameworks. These cases will not 
involve institutional discrimination directly, but it arguably involves systematic 
tolerance (and even encouragement) of certain conduct and a pervasive corporate 
culture which can be seen as form of institutional discrimination. 
Harassment can be both a one-time occurrence and a pattern of procedures, or 
a series of continuous, recurring activities. Its corollary feature is that it does not 
assume an individual intention, guilt or prejudice and does not (or does not only) 
sanction the behavior of actual harassers or individuals participating in these 
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procedures, but the organization, the unit or the whole institution that allows for an 
intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment. 
 
2. Operationalizing institutional discrimination as harassment 
 
The following pages turn to demonstrating the unique potential in the anti-
discrimination legal concept of ‘harassment,’ as it is perceived under EU law, to tackle 
the phenomenon of institutional discrimination. To accentuate the peculiarity of 
‘harassment’: it is focused on the existence/creation/tolerance of an ‘intimidating, 
hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment’, but it does not require a 
comparator (direct discrimination is defined as unfavourable by comparison to 
someone in a similar situation), and it allows entire organizations or subunits to be 
sanctioned along individuals. Using Hungarian case law built on NGO actio popularis 
litigation, I will show how an activist interpretation to broaden the scope of harassment 
to cover police raids, ethnic profiling, administrative bigotry, such as banning pride 
events, and even hate speech may open novel avenues for human rights litigation, 
even tackling cases where no other legal remedies would be available. Arguably, the 
extraordinary potential and these litigation strategies are exportable throughout the 
Europe (and maybe even beyond), and can be used as a silver bullet. 
In the following I will cite a few cases where Hungarian human rights NGOs 
convincingly used harassment at some point in litigation to for example combat ethnic 
profiling and hate speech by local politicians: in all cases where no alternative 
argument for legal remedy was available. Again, let us be reminded that a defining 
element of institutional discrimination is that it concerns the aggregate effect of 
formally legal actions and procedures. 
In a 2011 case launched before Hungary’s equality body (EBH/865/2011), the 
Hungarian Helsinki Committee (HHC) successfully argued that in the village of 
Rimóc (in Northern Hungary), 97 per cent of the 150 bikers stopped and penalized 
for the lack of bicycle accessories between 1 January and 5 September, 2011 were 
Roma (Helsinki, 2012). The case ended in a settlement between the Nógrád County 
Police Headquarters and the HHC. A similar project was launched in 2016 targeting 
the Budapest Metropolitan Police’s stop and search practices concerning 400 
homeless people (EBH/17/2016). Here too, settlement negotiations and an 
agreement was concluded, police undertook to issue a memorandum declaring that it 
is discriminatory to carry out general identity checks of homeless and socially 
disadvantaged people.  
A series of complex raids on Roma in the northern city of Miskolc triggered 
considerable attention. Various Hungarian and European NGOs and authorities 
conducted a complex investigation of the practice of coordinated raids by the police 
the city health and social departments, child protection services, and the water and gas 
suppliers in the segregated areas of the city in between 15 April 2013 and 17 April 
2014 involving more than 2700 properties and approximately 4500 people, examining 
residency documentation, livestock conditions, sanitation, etc. (AJB-1474/2014). 
According to the ombudsman and his deputy in charge of nationalities (minorities), 
the high security inspections lacked appropriate constitutional reasons and posed an 
unnecessary and disproportionate restriction on the right to privacy of the inspected 
people who were mainly socially disadvantaged and Roma. The reoccurring 
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inspections were focused on the segregated areas of Miskolc and were held to lead to 
direct discrimination based on social origin and financial status and indirect 
discrimination based on ethnic origin, as well as the style of communication of the 
inspectors was found to be offensive, abusive and humiliating. Although a report by 
the parliamentary commissioner (ombudsperson) for fundamental rights repeatedly 
stated that the raids were considered to be intimidating, the provision of harassment 
was not actually used in the findings. Relying heavily on the ombuds-report, the 
Hungarian Civil Liberties Union successfully argued the case at court. The 57-page-
long landmark anti-discrimination decision issued by the Miskolc Regional Court on 
2018 December 12 actually held that the authorities’ behavior amounted to 
harassment (and ordered the city of Miskolc to pay app. 33000 Euros to charity 
working on desegregation and social work.) The court focused special attention on the 
adjacent communication on behalf of the local government, finding exclusionary, 
racist statements, which were also found to amount to (discriminatory) harassment. 
Harassment has also been applied by the Budapest Court of Appeal in 2014 
declaring that the practice of the police repeatedly banning Gay Pride March amounts 
to institutional harassment. The court declared that the Metropolitan Police 
committed direct discrimination and harassment based on sexual orientation in 2012 
when they banned the march claiming it disrupted traffic in Budapest. In previous 
years, the police consistently issued similar bans, and all have been overruled by the 
court, not to mention that various other events were permitted with roughly the same 
routes with significantly more participants. (One of these was a GONGO-march 
partially financed by the government with more than a hundredfold number of 
participants.) The trial court found that the police engaged in harassment, because 
their decision led to the creation and strengthening of a hostile, degrading and 
humiliating environment for a group of people with regard to their sexual orientation, 
and such practices can increase homophobia (Háttér, 2014). 
Another set of cases concerned hate speech by local politicians. Before 2012, 
the coming into force of the new constitution (and subsequent criminal and civil 
legislation), the significance of these strategic lawsuits was that according to the 
Constitutional Court neither criminal, nor civil law provided adequate measures to 
combat racist hate speech.
2
 Even though not all cases led to victory, the Equal 
Treatment Authority (ETA), Hungary’s equality body and the courts had no 
conceptual problems with considering this approach to invoke harassment.  
The first notable case concerned racist hate speech by the mayor of a small 
town, Edelény. At the public meeting of the city council in 2009 that was broadcasted 
on the city television, Mayor Oszkár Molnár made the following statement: 
It is no secret that in the neighboring villages where mostly the Roma live, for 
example in Lak and Szendrőlád, pregnant women deliberately take pills to give 
birth to loony children so that they can claim double the amount of social 
                                                        
2
 30/1992. (V. 26.) AB határozat, ABH 1992; 36/1994. (VI. 24.) AB határozat, ABH 1994; 
18/2004. (V. 25.) AB határozat, ABH 2004; 95/2008. (VII. 3.) AB határozat, ABH 2008; 
96/2008. (VII. 3.) AB határozat, ABH 2008. In 2008 the specialized ombudsman for minority 
rights, a pioneer advocate for the cause, prepared a – never adopted – draft-legislation 
expanding the scope of harassment explicitly to hate speech: A kisebbségi biztos javaslata a 
gyűlöletbeszéd elleni fellépésre, Fundamentum 12(2): 125–127 (2008). 
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benefits and that during the pregnancy – this is new information, but I have 
checked it, it’s true – women beat their stomachs with rubber hammers so that 
they would have handicapped children […]. 
 
The statement was repeated several times in the media, it was made public on the 
video news website of the national television channel RTL Klub and could be viewed 
on YouTube. The ETA found it to be a harassment of Roma mothers and pregnant 
women (EBH/1475/2009). On repeated appeal, the Supreme Court overruled this 
decision on the grounds that even if the mayor’s statements constitute harassment 
(which it did not rule out), there is a procedural obstacle as the statements were not 
made with reference to the residents of the local municipality, and the mayor can only 
be held responsible for discrimination in relation to them. 
In 2011 the Supreme Court passed a similar review of a decision of the Equal 
Treatment Authority (Kfv.III.39.302/2010/8).
 
The case was the following: After the 
violent death of the 14-year-old Nóra Horák in 2008 there was strong hostility against 
the Roma among the locals in the town of Kiskunlacháza. The city council organized a 
meeting with the title ‘Demonstration for life against violence’ where Mayor József 
Répás said the following:  
The rapists, the thieves, the murderers should be frightened! There is no place 
for violence in Kiskunlacháza, there is no place for criminals, we have had 
enough of the Roma violence! Kiskunlacháza and Hungary belong to the 
peaceful and law-abiding citizens. We will no longer let them steal our 
belongings, beat up the elders and deflower the children. We are still in 
majority. 
 
According to the ETA, the statement caused significant fear in the Roma, because the 
mayor’s words increased the already present hostility. The mayor published an article 
in the local newspaper of the city council with the title ‘We have had enough!’ that was 
published in one of the national daily newspapers. In the article, he stated that 
[s]everal brutal crimes have been revealed that had been committed by 
perpetrators with verified Roma origin. Still, the leftist, liberal media and the 
government talks about racism […] I am sorry to say that today there is an 
institutionalized racism against Hungarians in Hungary. […]  We must stop the 
terrorizing of the society, the deliberate creation of fear. We cannot let people 
hide behind the mask of minority and enjoy more rights than the majority. The 
basis of a normal society is that people feel safe. It should be a world in which if 
I leave my home in the evening, later I arrive home safely, and not in a body 
bag. 
 
Based on the petition of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee the ETA found that the 
mayor violated the principle of equal treatment with regard to the Roma residents of 
the town and committed harassment (EBH/187/1/2010). The Supreme Court, again, 
refused to recognize the scope of the antidiscrimination law. However, in retrial, the 
Budapest-Capital Administrative and Labour Court stated that the speech and writings 
of the mayor do not fall under the freedom of expression and constitute unlawful 
conduct (Helsinki, 2014). 
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In 2015 the Hungarian Helsinki Committee initiated a lawsuit against Budapest 
8th District City Council and Mayor Máté Kocsis because of the harassment of 
refugees who had come to Hungary. The mayor made a rudely generalizing and 
inflammatory post public on Facebook. Mr. Kocsis wrote that  
[o]ur recently renewed Pope John Paul II Square has been completely 
destroyed by the migrants. They have built tents and fires in the park, they 
throw away their litter, run around madly, they knife people and destroy things. 
Never has there been so much human excrement in a public space. […] We 
will protect the public property and we will guarantee the safety of our citizens 
with all legally available means. 
 
According to the plaintiff, the majority of the statements were unfounded and 
inflammatory, capable of inciting hostile emotions, talking about not individual 
refugees, but generalizing the statements, stigmatizing all migrants regardless of their 
individual behaviour and attitude, picturing them as threats to Hungarian society, 
thereby detracting their social assessment. The Facebook post clearly violates the 
obligation of public authorities to provide equal treatment. When assessing whether 
the behaviour of the defendant led to the creation of an intimidating, hostile and 
degrading environment one must take into consideration the already extremely hostile 
public attitude against migrants that was proved by the atrocities against asylum 
seekers, the people helping them or the people who were believed to be refugees. In 
2016 the Regional Court of Budapest Capital (P.22.427/2016/10), not contesting the 
applicability of harassment, rejected the petition on procedural grounds, arguing the 
city council’s relationship to the asylum-seekers does not fall within the scope of the 
anti-discrimination act. As of October 2018, the case is on retrial and pending. 
Also in 2016 in another lawsuit initiated by the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union 
(HCLU) the ETA found that János Majoros, the mayor of Mezőkeresztes committed 
an act of harassment against the Roma with his public letter published in the July 2015 
issue of the local newspaper (EBH/459/5/2016). The article of the title was ‘Let’s stop 
the decrease of real estate prices’ and the mayor named two reasons for the decrease. 
One was that people with no income managed to acquire properties in the town and 
they sub-let these, the other that buyers of the real estates who were paying in 
instalments did not pay the full amount of the price. Two paragraphs later the mayor 
suggested a solution to the problem and asked the people of the town that if they 
could, they should not sell their properties to persons of Roma origin. The public 
letter was also published on the website of the city council. According to the ETA ‘the 
mayor’s warning, that people should not sell their properties to Roma people is in 
itself degrading and violates their human dignity, but in its context the warning can 
create a hostile, offending and humiliating environment for the Roma’ (HCLU, 2016). 
There was also an ombudsman report (AJB-703/2017) in the same case coming to 
similar conclusions. 
Möschel (2019) points to two Italian cases. The first involved politicians’ 
statements and posters from the Lega Nord and Silvio Berlusconi’s party, which 
warned against voting for a certain candidate in Milan’s mayoral elections because he 
would transform that city into a ‘gypsy-town’ and into Europe’s largest mosque. 
Following NGO litigation, the court (Tribunale di Milano, Sezione I civile, 26 May 
2012, no. 34318/11.) found racial harassment with regard to the comment about 
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Roma (but not concerning the mosque). In another actio popularis case against the 
local branch of the Lega Nord of a small Northern Italian town, Saronno, statements 
contained on seventy posters hung up in the municipal territory claiming that the town 
did not want to any illegal immigrants while the government organizes an invasion, the 
Milan Tribunal rejected discrimination claims (due to the restricted personal scope of 
the law), but held that the statements were clearly very offensive and humiliating and 
not only had the effect of violating the dignity of foreigners, asylum applicants and 
people having a different ethnicity than Italian citizens but also favoured a hostile and 
intimidating climate against them (Tribunale di Milano, Sezione I civile, 22 February 
2017, no. 47117/2016.) 
Recognizing hate speech as a form of harassment is not unprecedented in other 
jurisdictions. Schindlauer (2018: 84–85) points to three Bulgarian cases. In the first, 
Deputy Prime Minister for Economic and Demographic Policy Valeri Simeonov, who 
also served as the Chair of the National Council for Cooperation on Ethnic and 
Integration Issues was found to be guilty of harassment by the Burgas District Court 
(K. B. and O. I. vs Valeri Simeonov, Decision No. 1151, case No. 7094/2016, 31 July 
2016), after stating in the National Assembly in 2014 that ‘[i]t is an undeniable fact that 
a large part of the gypsy ethnicity lives outside of any laws, rules and general human 
norms of behaviour.’ The Supreme Administrative Court similarly established 
harassment in 2017 (N.A. vs Mediapool Ltd.; Decision No. 2171, case No. 
12401/2015, 21 February 2017) when an online news portal failed to delete anti-
Turkish hate speech comments for an entire month, and in a 2019 judgment as well, 
when a national TV company having failed to moderate anti-Roma hate comments on 
its website (NN vs NN Decision No. 13542, case No. 10756/2015, 12 December 
2016).  
Returning to Hungary, another significant decision, targeting different social 
phenomenon, by the Curia, the supreme court of Hungary (Pfv.IV.21.274/2016/4) 
concerned litigation initiated by the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, arguing that the 
failure of the police to dissolve marches organized by far-right paramilitary 
organizations in the Roma-inhabited part of the town of Gyöngyöspata amounted to 
harassment. (This case too was based on a report of the ombudsman.) 
Conceptualizing the lack of appropriate law enforcement action as a form of 
discrimination is in line with the European Court of Human Rights’ practice in seeing 
under-policing of hate crimes as a form of discrimination (although harassment is not 
used in the decisions, see for example Balázs v. Hungary [Application no. 15529/12, 
20 October 2015], R. B. v. Hungary [Application no. 64602/12, 12 April 2016], 
Király and Dömötör v. Hungary [Application no. 10851/13, 17 January 2017]).3 In the 
Balázs case the Court pointed out that treating racially induced violence and brutality 
on an equal footing with cases that have no racist overtones turns a blind eye to the 
specific nature of acts which are particularly destructive of fundamental rights. A 
failure to make a distinction in the way in which situations that are essentially different 
are handled may constitute discrimination, that is, unjustified treatment irreconcilable 
                                                        
3
 The third-party intervener, the European Roma Rights Centre submitted that this was a case 
of institutional racism against Roma within the State bodies, evidenced by the failure of the 
authorities to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their 
colour, culture, or ethnic origin. 
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with Article 14 of the Convention. The vigour and impartiality required for the 
investigation of attacks with potential racial overtones is needed because States have to 
continuously reassert society’s condemnation of racism in order to maintain the 
confidence of minorities in the ability of the authorities to protect them from the 
threat of racist violence. Furthermore, when it comes to offences committed to the 
detriment of members of particularly vulnerable groups, vigorous investigation is 
required.
4
 In the Gyöngyöspata case, while the high court rejected harassment-
arguments regarding ethnic profiling of Roma in stop and search practice, it did accept 
the under-policing claims and ruled that such practices amount to discrimination in 
the form of harassment.  
In another noteworthy case, the administrative court rejected appeals 
(6.K.31.719/2017/14) against the ruling of the equality body where it held that the city 
council of the town Tiszavasvári was guilty of harassment when it signed an agreement 
and cooperated in organizing marches with a far-right paramilitary organisation to 
‘regulate’ its Roma population. 
 
3. Assessing harassment: conceptual peculiarities, practical limitations, 
procedural risks 
 
So far I have shown that an activist interpretation of harassment may use it as a tool to 
broaden the scope of anti-discrimination protections to include a number of complex 
inequalities involving all sorts of discrimination in terms of grounds and protected 
characteristics (such as race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, social status, class, etc.). 
This second part of the article argues that while harassment may indeed be a 
useful and unique tool to tackle institutional discrimination, it is not a panacea for all 
forms of discrimination and social injustice, because (i) its scope and application 
terrain is inherently limited (as not every form of institutional discrimination can be 
conceptualized as harassment, not every form of discriminatory harassment will lead 
to institutional discrimination, and not every form of harassment amounts to 
discrimination); (ii) the very concept of harassment as it encompasses and blends 
criminal, labour and antidiscrimination law dimensions is not entirely uncontroversial; 
and (iii) the uniqueness of its operational principle relying on subjectivity also carries 
risks. Hence, the second part of the article focuses on the limitations and 
controversies involved with the concept of harassment. While earlier discussions 
                                                        
4
 The Court held that for the investigation to be regarded as ‘effective’, it should in principle be 
capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and to the identification and 
punishment of those responsible. This is not an obligation of result, but one of means; the 
authorities must have taken all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence 
concerning the incident. When investigating violent incidents, State authorities have the 
additional duty to take all reasonable steps to unmask any racist motive and to establish 
whether or not ethnic hatred or prejudice may have played a role in the events. This obligation 
to investigate possible racist overtones to a violent act is an obligation to use best endeavours 
and is not absolute. The authorities, however, must do what is reasonable in the circumstances 
to collect and secure the evidence, explore all practical means of discovering the truth and 
deliver fully reasoned, impartial and objective decisions, without omitting suspicious facts that 
may be indicative of racially induced violence. 
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involved a diverse set of grounds for discrimination, the subsequent analysis focuses 
on cases involving gender-based (sexual) discrimination. The case of sexual 
harassment is arguably special and particular for several reasons: (i) the way how the 
blending of criminal, labour and anti-discriminatory conceptualization of harassment 
are operationalized in legal practice in this field has not (yet) been applied in other 
fields involving other grounds of discrimination. Also, (ii) socio-political develop-
ments, such as the #MeToo movement put sexual harassment in the centre of public 
discussion, also accentuating the potential dangers and occasional backlashes in legal 
practice. Furthermore, a prominent and widely publicized field of sexual harassment 
case law relates to a very particular area, American higher education institutions, 
which arguably can leave faculty and students without adequate legal protection.  
Despite this atypical nature of sexual harassment (which carries the danger of 
reducing and monopolizing discussions) it is still a useful case to demonstrate the 
complexities of the legal concept of harassment, as it has been the leading example of 
how dignity, equality, and identity claims are bridged and blended, which is a general 
and unique defining feature of harassment. Let us now turn to the discussion of these 
issues. 
 
3.1 Harassment and institutional discrimination: inherent and implied 
limitations 
 
The previous pages have argued that harassment can serve as a unique tool to counter 
various forms of exclusion and social inequalities, cases of institutional discrimination 
in particular, which would not easily be covered by the classic, ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ 
forms of discrimination. This nevertheless does not cover all forms of discrimination-
related injustice for the following obvious reason: besides (i) cases where 
institutionalized discrimination is harassment; (ii) there are forms of institutionalized 
discrimination that cannot be conceptualized and operationalized as harassment; and 
(iii) there are various forms harassment that amount to discrimination, but not 
institutional discrimination; and (iv) there are also forms harassment that are not 
discriminatory. 
The previous section brought examples for successfully argued cases for (i), and 
as a thought experiment we can extend the list of potentially successful similar cases 
where there is direct personalized emotional harm petitioners can argue to have been 
induced by identifiable agents in direct interaction with them. Consider judges sitting 
in courts treating marginalized defendants in a degrading manner; non-inclusive 
practices in cafeteria offerings (not providing Halal or Kosher food) in schools or 
prisons (where going out or ordering in is not an option); allowing to display, or in 
other cases prohibiting religious symbols or clothing in certain public venues; or (in 
the light of American student-grievances) even not having trigger warnings and ‘safe 
spaces’ safeguarding from ‘microaggressions’ in the classroom.
5
 Intimidation in the 
educational context has also been claimed to be caused by instructors using slang or 
examples or exam questions that are unknown to students from certain 
socioeconomic or cultural backgrounds; holding office hours or scheduling significant 
                                                        
5
 These would include the prohibition of discriminatory language as well as hand gestures and 
other forms of intimidating disagreement. 
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learning opportunities or exams not only during religious holidays, but also at times 
commonly used for work-study jobs or athletic practice. 
It is not easy to distinguish these cases in a theoretically sound way from (ii), 
institutionalized discrimination that cannot be operationalized as harassment in the 
anti-discrimination legal logic and term. In some cases litigators would just either be 
in, or out of luck arguing for it. Harassment presupposes a certain litigable action, 
practice or behaviour which distinguishes it from ‘simple’ structural discrimination 
conceptually encoded in the workings of an institution. The more distant, indirect the 
attributable action and the general the harm will be, the more chances for a successful 
litigation will decrease. Also, it may be very difficult, sometimes even impossible to 
establish and measure personal harm caused by intimidation, fear and degradation. 
Hence, the following phenomena probably fall under the cluster of non-harassment 
institutional discrimination: the systematic under-qualification of hate crimes (when 
the investigation and the indictment is based on less serious charges); residential or 
educational segregation (including the case when Roma children are classified as 
students with special needs, or when standardized tests that are used for classification 
contain racial or ethno-cultural bias); the legal framework that engages in (racially 
discriminatory) gerrymandering and enables abuse (in the form of ethno-corruption) 
in electoral law (see, for example, Pap, 2017); the well-documented instances of the 
displacement of Roma children from their families to state care; when the organizers 
of academic events set up ‘manels’ (panels consisting only of males); the negative 
media representation of minorities, etc. The ever-long list of bias encoded in 
legislation, be it direct or embedded in terminology in a subtle way also belong here 
and to bring examples from a variety of jurisdictions, it can arguably include rules on 
jury selection; three-strikes- and drug laws; sentencing guidelines; custody decision 
patterns (including the accumulation of child support debts for incarcerated African 
American males); the cis-heterosexual conceptualization of marriage; citizenship laws 
irregularizing certain populations; the legal acceptance of prostitution; culturally biased 
public holiday-policies, etc. One may even bring here an insensitive approach in 
memory politics, the way how history in books is represented, or the lack of reflection 
on certain authors’ involvement with slavery, the holocaust, but also not renaming 
street names, college buildings, fraternities, sports clubs or removing monuments and 
statutes for similar reasons. The use of historical flags such as the American 
confederate (Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, 576 U.S. 
[2015]) or the Hungarian ‘Árpád stripes’ (reminiscent of the Hungarian Arrow Cross 
Party of 1944–45 and therefore having fascist connotations) can arguably be 
intimidating, offensive and degrading for certain groups of the population, but it would 
likely be difficult to litigate such cases. 
As for (iii), non-institutional discrimination harassment, here the criteria is that 
discrimination is committed by a particular action and not a general pattern or 
operational mechanism. Besides ‘classic’ sexual harassment or bullying, this could 
include the case one of my colleagues told me about, when a Roma plaintiff made a 
complaint for a hate crime and the police officer who recorded the complaint was 
wearing a T-shirt with the inscription of a music band that can be connected to 
extreme right organizations. I believe that the criterion for creating a humiliating, 
degrading environment was also fulfilled by the poster campaign of the Hungarian 
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government in 2015 against migrants – who were, in reality, mostly refugees and 
asylum seekers. 
The Handbook on European non-discrimination law, published by the EU’s 
Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) in 2018 brings a number of further examples 
(FRA, 2018: ch. 2.4). Such was the case before the Hungarian Equal Treatment 
Authority, where a complaint was made about teachers who threatened Roma 
students that their misbehaviour at school will be notified to the ‘Hungarian Guard’, a 
paramilitary far-right organization. It was found that the teachers had implicitly 
endorsed the racist views of the Guard and created a climate of fear and intimidation, 
amounting to harassment (EBH/654/2009, cf. FRA, 2018: 66–67). In 2012 the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights issued its judgment in the case of 
Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia (nos. 43370/04, 8252/05, and 18454/06) in 
a case concerning Moldovan nationals living in the Moldovan Republic of 
Transdniestria (MRT), a separatist entity that split from the Republic of Moldova in 
1990 but that has not been recognized by the international community, ruling for the 
applicants who claimed that the MRT’s prohibition of using Latin scripts in education, 
and allowing a systematic campaign of vandalism in the school, along with arresting 
and profiling protesting parents and threatening them with the loss of their jobs and 
parental rights amounted to a systematic campaign of harassment and intimidation of 
those participating in schools using Moldovan as the language of instruction. A 
separate, repeated discussion is needed to discuss (iv) the scenario where the legal 
term and concept of harassment is used to sanction behaviour that is not actually 
discrimination. 
 
3.2 Harassment and discrimination: overlapping but not interchangeable; 
bridging dignity, identity and equality claims 
 
The conceptual peculiarity of harassment is twofold. As described above it blends 
transgressions sanctioned by three different fields of law: criminal, anti-discrimination 
and employment law when employees face disciplinary proceedings based on 
allegations of (mostly, but not necessarily limited to) sexual harassment, following 
internal guidelines or policy decisions that are only indirectly connected to or based 
on legislative frameworks. 
The second uniqueness of harassment relates to the complexity of the 
relationship between identity, equality and dignity claims and policies, and the way in 
which law conceptualizes and merges the three (and this is also intertwined with the 
intricate relationship between identity recognition and identity politics: the politics of 
recognition targeting cultural and symbolic injustice and identity politics). This feature 
of harassment is an attributable to legislative developments pertaining to gender and 
sexual harassment in particular but there is no legal indication that it would not be a 
generally applicable feature of harassment irrespective of the ground (i.e. the 
protected personality trait or characteristic).  
Fraser (2000) shows how, at least in the case of gender, equality includes both 
recognition and redistribution (thus: equality) claims, and in political (and often legal) 
discourses (even concerning discrimination) there is a shift from equality to dignity, 
and, confusingly often also an uncritical, unreflected and unexplored blending of the 
two. What we actually see here is an interesting back-and-forth bouncing, rondo-like 
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recognition of these commitments. Since Catherine McKinnon’s (1979) seminal work 
in the 1970s, it has been widely recognized that that dignity harm can be 
conceptualized as a form of discrimination, and by the 1990s in Europe several 
legislative documents formally recognized and acknowledged this link, in particular in 
the context of gender based discrimination and sexual harassment. A 1991 
Recommendation by the European Commission on the protection of the dignity of 
women and men at work (Commission Recommendation 92/131/EEC of 27 
November 1991) held that  
sexual harassment means unwanted conduct of a sexual nature, or other 
conduct based on sex affecting the dignity of women and men at work. This can 
include unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct. […] It is 
unacceptable if such conduct is unwanted, unreasonable and offensive to the 
recipient; […] and/or […] creates an intimidating, hostile or humiliating working 
environment for the recipient. […] Sexual attention becomes sexual harassment 
if it is persisted in once it has been made clear that it is regarded by the 
recipient as offensive, although one incident of harassment may constitute 
sexual harassment if sufficiently serious. […] conduct of a sexual nature, or 
other conduct based on sex affecting the dignity of women and men at work, 
including conduct of superiors and colleagues, is unacceptable if […] creates an 
intimidating, hostile or humiliating work environment for the recipient; and that 
such conduct may, in certain circumstances, be contrary to the principle of 
equal treatment. 
 
As we can see, here the language links dignity harms with the concept of 
discrimination, although not unconditionally, as it uses terms like ‘can’ or ‘in certain 
circumstances.’ Nevertheless, the link and connection between dignity and equality, 
incentivized and inspired by sexual harassment legislation, has become a standard 
form discrimination for all protected characteristics. (Note that the cited EU law 
definition for racial harassment was only adopted in 2000).  
This subsection highlighted the first conceptual peculiarity of harassment: its 
extreme complexity. Not only does it include and blend sanctions from three different 
areas of law, but the harms it targets and aims to remedy are also very diverse and 
different.  
 
3.3 Harassment and subjectivity: inherent risks 
 
The other conceptual peculiarity of harassment concerns how it operationalizes 
subjectivity in legal conceptualization in a unique fashion. It is quite atypical, and 
certainly challenging for legal procedures to incorporate subjective feelings. While it is 
a powerful and empowering tool for victims and members of marginalized 
communities to seek remedies in regards of an intimidating and humiliating 
environment, without proper guidelines for legal standards and procedures, the 
reliance on subjectivity is not without risks. Hence, if a petitioner can assume standing, 
that is, a protected personality trait or characteristic in relation to which harassment 
charges can be brought (and for which in several instances of anti-discrimination 
legislation there is an open-ended list), it is a daunting task for the judiciary and 
equality bodies to set up standards and due process/fair trial guarantees. It can, 
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however, lead to lawlessness if there are no constraints to sanctioning based on 
declarations of feelings. 
For comparison, in asylum law, standards have been developed to ascertain and 
operationalize objective standards for ‘well founded-ness’ in its central concept of ‘well 
founded fear of persecution’ – on the basis of which refugee status should be granted. 
Here, there is an intricate system of ‘objective’, pre-established country-specific fear 
(that is: persecution)-factors, on the basis of which the subjective feeling of fear from 
persecution can be established. The asylum-seeker will make a claim and recipient 
authorities will carry out a validation procedure, first establishing whether the group in 
question is actually in danger of persecution, and second, whether the claimant is a 
member of the group. The production and reception of the refugee legal narrative is a 
complex phenomenon involving several narrators with sometimes conflicting stories 
and objectives (Zagor, 2014).  
Although the ‘hostile, intimidating environment’ conceptually relies on 
subjective standards, the law is not entirely silent on benchmarking. Referring to the 
case law of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal, the FRA Handbook sets forth 
that for a ‘conduct to be considered as harassment, it should be perceived as excessive 
and open to criticism for a reasonable observer of normal sensitivity and in the same 
situation’ (FRA, 2018: 65). This seems to introduce some sort of objective standards. 
However, the definition continues, and softens the criteria: ‘the harasser does not have 
to intend to discredit the victim or deliberately impair the latter’s working conditions. 
It is sufficient that such reprehensible conduct, provided that it was committed 
intentionally, led objectively to such consequences’, i.e. that the employer felt this 
way.
6
 According to the FRA, for harassment, ‘there is no need for a comparator to 
prove it, as harassment in itself is wrong because of the form it takes (verbal, non-
verbal or physical abuse) and the potential effect it may have (violating human dignity)’ 
(FRA, 2018: 66). This ‘potentially occurring effect’ unfortunately is an utterly vague 
description, not helping in crystallizing legal standards. 
Having shown general peculiarities of the legal conceptualization of harassment, 
and also having noted the particular role gender-based discrimination played in the 
development of its current understanding, the prevalence and relevance of the 
#MeToo movement calls for a separate discussion on sexual harassment. The reasons 
for this are twofold: (i) sexual harassment provides a vivid example of the legal and 
political dangers, inherent in the concept of harassment, which stems from the 
blending of criminal, labour and anti-discriminatory frameworks. It is (ii) also special 
in the sense that in certain fields, in particular in American higher education cases, 
legal practice has been quite controversial and (iii) academic, legal and political 
                                                        
6
 The European Union Civil Service Tribunal held for example that an appraisal of the 
performance of an official made by a supervisor, even if critical, cannot as such be classified as 
harassment. Negative comments addressed to a member of staff do not thereby undermine his 
personality, dignity or integrity where they are formulated in measured terms and are not based 
on allegations that are unfair and lacking any connection with objective facts. It has also held 
that the refusal of annual leave in order to ensure the proper functioning of the service cannot, 
as such, be regarded as a manifestation of psychological harassment. Case T-11/03, Afari v. 
ECB, ECLI:EU:T:2004:77 and Joined Cases F 106/13 and F 25/14, DD v. European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), ECLI:EU:F:2016:205, cf. FRA (2018: 140). 
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discussions on this arguable backlash along the #MeToo movement put sexual 
harassment in the frontline of public debates. 
 
3.4  Sexual harassment: From American higher education to the #MeToo 
movement 
 
Sexual harassment-related cases, be they legal or ‘political/ethical’, are often complex 
and multilayered in the sense that they may involve a form of sexual violence (that is 
unpermitted or unwelcomed physical advances), yet sexual harassment also includes 
scenarios in which verbal or other non-physical utterances create the intimidating, 
hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment. Thus, it involves at least two 
types of conduct: one that has always been illegal, amounting to even criminal 
sanctioning in the case of rape, sexual assault or coerced sex, but it may also include 
speech that in a relatively short period of time became socially and politically 
unacceptable. Verbal harassment creating an intimidating environment mostly came 
up in American higher educational contexts, and mostly pertaining to gender identity 
or sexual orientation, but also in the context of race in the public and legal discourse. 
As we will see, the line between law and politics is often blurred, as charges for sexual 
harassment – even if unsubstantiated or confirmed by judicial proceedings, or often 
even by a mere police investigation – are sufficient reasons to terminate employment 
contracts. This essay concerns primarily the legal aspect of harassment claims and 
sanctioning. However, ceasing contracts in the media, the art world or publishing (see, 
for example, Alter, 2018) over allegations (and not findings or judicial rulings), which 
are triggered to save the reputation of the employers may have legal relevance in 
adjacent, indirectly related litigation. Hence ‘political correctness’, and its 
manifestation in ‘cultural appropriation’, the shadow of harassment allegations, or the 
failure to prevent retaliation and to create ‘safe places’ will carry property interest.  
The case of American higher education is not discussed here because the 
author would believe that academia is the most important or pervasive context 
(although few professionals are fully exempt from cognitive biases when it comes to 
their field). The overall impact of the #MeToo movement in Hollywood, or even in 
politics is much higher and much more visible. Most of these cases are, however, 
extra-legal in the sense, that contracts are being cancelled, nominations are being 
withdrawn, resignations are handed in without formal legal procedures. The 
importance of higher education cases lies in the fact that here the endurance of law is 
tested within social, cultural and political developments. 
The legal, constitutional and policy ramification of sexual harassment 
procedures will therefore be intricate and robust. The following questions require 
special attention: 
First, there is a conceptual and terminological inconsistency in the legal 
provision of harassment as an anti-discrimination clause, which allows for melding 
verbal transgressions and minor, often culturally ambiguously coded physical advances 
with criminally sanctionable rape and sexual assault. Kipnis (2015a) points for 
example to the, in her account troubling, terminology of referring to rape victims as 
survivors, a term previously reserved for holocaust victims. Echoing her assessment of 
a ‘panicky conflation’ where ‘gropers become rapists’, Julia Hartley-Brewer underlines 
the dangers of generalizations concerning ‘rape culture’ which is ‘characterised by a 
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“continuum of abuse” – running from locker-room banter to gang rape’ (Various 
Authors, 2017). 
In general, there is an inherent difficulty in striking a balance between due 
process requirements for the accused (harassers) and narrowly tailored commitments 
to combat secondary victimization and the subsequent chilling effect of silencing and 
non-reporting (see, for example, Cortina and Berdahl, 2008). 
Second, as Dobbin and Kalev (2018) show, the adversarial, law-based formal 
grievance systems are most often intrinsically inadequate for sexual harassment, as 
victims do not trust the process, they fear social and job-related retaliation,
7
 and formal 
complaints actually rarely lead to the removal of the harasser and the victims will 
continue to coexist in the same space. Also, in many cases victims are not interested in 
severe sanctioning, they mostly want the practice to stop. However, the non-legal 
sanction-based ombuds-type mediation, which employers are incentivized to follow to 
avoid high profile, public procedures and costly lawsuits, run the risk of depriving 
victims of legal remedies by forced private arbitration procedures (see the IBM and 
Uber cases and Fowler, 2018). 
Third, in a certain specific environment, such as higher education, the location 
of the most visible and widely discussed harassment cases, there is an inherent conflict 
between aspirations for an intimidation-free safe place, and academic freedom: which, 
besides free speech being a fundamental constitutional value and an individual right, is 
also a specific professional, educational value. It is the core of the free speech doctrine 
in all jurisdictions that up to a certain degree, and here the margin of appreciation is 
usually quite broad, even offensive, shocking speech should not be censored and 
outlawed. The required degree of tolerance for artistic and political speech varies 
depending on the manner, time and place of the speech, and for the workplace the 
standards may very well be more stringent. There are also certain exceptional content-
based limitations on free speech: it is a habitual practice to introduce (even criminal) 
sanctions on holocaust-denial, blasphemy, or the violation of other, specific, 
historically rooted sensitivities concerning the dignity of certain communities. One 
may argue that such exceptional protections need to include verbal sexual (or other 
protected characteristic-based) harassment. At this point, however, no straightforward 
judicial or political declarations for this type of exceptionalism have been set forth. 
Since, as mentioned above, the field of American higher education is arguably a 
visible frontline for harassment (legal, or para-legal) cases it is important to provide an 
overview of the legal and socio-political landscape. American universities have become 
the social and political laboratory where the delicate interplay between legal and 
political/cultural responses to changing attitudes and social practices (i.e. political 
correctness and the emergence of calls for trigger warnings and safe places from 
‘microaggressions’ and other forms of cultural insensitivity) surfaces. University related 
harassment cases have received the greatest attention (not only from the media, but 
also in terms of legal practice), and arguably, produced controversial cases and trends, 
and this was intrinsically connected with debates on the ‘snowflake’ generation’s 
peculiar role in the commercialized educational sector. True, in the past years higher 
education culture developed hypersensitivity against any form of an unwelcoming or 
                                                        
7
 A US federal survey indicated that 66 per cent experienced it, see Dobbin and Kalev (2018), 
quoting Cortina and Magley (2003). 
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intimidating environment, going well beyond prohibiting discriminatory language and 
actions.
8 
The legal background for higher educational sexual harassment cases in the US 
is Title IX of the Civil Rights Act, which states that ‘no person in the United States 
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance’. Title IX defines sexual harassment as ‘unwelcome 
conduct of a sexual nature’ as long as the behaviour is serious enough to impact the 
victim’s access to educational opportunities by creating a hostile environment. Facing 
federal and civil penalties, schools are required to conduct a ‘prompt, thorough, and 
impartial’ investigation into any allegation of sexual assault reported on campus. Thus, 
an originally antidiscrimination provision, following the interpretation that such 
conduct may create a hostile environment was expanded to investigate sexual assaults, 
issues that may include criminal behaviour falling under the competence of the police. 
It is important to note that these cases will typically involve alleged actual physical 
contact of some sort (and go beyond non-verbal intimidation). 
The Office of Civil Rights (OCR) is the federal agency charged with enforcing 
federal antidiscrimination statutes, and in 2011, it issued an official correspondence 
(called Dear Colleague Letter (DCL)) regarding campus rape, which laid out the 
minimum grievance procedures by which schools must comply for cases involving 
sexual violence (Kirkpatrick, 2016).  
The DCL mandated that schools provide notice to students of the procedures 
and outcomes, perform adequate and impartial investigation into complaints, develop 
an equitable process in which parties have an equal opportunity to speak and present 
evidence, and ensure that the proceedings are facilitated by individuals who receive 
annual training on sexual violence issues. Other than these broad guidelines, the OCR 
fails to specify how schools should carry out these mandates. As a result, some schools 
are conducting such disciplinary hearings differently than others. (Kirkpatrick, 2016: 
165) 
As Kirkpatrick (2016: 165) points out, out of the nineteen-page document, a 
mere two sentences address due process rights for the accused. ‘The document even 
urges that steps to afford due process rights to the accused should not restrict or delay 
protections for the Complainant’ and ‘strongly discourages institutions from allowing 
the accused to cross-examine the complainant.’ Failing to comply, universities risk 
losing federal funding. Generally discouraging to pay too much attention to the due 
process rights of the accused, the DCL set forth the so called ‘preponderance of the 
evidence standard,’ used in civil cases, requiring (50.01 per cent certainty) to resolve 
sexual assault accusations. Using a higher burden of proof, such as a clear and 
convincing evidence standard, applied in criminal cases, the schools arguably would 
                                                        
8
 See for example accounts of Laura Kipnis arguing that feminism became hijacked by 
melodrama and students are committed to vulnerability and conditioned to infantilization, and 
that they have no agency in what happens to them, and anyone with a grudge, a political 
agenda, or a desire for attention can easily leverage the system. She argues that now emotional 
discomfort is regarded as equivalent to material injury (to be remediated) and the climate on 
campuses is so accusatory and sanctimonious and chilling that open conversations are 
practically impossible (Kipnis, 2015a; 2015b; 2017). 
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be in violation of Title IX. A typical hearing process may end in expelling students 
and firing professors, and as interim measures banning from campus (if they were 
living there, forcing them to move) and suspension (with or without pay). The 
disciplinary process is otherwise the same ‘that governs alleged violations of university 
codes of conduct, such as the plagiarism of a term paper or the theft of a roommate’s 
belongings’ (Kirkpatrick, 2016: 166). Most operate like courts, using a panel of 
decision makers who hear and weigh evidence, determine the facts, and decide 
sanctions. There is extensive but contradictory judicial practice on these procedures 
(following litigation contesting school decisions): universities are under no clear 
obligation to allow the accused to have legal counsel present, although they usually 
allow a fellow faculty member (called faculty counsel) to be present, and there is also 
no legal requirement to inform the accused students or faculty of the specific charges 
or the discovery of any evidence, and the right to cross-examine witnesses or the 
complainant is also not provided (Kirkpatrick, 2016: 167). 
Kirkpatrick (2016: 167) shows how, ‘courts even differ as to whether or not 
hearing committee members need to recuse themselves if they are familiar with the 
accused or complainant and have a conflict of interest’.
9
 In a typical sexual assault 
hearing, the university will first send notice of the charge to the accused and ask him 
or her to respond. The accused (and maybe but not always complainant) will then 
appear before a panel akin to a jury, which is typically comprised of disinterested 
tenured professors, sometimes along with students, faculty, and staff.  
Panels often use the same Title IX coordinator as investigator, prosecutor, 
defender, jury, and judge. […] In addition, the panels are made up of university 
employees who most likely have an innate interest in the claims […], as 
acquitting the accused student carries with it the threat of OCR costing colleges 
over half a billion dollars in federal funding. (Kirkpatrick, 2016: 172) 
 
Appeal is not always available, but most often there is a fairness hearing review 
committee, the decision of which then can be appealed to the President, and then 
Board of Trustees (but only) for procedural errors. 
It is a twist that in several cases faculty members can actually be sanctioned for 
retaliation, even if it merely involves an academic commentary on a case, be it even a 
mere tweet (see, for example, Smith 2003). Laura Kipnis of Northwestern University 
provides a broadly cited documentary of what she labels as a witch hunt against her by 
‘allowing intellectual disagreement to be redefined as retaliation’ (in particular 
attending disgraced philosophy professor Peter Ludlow’s dismissal hearing) (Kipnis, 
2015a; 2015b; 2017). 
In sum, students and professors can be expelled (with very slim chances or re-
employed in or able to transfer to another institution) without even a police report 
ever filed, by a committee the members of which are not impartial (due to their 
position) and actually lack any formal training in dealing with sexual misconduct, 
                                                        
9
 Citing, for example, Osteen v. Henley, 13 F. 3d 221 (7th Cir. 1993), Winnick v. Manning, 
460 R. 2d 545, 549 (2nd Cir. 1972), Dillon v. Pulaski County Special School District, 468 F. 
Supp. 54 (8th Cir. 2009). 
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effects of alcohol or even law (Kirkpatrick, 2016).
10
 And these judgments are passed 
not (only) for engaging in alleged physical interaction, but also for a mere 
commentary. Here and by this, the more general concept and conceptualization of 
harassment is revisited. 
In 2018 the Trump-administration projected that the 6000 colleges and 
universities conduct an average of 1.18, and the 17000 elementary and secondary 
schools 3.23 sexual harassment investigations annually (Green, 2018b). The 
Department of Education foreclosed a proposal to redefine federally regulated sexual 
harassment narrowing it down to ‘unwelcome conduct on the basis of sex that is so 
severe, pervasive and objectively offensive that it denies a person access to the school’s 
education program or activity.’ The proposed rules would hold schools accountable 
only for formal complaints filed and for conduct said to have occurred on campus, 
and a higher legal standard to determine whether schools improperly addressed 
complaints would also be allowed, leaving it in the schools’ discretion to choose 
between ‘preponderance of evidence’ or ‘clear and convincing’ evidentiary standards. 
Secretary DeVos actually rescinded the 2011 DCL, assailing the guidelines as federal 
overreach that coerced schools into setting up quasi-judicial systems fraught with 
inconsistencies. The proposed rules would expand the accused perpetrators’ right to 
use mediation, request evidence and cross-examine.
11
 
It should be noted that the peculiarity of the higher education cases is not 
independent from how the business interests in this highly lucrative enterprise, where 
students are customers and consumer satisfaction is paramount, and avoiding 
classroom friction with unpopular is an existential necessity for adjuncts, instructors, 
and part-time faculty with renewable contracts, who make up a majority of teaching 
staff (Kipnis, 2015a). 
The alarming feature of the American cases is how the application of the 
(essentially legal) concept of harassment is applied in an extra-legal arena in 
terminating contracts, ending careers, etc. without due process findings and 
investigations by competent authorities. And this is where we revisit the terrain of 
politics in the (social) mediatized world, where social progress is often blurred by 
reductionism, and moral panic.  
Lídia Balogh (2017), for example, demonstrates how the European Parliament 
resolution of 26 October 2017 on combating sexual harassment and abuse in the EU 
(2017/2897(RSP)) provides a continental case for the moral panic-induced conceptual 
and terminological chaos: first, the European Parliament throughout the text 
repeatedly uncritically bundles non-criminal conduct such as harassment and other 
forms of discrimination, with rape, physical violence, forced marriage, female genital 
mutilation and honour crimes. Sexual harassment and sexual abuse are identified as 
forms of gender-based violence. Furthermore, as if a grievance competition would be 
at place, sexual harassment is identified as ‘the most extreme […] form of gender-
                                                        
10
 It also needs to be added that ‘[e]ven though most of these cases involve the voluntary 
consumption of alcohol, the accused male may not use it as a defense whereas the female 
complainant can escape scrutiny from it’ (Kirkpatrick, 2016: 164). 
11
 Cf. Green (2018a): ‘The Obama administration […] strongly discouraged parties from 
personally questioning each other during hearings, believing it would be “traumatic or 
intimidating, thereby possibly escalating or perpetuating a hostile environment”.’ 
 
HARASSMENT: A SILVER BULLET TO TACKLE INSTITUTIONAL DISCRIMINATION 31 
 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 5(2): 11-35.  
based discrimination.’ Also, the resolution indiscriminately ‘Welcomes initiatives such 
as the #MeToo movement that aim to report cases of sexual harassment and violence 
against women; strongly supports all the women and girls who have participated in the 
campaign, including those who denounced their perpetrators.’ Besides endorsing an 
informal movement (lacking identifiable agents) this unselective support for all women 
making accusations, in principle includes even fraudulent, malevolent ones, and 
hence, arguably is problematic. 
On a final note on sexual harassment and #MeToo, the occasional 
controversial use, or even as some argue, abuse in relation of sexual harassment can 
and should be seen as a necessary side effect or externality of the massive shift in how 
gender equality, gender roles, and the contours of social interaction changes in 
Western societies, which includes the recognition and rejection of certain deep 
running particular behavioural patterns.  
The detailed discussion of American sexual harassment cases in this article is 
prompted by several reasons. First, since sexual harassment (and this is the main 
message of the #MeToo movement) is so pervasive and systematic in many facets of 
the workplace that it may actually amount to institutional discrimination. Second, the 
#MeToo movement, as well as the arguable backlashes seem to dominate, if not 
monopolize public discussion and actually shifted attention from other areas of 
workplace related harassment. A third reason lies in the fact that although there are no 
reports of, or systemic fair trial concerns have been raised regarding harassment-
related legal practice applied with regard to other protected characteristics, there is no 
conceptual or textual gag rule that would limit potential backlashes to sexual 
harassment.  
Summing up this section, harassment is an exceptionally complex and 
multifaceted legal concept. It may be added, its uniqueness may prove to be its 
weakness as well, as it may potentially be self-limiting. If there are other feasible 
alternatives such as direct or indirect discrimination to build the cases on, it will be 
easier for counsels to argue their case in front of a judge – especially in continental 
jurisdictions, with less room for judicial activism and savour for abstract, theoretical 
argumentations. Although the above described institutional discrimination-targeting 
harassment cases are remarkable, and I believe in a global export-potential, we need 
to be aware of its limitations. Apparently, institutional discrimination is an important 
analytical category, but due to its theoretical and doctrinal complexity, its application 
in public policy planning is likely to be more successful than in human rights litigation. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
To conclude: harassment is a truly unique legal concept which binds dignity, equality 
and identity claims in a complex and unique fashion, encompassing sanctions for 
criminal, discriminatory and employment law transgressions, and conceptualizing and 
operationalizing subjectivity in a singular fashion. The article showed that the concept 
is no panacea for all forms of social injustice, and has several technical and conceptual 
limitations. However, the occasional controversial legal practice of sexual harassment 
(where fair trial procedures potentially lack guarantees) should not blind and 
monopolize discussion on this multifaceted analytic concept and a legal term, which 
can work as a unique tool to combat institutional discrimination in regards of a broad 
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range of protected characteristics in the legal, as well as the broader, political and 
cultural sense. While the #MeToo movement provides a vivid example for the latter, 
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The article analyses discursive and practical activities by governmental 
and non-governmental actors in Russia and Ukraine aimed at the 
conceptualization and promotion of human equality on ethnic 
grounds as non-discrimination. The author aims at analyzing the 
reasons why anti-discrimination instruments are in low demand vis-à-
vis concerns about ethnic xenophobia and conflicts. The author 
argues that the given societies have limited incentives and institutional 
capabilities for the creation and effective application of anti-
discrimination mechanisms. The ruling elites have no reason to 
regard ethnic inequalities as a challenge; civil society activists and 
ordinary claimants might not treat non-discrimination as an efficient 
remedy; and there is no commonly accepted image of injustice in 
inter-group relations. Moreover, the marginality of anti-discrimination 
agenda in the post-Soviet space begs questions about the said 
mechanisms’ universal applicability, since the latter require pre-
conditions that are not guaranteed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Expressions like ‘human equality’ persist in all international human rights instruments 
and national legislative frameworks. The character, scale and consequences of related 
problems and responses to them vary and thus deserve a region-specific analysis. This 
article addresses the so-called post-Soviet space which can be defined as all former 
constituent republics of the USSR except for the Baltic States, which are not the 
Soviet Union’s successor states under international law. Most post-Soviet countries 
have an ethnically diverse population; many have experienced violent ethnic conflict 
and have a record of ethnicity-based exclusionary and discriminatory practices. The 
post-Soviet space is also of special interest for other reasons. Social equality in general 
and, in particular, on ethnic grounds was a key element in official rhetoric throughout 
the period of communist rule, and nationalities policy for decades was aimed at the 
equalization of social conditions for different ethnicities as well as the suppression of 
ethnic hostilities. Therefore, equality agendas that have been developed over decades 
in a specific way must not be alien to the elites and common citizenry of post-Soviet 
countries. 
The questions addressed below are about how and by whom issues of equality 
are raised and handled in the region as an agenda of (non)discrimination. The term 
‘agenda’ is understood in a narrow sense as discursive and practical activities aimed at 
the conceptualization and promotion of human equality on ethnic grounds. Equality 
can be approached from different perspectives, and this article concerns one of the 
major frames for the conceptual and institutional organization of equality protection 
and promotion; that is, the prevention and elimination of discrimination. 
The article rests on two case-studies and concerns Russia and Ukraine, thereby 
facilitating comprehension of the major features of equality agendas in the aftermath 
of the Soviet Union’s breakdown. Russia and Ukraine are the biggest successor states 
of the USSR in terms of population size, and they have a relatively large proportion of 
ethnic minorities. Russia has an authoritarian and increasingly repressive regime, while 
Ukraine is a pluralist (albeit unconsolidated) democracy. While Russia is gradually 
reducing its cooperation with international and European organizations and 
denouncing its international obligations, Ukraine is striving to confirm its pro-
European choice in the framework of an Association Agreement and through 
institutional reforms aimed at rapprochement with the EU, including the development 
of an anti-discrimination framework. 
The study is of a multi-disciplinary character; it strives to combine a normative 
analysis of the respective domestic constitutional and legal provisions of the countries 
in question with policy analysis of initiatives and actions of public and private actors 
that deal with ethnic issues. The study addresses the identification and consideration 
of the major modes of problematizing the issues of ethnic discrimination, related 
institutional settings, and policy patterns. The empirical basis of the study is the 
author’s analysis of legal norms, case-law, official statements, and documents of civil 
society organizations from the year 2000 onwards in Russia and Ukraine. The start of 
the 21st century was a clear landmark in terms of the anti-discrimination agenda in 
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Europe and worldwide. The 2000 EU Equality Directives
1
 and preparations for the 
World Conference against Racism (2001) mobilized civil society organizations and 
provided an impetus for professional discussions in the countries in question. 
Discriminatory practices and claims of discrimination as such are not 
scrutinized in this article. It is assumed here that there are legitimate reasons for 
concern about inequalities on ethnic grounds in both countries, and the issue 
addressed here are those activities aimed at the amelioration of the situation. There is 
routine discrimination in the labor market, education and housing against stigmatized 
groups: basically Roma and people originating from the Caucasus, Central Asia and 
other countries of Asia and Africa. A specific problem is the ethnic profiling practiced 
by law-enforcement (see CRI(2019)2, paras. 92–97). In Russia after 2000 the state 
authorities resorted several times to persecution campaigns against certain groups at 
the national and regional level (such as Georgians, the Meskhetian Turks, Tadjiks and 
Chechens) (Compliance, 2008). 
 
2. Methodological remarks 
 
In theory, there can be many ways to conceptualize equality in general and equality on 
ethnic grounds in particular. A variety of answers may be given to the questions who 
may be compared with whom, according to what criteria certain kinds of treatment or 
social asymmetries are assessed as illegitimate, and what goals and pro-equality 
measures are deemed acceptable (Fredman, 2002: 7–15; Nikolaidis, 2015: 9–49). 
One of the dominant approaches employed and proliferated worldwide rests on the 
notion of discrimination. 
One can barely talk about a comprehensive and consistent doctrine of non-
discrimination; rather, there is a frame with an evolving content. ‘Frame’ is understood 
here as a ‘scattered conceptualization’ (Entman, 1993: 51), or a way to contextualize 
certain social phenomena and to define their primary characteristics in public 
communication (Benford and Snow, 2000). The fundamental premise can be 
denoted as the justicization of inequality; in other words, the basis is judging and 
overcoming social inequalities by legal means. The framework includes several basic 
theoretical postulates and respective practical approaches (Bell, 2009; Ellis and 
Watson, 2005): 
(1) Direct discrimination; i.e. unequal treatment of individuals on certain 
grounds in a similar position without justification must be prohibited. 
(2) Indirect discrimination; i.e. equal treatment of people in different positions 
which causes a respectively worse outcome for a certain category of individuals and 
which is devoid of reasonable justification must be outlawed and stopped by legal 
means. 
(3) Public authorities must prevent, stop and eradicate discriminatory practices 
by both public and private persons in public life. 
                                                        
1
 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June, 2000 implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin; Council Directive 
2000/78/EC of 27 November, 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation. 
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(4) Victims of discrimination must be entitled to contest the latter by legal 
means, to get redress and compensation. 
(5) Since victims of discrimination are usually in a weaker social position than 
the alleged perpetrators, the standards of proof must be lowered, and the burden of 
proof shifted from the claimant to the defendant. 
(6) For overcoming discriminatory practices and their outcomes, public 
authorities may undertake special measures, including those that place former victims 
of discrimination or their descendants in a more favorable position. 
 
Post-WWII international human rights instruments provide only a very general 
and vague framework (Winant, 2006). The conceptual and practical guidelines for 
non-discrimination have been elaborated at the domestic level, primarily in the US, 
and they largely reflect the background situation, challenges and institutional designs 
of this country. This approach has been expanding to international organizations and 
other parts of the world. 
An important stage in this proliferation was the acceptance of the core ideas 
and techniques by the European Union and their transposition first to acquis 
communautaire and then to the domestic legislations of member and candidate states 
(Bell, 2009; Ellis and Watson, 2005; Schiek and Chege, 2008). The 2000 Equality 
Directives have been transposed into the national legislations of all member and 
candidate states; the EU has leverage (its Neighbourhood Policy including Association 
Agreements) regarding transplanting the mechanisms to the Union’s eastern 
neighbors. The Council of Europe also contributes to this process (for more, see 
McCrudden and Kountouros, 2007; Nikolaidis, 2015). 
Techniques and institutional solutions in individual countries designed for 
tackling inequalities vary, and include the definition of discriminatory grounds; the 
objectives of anti-discriminatory measures (the prevention of discriminatory treatment, 
the provision of equality of opportunities or redress of past injustices); their scope; the 
degree of state intervention; the forms of perpetrators’ liability; the attitude towards 
intention to commit discriminatory acts; and the scope and forms of positive action. 
General global trends are the placement of focus on substantive equality (equality of 
opportunities or outcomes) instead of formal equality (equal treatment); lowering of 
the standards of proof and the shift of the burden of proof to the defendant; and 
general acceptance of state interventionism and social engineering as necessary 
conditions for reversing the production of social discrepancies. 
A problem is that the notion of discrimination has procedural and material 
dimensions. Discrimination serves as a system of presumptions and indicators that 
allows for the resolution of a dispute about fair or unfair treatment by legal means. 
Along with this, discrimination is often regarded as a conception for modeling certain 
social relationships; respectively, it prompts simplistic explanations of social 
asymmetries as outcomes of certain kinds of treatment linked to certain ascriptive 
characteristics of the treated individuals or social entities. Meanwhile, social 
stratification is caused by numerous factors, and the correlations between social 
disparities and ethnic or racial categorizations cannot be easily and effectively 
comprehended and tackled. The uneven distribution of social capital and the freedom 
of choice that people enjoy in their interactions cannot be totally overcome or 
eliminated either by individual complaints or state intervention. The anti-
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discriminatory frame generates an important output, which is an ideology that seeks to 
interpret all disparities and asymmetric interactions between people belonging to 
different racial or ethnic categories as overall relations of subjugation between 
‘dominant’ and ‘subordinate’ groups (Bonilla-Silva, 2006; Feagin and Hernan, 1995; 
Winant, 2006). 
In the post-Soviet space there is another frame of equality on ethnic grounds 
that was generated by Soviet rule also within a modernist approach to nationhood and 
ethnic diversity. The Soviet approach is also not a comprehensive doctrine, and unlike 
non-discrimination, it was never fully and consistently embedded either in 
constitutional and legal provisions nor the programmatic documents of the ruling 
communist party. Party declarations, official ideological commentaries and the real 
practices of government demonstrate the contours and content of this approach. It 
rested on the idea of state social engineering pursued for building communism and 
thus for creating a manageable and modernized society that shared a common supra-
ethnic ‘Soviet’ identity (Connor, 1984: 214–216). 
The promotion of equality on ethnic grounds was necessary, first, for 
overcoming past distrust of non-Russian peoples towards the Russian majority, and 
thus for securing minorities’ loyalty towards Soviet rule. Second, the equality of social 
conditions for different regions and peoples was a prerequisite for the modernization 
and economic development of the country, as well as for forming a loyal population 
with common cultural habits and skills (Martin, 2001: 1–177). In sum, the real 
equality policies comprised a limited and inconsistent symbolic recognition of 
ethnicities’ equality and the policies of socio-economic and cultural transformations 
aimed, inter alia, at the equalization of different ethnicities’ social parameters. Among 
the tools of governance were the fight against incitement of hatred or enmity partly 
through criminal law, and the suppression of all unauthorized activities on ethnic 
grounds by a variety of means. 
One can note that both frames – both anti-discriminatory and Soviet – had 
much in common. They combine recognition of individual and group dimensions of 
equality; they lead to the recognition of structural inequalities as a problem; and they 
ultimately require state action. However, their translation into practice requires certain 
preconditions that do not necessarily exist. For the anti-discriminatory frame, these are 
the availability of active claimants ready to contest unfair treatment by legal means; 
competent and effective judiciary and/or independent anti-discriminatory bodies; and 
the government’s ability and capacity to pursue policies aimed at overcoming 
disparities. The ‘Soviet’ approach needs only the latter – the resources and political 
will for social engineering. 
In theory, the anti-discrimination normative framework, as the experience of 
individual countries shows, can generate three kinds of practices that constitute the 
anti-discrimination agenda. Two belong to the domain of so-called ‘instrumental,’ and 
one to the domain of ‘symbolic’ politics; in brief, the difference between the two 
categories is that the first one generates a direct ‘resource’ effect, while the latter has 
an ‘interpretative’ one (Schneider and Ingram, 2008: 207). The first practice is the 
readiness of public institutions to acknowledge the problem of discrimination and to 
tackle it through interventions by legal, administrative and judicial means. The second 
one is the mobilization of law, or the readiness of people who consider themselves the 
victims to contest en masse the alleged violation of equality as discrimination through 
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legal mechanisms. The third one is the recognition of inequality as a problem that 
permeates the entire society and that can be interpreted as the complex relationships 
between the ‘dominant’ and ‘subjugated’ ethnic or racial groups. In other words, 
ethnic categories are deemed social entities and the correlations between ethnic 
divisions and access to social resources as a kind of class struggle. The question about 
the acceptance of the anti-discrimination agenda in a given society can be decomposed 
into separate questions about the existence of the three kinds of practices listed above. 
While the first one relates to top-down state action, the second one (mobilization of 
law) concerns bottom-up activities; the third one is about the discursive patterns that 
stimulate and legitimize the first two kinds of practices and that can be developed on 
both a bottom-up and top-down basis. 
 
3. Top-down approach 
 
This section concerns law-making, implementation practices and policy measures. 
The basics in Russia and Ukraine look alike. The constitutions contain general 
provisions on equality using an open-ended list of grounds. Both countries are parties 
to the major relevant international – universal and European – human rights 
instruments. Sectoral legislation contains general provisions about equality before the 
law and even the prohibition of discrimination. In both countries, discrimination is 




Article 19, part 1 of the 1993 Constitution provides that ‘all people shall be equal 
before the law and court’, while Article 19, part 2 guarantees the equality of rights and 
freedoms of man and prohibits limitations of human rights on social, racial, national, 
linguistic, or religious grounds. 
A number of sectoral laws also contain equal rights provisions and prohibit 
discrimination; however, no piece of legislation contains a definition of discrimination 
and distinguishes between direct and indirect discrimination as well as other forms of 
the latter. The legislation contains no other relevant definitions (such as the subject, 
burden, and standards of proof) and no adequate procedural provisions. 
Consequently, civil jurisprudence about discrimination exists, but it is ineffective, 
limited in scope and unrelated to ethnicity or language (Osipov, 2012: 103–104; 
Smirnova, 2008: 90–121; Valtseva, 2018). 
Article 136 of the Criminal Code establishes liability for discrimination and 
defines the latter as ‘violation of rights, liberties, and legitimate interests’ using an 
open-ended list of grounds. Only a few cases had been commenced under this 
provision until 2011, and none related to ethnic discrimination. According to the 
official statistics, no criminal cases have been commenced over the last few years 
(Ovsyannikov, 2019). Since 2011, only organized discrimination by an official has 
been a criminal offence, while private discrimination constitutes an administrative 
misdemeanor (Art. 5.62 of the Code of Administrative Violations). Twenty-four cases 
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were commenced under this article and finalized throughout 2017, and fourteen in 
the first six months of 2018; reportedly, all concerned discriminatory advertisements.
2
 
One specific feature of Russia’s approach is the existence of a special law, the 
Act ‘On Countering Extremist Activities’, adopted in 2002. It offers a broad approach 
to defining ‘extremism’ and ‘extremist activities’ (both terms are used as full 
synonyms); the notion is introduced not by definition but by a list of manifestations 
that range from terrorism to intolerant statements. The notion of ‘extremism’ since 
July 2006 has also included discrimination, as this is defined in Article 136 of the 
Criminal Code; however, this provision of the anti-extremist law remains inactive. 
Anti-extremist legislation is extensively enforced, but it does not in fact concern cases 
of non-violent discrimination (Osipov, 2012: 119–120; Verkhovski, 2018: 18–55). 
Some cases invoking Article 19 of the Constitution have been considered by 
the Constitutional Court. None involved race or ethnicity; a few of them concerned 
inequality on the grounds of language. The most significant ones concerned the use of 
state languages in the republics within Russia along with Russian (Prina, 2016: 84–87). 
In 2004, the Constitutional Court upheld the compulsory teaching of the republican 
state languages along with Russian but made a reservation that the said teaching should 
not be detrimental to the equal opportunities of pupils.
3
 Later on, in 2009, the 
Supreme Court for the same reason declined a claim for permission to pass the 
‘uniform state examination’ (school graduation tests) in languages other than Russian.
4
 
The Strategy of the State Nationalities Policy of the Russian Federation until 
2025
5
 – the major official doctrinal document in the area of ethnic relations – contains 
numerous references to equality and non-discrimination. The promotion of equality 
on a variety of grounds is referred to among the goals (item 17) and equal rights along 
with the prevention of discrimination among the principles of the state nationalities 
policy (item 19) in both versions of the document. The provision of equal rights and 
the prevention of discrimination in the functioning of public bodies drifted from the 
objectives (item 21) to the main directions of the state nationalities policy in the course 
                                                        
2
 According to statistical data from the Juridical Department under the Supreme Court of the 
Russian Federation; see No. 1-AP ‘Svodnye statisticheskiye svedeniya o deyatelnosti federalnyh 
sudov obshey yurisdiktsii i mirovyh sudey za 2017 god. Otchet o rabote sudov obshey 
yurisdiktsii po rassmotreniyu del ob administrativnyh pravonarusheniyah’ (Joint statistical data 
about the activities of the federal courts of general jurisdiction and magistrate courts for 2017. 
A report about the work of courts of general jurisdiction on the consideration of cases on 
administrative violations), available at: http://www.cdep.ru/index.php?id=79&item=4476; No. 
1-AP ‘Svodnye statisticheskiye svedeniya o deyatelnosti federalnyh sudov obshey yurisdiktsii i 
mirovyh sudey za pervoye polugodiye 2018 goda. Otchet o rabote sudov obshey yurisdiktsii po 
rassmotreniyu del ob administrativnyh pravonarusheniyah’ (Joint statistical data about the 
activities of the federal courts of general jurisdiction and magistrate courts for the first half of 
2018. A report about the work of courts of general jurisdiction on the consideration of cases 
on administrative violations), available at: http://www.cdep.ru/index.php?id=79&item=4758. 
3
 Constitutional Court Judgment No. 16-P of 16.11.2004; available at: 
http://doc.ksrf.ru/decision/KSRFDecision30404.pdf (in Russian). 
4
 Supreme Court Judgment No. GKPI09-317 of 21.04.2009; available at: 
http://vsrf.ru/stor_pdf.php?id=261508 (in Russian). 
5
 Adopted by Presidential Decree No. 1666 of 19.12.2012; updated by Presidential Decree 
No. 703 of 06.12.2018. 
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of the strategy’s update in 2018. However, the Strategy does not specify the 
mechanisms and public bodies in charge of anti-discrimination measures; the only 
indicator mentioned in the version from 2018 is the percentage of people who in 
surveys acknowledge no discrimination against themselves (item 34). The Strategy is a 
document of programmatic character and is not directly enforceable. Russian 
Government Order No. 2985-R from 28 December, 2018 ‘On the plan for realization 
of the Strategy of State Nationalities Policy in 2019–2021’ as well as earlier similar 
plans envisage only the monitoring of individual complaints and mass-media 
publications about violations of equality on a variety of grounds and assign this 
monitoring to the Federal Agency of Nationalities Affairs. The Agency has no special 
unit for equality issues and has publicized no information about its activities 
concerning non-discrimination. 
In theory, public prosecutors and executive authorities responsible for the 
supervision of consumer protection, housing, labor relations and advertising can take 
measures against discriminatory treatment, but the former interfere in only a few 
exceptional cases usually concerning discriminatory commercials. Officials as a rule 
do not speak out about the issue of discrimination and inequality in public. Finally, 
there are no programs for the promotion of equal opportunities. 
Over the last few years there has been only one legislative initiative that 
concerned ethnic discrimination; this was an amendment to the Labor Code that 






The 1996 Constitution declares the equality of all people in their dignity and rights 
(Article 21) and guarantees equal fundamental rights and freedoms as well as the 
equality of citizens before the law irrespective of their ‘race, color of skin, political, 
religious and other affiliations, gender, ethnic and social origin, wealth, place of 
residence, linguistic and other characteristics’ (Article 24). Most codes and numerous 
laws stipulate the principle of non-discrimination and contain a ban on the violation of 
equality of rights and/or the prohibition of discrimination. 
Article 161 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine addresses the violation of equality 
based on race, ethnicity or attitude to religion. However, like the old Soviet criminal 
codes it combines in one provision the liability for the incitement of ‘national, racial of 
religious feud and hatred’ and ‘direct or indirect restriction of rights or granting direct 
or indirect preferences to citizens.’ Regarding this, there are no complete and accurate 
statistics; according to different sources, article 161 is applied rarely in general, and 
never with regard to discrimination. According to the data obtained by the Advisory 
Committee on the Framework Convention on National Minorities, the number of 
prosecutions rose from two in 2012 to 79 in 2015, while the number of convictions in 
which a hate motive was proven reached two in 2014 and three in 2015 
(ACFC/OP/IV(2017)002, 2018: item 85). The annual report of the Ukrainian 
Ombudsperson for 2017 reports that about 95 criminal cases involving the motive of 
hate were opened throughout the year, but only four were submitted to courts 
(Tshorichna, 2018: 517–518). 
                                                        
6
 Federal Act No. 162-FZ of 02.07.2013. 
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Ukraine is different from most post-Soviet countries including Russia because it 
has a comprehensive law against discrimination. Act No.5207-VI ‘On the Principles of 
Preventing and Combating Discrimination in Ukraine’ was adopted on 6 September, 
2012 and significantly amended by Act No.1263-VII of 13 May 2014. Adoption of the 
anti-discriminatory law was a requirement of the EU in the course of drafting the Visa 
Liberalisation Agreement (EU–Ukraine, 2010); similar conditions were also defined 
for Moldova and Georgia which also sought visa-free entry into the Schengen area for 
their citizens and association with the EU. Moldova and Ukraine adopted laws against 
discrimination in 2012 and Georgia in 2014. All three laws follow the EU model of 
anti-discriminatory legislation. 
In particular, the Ukrainian law prohibits direct and indirect discrimination on 
an open-ended list of grounds which includes race, skin color, ethnic and social origin; 
defines the scope of this prohibition and exempting positive measures; and defines the 
competences and obligations of public bodies in the area of prevention and 
elimination of discrimination. An important novelty was the shift in the burden of 
proof to the defendant in the 2014 amendments to the Anti-Discrimination Act and to 
the Civil Procedural Code. Individuals can bring complaints regarding discrimination 
before courts, administrative bodies and the independent equality body, and 
respectively claim redress. The law does not outline the procedure for redressing 
pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage. 
The independent equality body and in fact the only public body implementing 
the law is the Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsperson). The 
Commissioner is authorized to overview the general implementation of anti-
discrimination law, provide expert conclusions, take legal action in cases of 
discrimination in order to safeguard the public interest, and consider individual 
complaints. However, decisions from the Ombudsperson about individual complaints 
are not obligatory. 
In the year 2013, the Secretariat of the Commissioner received 2,051 petitions 
related to discrimination; of these, four complaints concerned race and color of skin; 
42 ethnic or national origin, and 17 belonging to national minorities; 91 complaints 
were about the use of languages, including five specifically related to the use of the 
Ukrainian language (Tshorichna, 2014: 375). Further, the number of petitions 
decreased, so that in 2014 the Secretariat of the Commissioner received and 
examined 496 complaints about discrimination and the violation of rights of national 
or religious minorities; 49 associated with race and ethnicity, and 57 language 
(Tshorichna, 2015: 272–273). In 2017, there were 373 complaints related to 
discrimination and minority issues; 37 of them concerned race and ethnicity, and 
seven language (Tshorichna, 2018: 510, 532). In 2018, out of 616 complaints 43 were 
about skin color or ethnic origin; the report for 2018 contains no data about language 
(Tshorichna, 2019: 100, 104–105). The content of most cases involving ethnicity or 
language is not disclosed; most pertain to access to service, and none had public 
repercussions. 
The only governmental program that can be deemed a positive or special 
measure is the ‘Strategy for Protection and Integration of Roma National Minority 
into Ukrainian Society till 2020’ adopted by Presidential Decree No.201/2013 of 8 
April 2013. The Program basically aims to facilitate cultural activities and 
informational campaigns and does not concern discrimination per se. Moreover, it 
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has been criticized by international institutions (the ODIHR) and civil society 
organizations as ineffective and non-transparent (ODIHR, 2014: 5). 
 
4. Bottom-up approach 
 
This section addresses the activities of civil societies in both countries. The anti-
discrimination framework can be workable if there are people who take legal action or 
bring complaints in the pursuit of their interests related to the safeguarding of equality. 
Organized civil society can facilitate such motions and also formulate public needs 




There are no statistics concerning individual legal actions or other motions (such as 
complaints about discrimination to administrative bodies, public prosecution or 
ombudspersons). The official judicial database
7
 shows that over recent years individual 
plaintiffs have increasingly often employed the term ‘discrimination’ in claims 
concerning employment and labor relations, given that the Labour Code interprets 
discrimination very broadly as any distinction unrelated to the person’s working skills. 
Anecdotal evidence from human rights organizations reveals that the number of cases 
actually involving treatment based on certain ascriptive characteristics or group 
belonging is low (less than 10 complaints per year throughout the country). Almost all 
concern discrimination on grounds other than ethnicity (usually gender, trade union 
activism, sexual orientation, or religion), and in almost all cases courts have dismissed 
such claims of discrimination (Valtseva, 2018). 
The European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) was 
informed by the Russian Ombudsman’s office that the Ombudsman had received 
around 200 complaints related to discrimination on all grounds in 2013–2017 (27 in 
2017) (CRI(2019)2, para. 12); however, this testimony is not supported by other 
sources, and there is no information about the content and outcomes of these 
disputes. The bottom-up mobilization of law more often manifests itself in sporadic 
complaints (or denunciations) submitted to the public prosecutor about discriminatory 
commercials or media publications; however, there are neither statistics not 
estimations of the number of such motions. 
Another indication is the difficulties that public interest NGOs encounter when 
they want to engage in strategic litigation against discrimination on any possible 
grounds. Respectively, individuals seek support for action against discrimination from 
human rights organizations in exceptional cases. On the surface, the problem is that 
potential claimants regard such problems as insignificant, resolve them informally, or 
seek to defend their violated rights (for example, desiring protection from illegal 
criminal persecution) when the contestation of discrimination appears to be 
inadequate. 
                                                        
7
 Gosudarstvennaya Avtomatizirovannya Systema Rossiiskoy Federatsii ‘Pravosudiye’ (The 
State Automated System of the Russian Federation ‘Justice’); available at https://bsr.sudrf.ru. 
The system contains descriptions of individual cases and does not allow for disaggregation by 
types of claim. 
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There are numerous ethnicity-based organizations across Russia, only a few of 
which refer in their charters or programmatic statements to the protection and 
promotion of equality among their goals. The charters of leading ethnicity-based 
organizations contain references to the protection of the rights of persons belonging to 
the respective groups, but not to the fight against discrimination or for equality. Such 
provision is lacking even in the charter of the Federal National Cultural Autonomy of 
Roma – the leading Russian Roma NGO.
8
 The Charter of the Federal Jewish National 
Cultural Autonomy refers to the promotion of tolerance and inter-ethnic dialogue.
9
 
There are very few organizations of labor migrants, and the only salient one – the 
Federation of Migrants, a government-orchestrated NGO – also does not have such a 
provision in its documents.
10
 
There are virtually no examples of ethnic organizations’ motions for equality 
and against discrimination except for several specific cases. First, the multi-ethnic 
republics of North Caucasus (Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia and 
Dagestan) have informal power-sharing agreements, and their alleged violation 
repeatedly invokes protest. For example, the Congress of the Karachai People – a civil 
society organization that stands for the representation of ethnic Karachais that 
represent 41 per cent of the population in the Karachaevo-Cherkessian Republic 
(KCR) – in June 2018 issued statements and petitions and claimed the alleged 
violation of ethnic proportionality in administrative appointments (Kongress, 2018). 
Another case involves the individual and collective protests against the 
compulsory teaching of state languages other than Russian in the republics of Russia. 
One of the key arguments of individual claimants and initiative groups in Tatarstan 
was that this teaching was done at the expense of other school subjects and provided 
pupils in the republic with a poorer quality education and was thus discriminatory. As 
mentioned above, this argument was partly endorsed in 2004 by the Constitutional 
Court of the Russian Federation and in 2009 by the Supreme Court. From a broader 
perspective, safeguarding formal equality is increasingly used by the state as 
justification for dismantling minority protection or special measures (Prina, 2016). 
Some non-ethnic human rights organizations which defend vulnerable groups 
or pursue public interests related to fundamental rights have addressed the issue of 
discrimination, including its ethnic component. This job has been done by small 
professional organizations to a large extent inspired by the opportunity to be part of an 
international movement against discrimination and to obtain foreign funding (for an 
overview see Osipov, 2012: 111–112). Leading NGOs such as the Human Rights 
Centre ‘Memorial’ (Moscow), the Anti-Discrimination Centre ‘Memorial’ (Saint 
Petersburg) and the Moscow Helsinki Group in the early 2000s had separate 
programs or projects about ethnic discrimination. The Moscow-based Centre for 
Social and Labor Rights addresses discrimination on various grounds in employment 
and occupation.
11
 All attempts to select promising individual complaints and to launch 
strategic litigation actually failed because the number of potential applicants was few, 
most required protection from ethnic violence, and most cases were lost for formal 
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reasons. The non-governmental association ‘Lawyers for Constitutional Rights and 
Freedoms’ (JURIX) in 2003–2011 had an educational program and, together with 
Open Society Institute, conducted research on ethnic profiling practices by the police 
in Moscow (Open Society Institute, 2006). A coalition against racial discrimination 
was also established under the aegis of the Moscow-based Centre for the 
Development of Democracy and Human Rights in 2000, and resumed in 2003. The 
coalition attracted a low level of public interest and failed to involve ethnic NGOs in 
its activities. Increasing pressure on independent civil society organizations after 2011 
led to the closure of JURIX and the relocation of the Anti-Discrimination Centre 
‘Memorial’ from Russia; the other organizations, under pressure and obliged to 
register themselves as ‘foreign agents,’ have had to change their priorities and basically 




Ukraine has more opportunities for civil society activity, having relatively advanced 
anti-discrimination legal and institutional frameworks and a lack of state pressure on 
human rights activists (or at least a much lower degree of such pressure than in 
Russia). An important indicator of bottom-up initiatives is the number of people that 
apply to the Ombudsperson. As mentioned above, complaints about discrimination 
on ethnic or linguistic grounds constitute no more than 12 per cent of the total 
number, but the amount has oscillated and has generally not grown over the years. 
However, the number of such complaints is much higher than in Russia. 
In other respects, the situation is largely not different from the Russian one. 
Minority organizations in Ukraine also neglect the issue of equality and discrimination 
in their founding documents and statements. Exceptions are also few, and most are 
related to the demands of some organizations that represent the Russian-speaking 
population for linguistic Ukrainization to be stopped, and ideally to grant the Russian 
language official status. After 2014, when the war against Russia and the separatist 
enclaves also backed by Russia broke out, the claims and other politicized activities of 
Russian minority organizations almost ceased (Equal Rights Trust, 2015: 158–159). 
Minority organizations usually express their concerns and demands in terms of 
minority rights without resorting to the language of equality. An important recent case 
was the adoption of the new Education Act in September 2017
12
 which drastically 
restricted the use of minority languages in the school system and thus brought the 
issue of equality back to the table. Most minority organizations maintained their 
silence, but some (mostly Hungarian ones) assessed the law as undermining the equal 
access of minorities to education (see, for instance, Transcarpathian, 2018). The 
government also justified the language provision by highlighting the need to secure the 
equality of opportunities for school graduates (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). 
However, these statements have not led to any meaningful discussions among policy-
makers and experts. 
Numerous NGOs are working against discrimination through counseling, 
monitoring and awareness-raising. All of the former are non-ethnic organizations; 
                                                        
12
 Zakon Uktaiiny No. 2145-VIII ‘Pro osvitu’ (The Law of Ukraine ‘On Education’) of 5 
September 2017. 
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most are highly professional, funded by European or American organizations, and 
oriented around international and European standards and guidelines. Since 2011, 
Ukraine has had an NGO Coalition Against Discrimination.
13
 This seeks to 
coordinate activities against discrimination on all grounds and comprises mostly non-
ethnic human rights organizations. 
 
5. Substitute and additional perspectives 
 
The issues of discrimination and, even more broadly, of equal rights and 
opportunities, are being replaced by an adjacent topic – that is, aggression on ethnic 
grounds. The call to counteract xenophobia, hate speech and hate crime is strong 
both in Russia and Ukraine, and from authorities and the general public. This is not a 
surprise since manifestations of enmity are visible, and both countries have a record of 
mob violence. In both countries ethnic minority NGOs and experts dealing with 
ethnic relations are prioritizing the issues of xenophobia and putting forward the 
promotion of tolerance and intercultural dialogue as a remedy. The dynamics in the 
two countries are, however, different. 
Russia has established an effective repressive machinery that has cracked down 
on all organized radical groups and persecutes all unauthorized activities resembling 
the fuelling of ethnic, religious or social tensions. The country has a package of ‘anti-
extremist’ legislation that is grounded in the 2002 Anti-extremism Act (with 
subsequent amendments). The package includes several articles of the Criminal Code: 
Article 282 defines liability for the incitement of hatred or enmity and the abasement 
of dignity on an unlimited variety of grounds; other articles criminalize participation in 
‘extremist’ organizations and appeals to ‘extremist’ activities. Moreover, the 
administrative legislation defines liability for the demonstration of Nazi symbols and 
establishes simple procedures for closing down or fining NGOs or media outlets; 
websites can be blocked without a court decision. This anti-extremist legislation is 
widely used to intimidate actual or potential opponents of the regime (CRI(2019)2, 
paras. 44–52; Verkhovsky, 2018: 38–92). Over the last few years, the number of 
criminal cases and sentences handed down for posts and reposts in social networking 
services that pose no threat to public order has steadily grown (Robinson, 2018). 
While in 2011, 82 people were found guilty, in 2014 the number had increased to 
258, and in 2017 to 460. The number of those sentenced under part 2 of the same 
article (that establishes liability for the incitement of enmity involving violence) has 
decreased: in 2011 there were 35 people, in 2014 nine, and in 2017, one (Human 
Rights Council, 2018). Since 2011, media publications and internet posts that raise the 
issue of ethnic discrimination have increasingly been qualified as ‘extremism.’ For 
example, 30-year-old Lidiya Bainova, a Khakass activist from Abakan (the Republic of 
Khakassia in Eastern Siberia), was accused of appeals to extremist activities in July 
2018 for publishing a post in which she emotionally wrote about the practices of daily 
xenophobia and discrimination against the Khakass people (Natsional'ny aktsent, 
2018). 
In December 2018, part 1 of Article 282 of the Criminal Code was redrafted, 
introducing administrative prejudice for the incitement of enmity. Criminal 
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prosecution for the deeds previously falling within the scope of this article is now 
possible only after at least one administrative conviction under the new article (20.31) 
of the Code of Administrative Violations (which penalizes the same deeds) within the 
preceding calendar year. The amendments have significantly decreased the number of 
criminal cases under Art. 282 and led to the gradual revocation of previously 
commenced cases or reversals of convictions, including that of Bainova. 
Although the excessive enforcement of ‘anti-extremist’ legislation is subject to 
growing criticism (Human Rights Council, 2018), NGOs and experts who deal with 
ethnic relations prioritize the issues of hate crime and xenophobia; almost all use the 
language of ‘counteraction to extremism’ and ‘intercultural dialogue.’ Ethnic NGOs in 
their public statements as a rule swear allegiance to the fight against ‘extremism’; a 
large part of the activity of ethnic NGOs, particularly that carried out using public 
money, aims at ‘intercultural dialogue’ or at least is rationalized as such. 
As mentioned above, Article 161 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code which 
penalizes both violations of equality and incitement of hatred, is applied to a limited 
degree. The insufficient ability of the police to prosecute radical nationalist 
propaganda and vandalism is routinely criticized by minority NGOs, human rights 
organizations, and even the Ombudsperson (Alternative, 2016; Tshorichna, 2016: 
153–155; 2018: 533–534; 2019: 105–107). Respectively, minority NGOs neglect 
issues of equality; their positive agenda is confined to cultural projects and the 
promotion of tolerance. Notably, Russia was in a similar situation before the mid-
2000s when the state started using anti-extremist legislation as a convenient repressive 
device, first against radical nationalists and then against all potential opponents. Russia 
has been pioneering the use of anti-extremist legislation; several other post-Soviet 
countries (including Belarus, Moldova and Kazakhstan) have pieces of anti-extremism 
legislation that generally follow the Russian example (Verkhovsky, 2016: 63–72); 
however, they are not enforced as extensively as in Russia. Ukraine adopted an ‘anti-
extremist’ package with major repressive potential in January 2014, but this was 
rescinded after the former president Yanukovich’s escape one month later. 
Another issue that deserves attention is the third kind of practice within the 
anti-discrimination framework. This is discourse based on the interpretation of 
discrimination as structural disadvantage or the subjugation of certain vulnerable 
groups vis-à-vis others. Surprisingly enough, these considerations in favor of either 
minorities or the majority are marginal both in Russia and Ukraine. Generally, the 
idea of the majority’s vulnerability in the face of minorities which ‘enjoy unfair 
privileges’ persists in majority nationalist discourse in Eastern Europe (Brubaker, 
2011). In Russia, only individual ideologies associated with Russian nationalism have 
occasionally tried to develop this argument (Delyagin, 2007), but these attempts have 
had no repercussions. Some Ukrainian nationalist ideologists argue in a similar way 
that state power has an ‘anti-national’ character, but these ideas have not evolved into 
consistent and detailed claims. A growing number of publicists are developing the idea 
of Ukrainians’ vulnerability and subjugation under a situation of Russian linguistic and 
cultural dominance (see, for instance, Ryabchuk, 2011; Yakimenko, 2017). 
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6. How much can one expect from the anti-discrimination agenda? 
 
At first glance, the expression of Peter Rutland, ‘the presence of absence’ (Rutland, 
2010), borrowed from Soviet bureaucratic jargon, matches this situation quite well. 
Those elements that fit the definitions of the anti-discrimination agenda are marginal 
in both countries, and the demand for non-discrimination has been stimulated by 
external actors. One may assume that the reasons for this must pertain both to the 
specific post-Soviet conditions and to the general applicability of anti-discrimination 
approaches. 
In Russia, pieces of legislation pertinent to non-discrimination are virtually not 
employed, while legislative provisions and executive programs for the promotion of 
equality do not exist. There have been no new legislative and political initiatives in this 
area (except for the 2013 amendments prohibiting discriminatory advertisements). 
Prior to the crackdown on independent civil society organizations, there were projects 
related to non-discrimination and equality based on ethnic grounds. These were 
carried out by a few professional NGOs using money from Western donors and had a 
tenuous public effect. 
For Ukraine, the major external factor is EU conditionality leverage. This was 
the reason for the adoption of the anti-discrimination law and for its subsequent 
implementation. The promoters of the equality agenda are the equality unit within the 
Ombudsperson’s office, involving limited staff, and several professional NGOs which 
are striving to use European legal and policy guidelines and are funded by Western 
donors. A limited number of complaints about ethnic discrimination are brought 
before the Ombudsperson and courts, and there are a number of civil society projects 
and initiatives. However, the issues of human equality are not at the top of public 
agendas, and ethnic discrimination appears to be a marginal issue even against this 
background. A sign of this is the non-involvement of ethnic activists in activities aimed 
at the protection of equality. 
On the other hand, the public authorities in both countries as well as legal 
professionals and civil society activists are aware of the notion of discrimination, or 
this information is easily accessible whenever necessary. In both countries the term 
‘discrimination’ is present in legislation, and to a limited extent in jurisprudence; 
‘discrimination’ is referred to in the major doctrinal official document on ethnic policy 
in Russia, while Ukraine has a comprehensive act against discrimination. Civil society 
activists in both countries have been running awareness-raising and advocacy projects; 
the issue is discussed by legal professionals. 
Ukraine has conditions more favorable for the development of an anti-
discrimination agenda because it is a competitive democracy and can benefit from 
EU-led conditionality policy, while Russia has an authoritarian regime, suppresses 
independent civil society, and limits international cooperation. Nevertheless, the 
visibility and effect of an anti-discrimination agenda are comparable in both countries. 
Several dozen complaints about ethnic discrimination go through the 
Ombudsperson’s office and courts per year in Ukraine, while in Russia the available 
sources report that there are fewer individual motions that address the courts, 
executive authorities, public prosecution and the federal ombudsperson. Notably, 
ethnicity-based civil society organizations in both Russia and Ukraine basically neglect 
the anti-discrimination agenda. Both public authorities and civil society at large 
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prioritize other issues, such as the fight against hate speech and projects aimed at the 
promotion of ethnic tolerance. 
One can say that the anti-discrimination agenda in Ukraine has occupied small 
niches of its own in the human rights movement and public ethnic policy, but in no 
domain does it generate a significant effect. Although Russia lacks the institutional 
settings available in Ukraine, the impact of the anti-discrimination agenda is 
comparable. 
Do the post-Soviet countries differ from other parts of Europe because of their 
Soviet legacy? There are few traces of a Soviet legacy in the promotion of equality on 
ethnic grounds, and these manifest themselves in official rhetoric but not in the state’s 
instrumental policies. Moreover, the difference between Russia and Ukraine, on the 
one hand, and Central-Eastern European countries, on the other, is not drastic. The 
former communist countries west of the post-Soviet space and the Baltic States have 
become EU members; therefore, they have a comprehensive anti-discrimination legal 
and institutional framework that includes independent equality bodies easily accessible 
to potential claimants. However, the number of individual complaints made on ethnic 
or racial grounds remains low and lags behind the number of complaints and suits 
presented on other grounds. 
For example, in 2017 the Hungarian Equal Treatment Authority processed 
1,423 submissions on all prohibited grounds; of these, the Authority found 
infringements in 33 cases, while only four were on the grounds of belonging to a 
national minority (Equal Treatment Authority, 2018: 11). The Slovak National Centre 
for Human Rights in 2017 investigated four cases of discrimination, of them in two 
established discrimination (both on the grounds of ethnicity or race) (Annual, 2018: 
9). The Polish Commissioner for Human Rights in its annual report for 2017 referred 
to only one case of ethnic discrimination, which had been under investigation since 
2015 (Summary, 2018: 18–19). 
Other countries of continental Europe that have no communist experience 
generally demonstrate more significant outcomes. For example, in 2017 the Danish 
Board of Equal Treatment received 294 complaints, of which 44 were related to race 
and ethnic origin (CERD/C/DNK/22-24, 2019: para. 255). However, ethnicity-based 
organizations in Europe do not prioritize anti-discrimination goals and rarely resort to 
the respective legal instruments or launch anti-discrimination campaigns. Notably, the 
scale of anti-discrimination activities may be much larger in another social context. For 
example, the number of complaints on the grounds of race, national origin and skin 
color to only the federal Equal Employment Opportunities Commission in the US in 
2017 constituted (respectively) 31,027, 9,438 and 2,833 (Charge Statistics, n.d.).  
This situation may be deemed surprising if we regard the frame of anti-
discrimination as universally applicable and instrumental in all national environments. 
If we discard this assumption, everything falls into place. 
The ruling elite and civil society must invest in anti-discrimination mechanisms 
if they have a compelling interest in overcoming disparities or segregation patterns that 
threaten social stability and governmentality. For most countries in continental 
Europe, including Russia and Ukraine, this is not the case. The other incentive can be 
external pressure, such as the conditionality policy of the EU. The need for 
compliance with external standards, as the recent history of most EU member states 
and neighbors bound by conditionality – such as Ukraine – shows, might be sufficient 
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for adopting anti-discrimination legislation, but barely for its consistent implement-
tation. 
From another perspective, bottom-up action against discrimination may not 
always be the most effective process for an individual claimant seeking to resolve a 
certain dispute. Bringing a case against discrimination in court may be a complex and 
time-consuming undertaking; a complaint to an independent anti-discrimination body 
in Europe is highly likely to bring about no satisfactory outcome since such bodies 
often do not have enforceable powers (as in Ukraine). 
When there is no commonly recognizable image of a victimized category that 
needs protective measures, and moreover, when the major stakeholders are not ready 
to accept the very idea of ethnic relations as intergroup domination and subjugation, 
the moral incentives for both state action from above and juridical activism from 
below will not be strong enough. On the contrary, the visibility of ethnic enmity and 
the experience of ethnic conflict push the issues of conflict prevention and violent 




Both Russia and Ukraine are lacking conditions for the three kinds of recurrent and 
large-scale practices which constitute the anti-discrimination agenda: namely, state 
action, judicial activism, and the widely accepted discourse surrounding illegitimate 
intergroup subjugation. The ruling political and intellectual elites in both countries 
have no compelling interest in dismantling a ‘color line’ (like in the US) and 
integrating a segregated society because these issues do not pose a problem. 
‘Traditional’ ethnic minorities are not basically suppressed and excluded (or such 
perceptions are not mainstreamed), and the issues of equality are regarded rather as 
the symbolic recognition or competition of public narratives than the oppression of 
individuals because of their ascriptive characteristics. In both countries, the state has 
no incentive nor resources for social engineering involving the equalization of social 
conditions. The state apparatus views the issues of immigration as problems of 
administrative control and integration in terms of immigrants’ cultural and linguistic 
competences rather than of their rights and social opportunities (Karpenko, 2016). 
The agenda of security and the prevention of violence takes priority and is framed as 
‘countering extremism,’ or ‘the promotion of civic unity’ overshadows and replaces 
equality and non-discrimination. The dominant reaction of the general public to 
sporadic news about individual cases of ethnic discrimination is confidence that 
private persons including landlords, employers and entrepreneurs have full and 
unlimited discretion in selecting customers or contracting counterparts.
14
 
On the other side, anti-discrimination goals and mechanisms (in the shape 
promoted by the EU and other international actors) provide weak incentives and 
limited opportunities for individuals and civil society organizations. Action against 
discrimination is time-consuming and does not lead to results that can usually satisfy 
claimants. In part, this can be explained by the state of national legislation, the 
                                                        
14
 A good illustration of this are the comments on a Facebook post of famous economist 
Andrei Movchan about a discriminatory commercial (May 19, 2018); see https://bit.ly/2RJQilX 
(in Russian). 
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executive and the judiciary (i.e., the lack of some legal institutions, the insufficient 
competences of judges and law-enforcement officials), and the doubtful effectiveness 
of the entire system in the eyes of ordinary people. It is easier for individuals to 
protect a certain violated right, or to resolve an issue informally, or to disengage, 
rather than to make a claim for the recognition of discrimination, and at best receive a 
tiny amount of compensation for moral damages (Valtseva, 2018). 
However, these conditions are not unique to the post-Soviet states; they are 
present in most other post-Soviet countries, as the effectiveness of their anti-
discrimination mechanisms demonstrates. The comparison between Russia and 
Ukraine is telling inasmuch as a democratic political regime does not play a crucial 
role in the development of anti-discrimination agenda: the outcomes in authoritarian 
Russia and democratic Ukraine are comparable, albeit Ukraine has achieved more. In 
both countries, the issues of discrimination are raised and addressed in practical terms 
but on rare occasions; thus, non-discrimination occupies its own niche, but it is far 
from playing any significant role in human rights advocacy and ethnic politics. 
It turns out that both for the governments and civil society organizations, the 
major incentive and resource is external pressure, including moral and financial 
support from international institutions that are working on the issue of discrimination; 
when this support is cut off (as in Russia), domestic anti-discriminatory activities fade 
away. 
Post-Soviet political and social systems can be characterized as neo-
patrimonialist (Gel’man, 2016; Hale, 2007) in the sense that people pursue life 
strategies through working towards their inclusion into patronal relationship and 
clientele networks. The search for such inclusion and respective privileges is a more 
effective solution than picking fights about equality for ideological reasons through 
ineffective formal institutions. These considerations also apply to ethnicity-based civil 
society organizations that usually prioritize cultural projects and seek good relations 
with the public authorities of their host states. For these purposes, human rights 
activities may be counterproductive. Many minority NGOs are interested in operating 
a range of businesses with their kin-states, and their priority is to avoid all that can be 
detrimental to cross-border cooperation. 
One can list other specific circumstances that negatively affect potential anti-
discrimination initiatives. Among these are the lack of resources available for civil 
society organizations; the policies of repression, control and co-optation aimed at civil 
society in Russia (and other post-Soviet authoritarian regimes); as well as the 
‘nationalizing’ policies (such as in Ukraine) that push the state of ethnic minorities to 
the margins of public attention. Besides these issues, post-Soviet societies generally 
elevate concerns about security and stability to the top; this is a reason why the ‘fight 
against extremism’ and ‘inter-cultural dialogue’ preclude concern about equality 
issues. 
Spontaneous processes of social stratification are unlikely to be stopped or 
reversed by judicial or administrative means without deep state interference in market 
mechanisms and the curtailment of the freedom of contracts. Moreover, the anti-
discrimination agenda might bring about such by-products as an anti-racist ideology, 
meaning the interpretation of statistical inequalities as inter-group relations of 
oppression and subjugation. A similar argument occasionally employed by majority 
nationalists is not yet being developed and still remains marginal in both Russia and 
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Ukraine. The post-Soviet countries are still staying free of this conflict-prone idea; in 
part because of the claims of Soviet ideologists that structural inequalities had been 
overcome long ago.  
To sum up, an anti-discrimination framework requires too many societal 
prerequisites which are not always available. Anti-discrimination also needs strong 
ideological motivation; i.e., a common belief in structural inequalities and group 
subjugation that must be overcome; this presumption is not always obvious and taken 
for granted. However, the propositions made above are not written to deny the 
instrumental value of anti-discrimination law, which must have its own niche. On the 
contrary, a set of specific presumptions and procedural rules that are fine-tuned in 
accordance with the social context must serve as effective tools for resolving certain 
kinds of disputes about equality. 
The question why the agenda of non-discrimination on ethnic grounds is non-
existent or marginal in the post-Soviet space should be reformulated and split into 
several other ones. Is there in principle a coherent approach that is effectively 
applicable worldwide? Are there reasons to expect that there must always be domestic 
demand for ethnic equality? Shall such demands for justice on ethnocultural grounds 
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As early as 1995, Nancy Fraser problematized the shift of justice 
claims from redistribution towards recognition (Fraser, 1995). Since 
then, this shift has proven even more pronounced, displacing 
redistribution claims and reiterating identities (Fraser, 2000). At the 
same time, we can see how recognition claims in the form of identity 
politics became overall present in the social justice activism of the 
Anglo-Saxon countries, stirring heated controversies there, not only 
from the Right, but from Marxist, liberal and feminist points of view, 
too. On the European continent, these debates take the form of 
mostly right-wing movements mobilizing against ‘gender ideology’ and 
‘political correctness’, portrayed as imminent danger coming from the 
US and/or the West.  
In my paper I critically engage with the widespread matrix of 
visualizing political positions and fault lines as being on two axes: 
economic (left and right) and cultural (liberal and authoritarian), and 
discuss why placing the attitudes towards ‘oppressed minorities’ on the 
cultural axis cuts the related issues from their embeddedness in 
material conditions. I point out that the cultural axes, the recognition 
shift, and the human rights paradigm type of articulation of injustices 
are going into the same direction, namely a culturalist interpretation of 
oppressions. Empirically based on the controversies around the 
Istanbul Convention (2017) and the Gender Studies MA programs 
(2017-2018) in Hungary and theoretically on Fraser’s concept of 
‘perspectivic dualism’ as outlined in her debate with Axel Honneth 
(Fraser and Honneth, 2003), I argue that this culturalist interpretation 
both of prevailing injustices and of the right-wing contestations actually 
reinforces the cultural war framework of the Right rather than 
overcoming it. 
 
Keywords: anti-gender movements, gender studies, human rights, redistribution, recognition, Nancy 
Fraser.
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 This article is a translated and expanded version of an article I originally wrote in Hungarian, ‘Az 
igazságosság dilemmái a kultúrharcok korában’ published in the social theory online journal Új 
Egyenlőség, January 9, 2018. http://ujegyenloseg.hu/az-igazsagossag-dilemmai-a-kulturharcok-koraban/ 
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1. Introduction 
 
Political scientists and analysts often attempt to represent the spectrum of values of 
competing parties and voters using a two-dimensional coordinate system.
2
 On the one 
hand, the horizontal right-to-left axis of the so-called political compass represents 
economic issues and the positions taken up with respect to the desirable degree of 
state involvement. On the other hand, the vertical axis represents cultural and social 
issues along a conservative/liberal (or authoritarian/libertarian) split.
3
 Positions with 
respect to human rights and the rights of minorities are represented on the vertical 
axis, as if there were a spectrum ranging from oppression to freedom, and more 
enlightenment and openness were equivalent to stronger recognition of human rights. 
In this two-axis coordinate system, attitudes to women and gay issues are also 
represented on the vertical axis in the form of a scale of values whereby more 
engagement with equal rights means more recognition of the idea that women and 
men, as well as gays and heterosexuals, are equal. In the following, I will argue that this 
approach is equivalent, from a political science perspective, to what Nancy Fraser calls 
a ‘recognition shift’; namely, ‘the struggle for recognition […] becoming the 
paradigmatic form of political conflict’ in the struggle for justice (1995), including in 
the feminist movement (Fraser, 2009: 108).
4
 With the help of some of Fraser’s 
writings, I aim to demonstrate how this approach to justice, by detaching issues 
identified as being cultural, such as gender equality, from the economic axis, amplifies 
the current misleading and hysterical culture war rhetoric that frames these issues of 
justice as a clash of values between progressives and conservatives. In other words, I 
will argue that the fact that the political Right carries out attacks against what they call 
‘human rights fundamentalism’ or ‘gender ideology’ must not be interpreted simply as 
the political instrumentalization of so-called ‘medieval attitudes’ such as the sexism 
and homophobia that prevail in society, or the reaction of ‘white heterosexual males’ 
trying to defend their status. I will argue that, instead, the recognition shift itself, 
positing human rights as the panacea, has contributed to making perceived or real 
consensuses with respect to human rights vulnerable. My aim is to identify several of 
the reasons behind the popularity of the increasingly authoritarian and hate-mongering 
Right – which requires, in my view, critical scrutiny of the progressive agenda and 
language too.  
As we know, since the beginning of the 2010s several European countries have 
seen the rise of conservative and, in part, fundamentalist social movements that rail 
against the perceived threat of ‘gender ideology’ (or ‘gender theory’), ‘political 
correctness’ and ‘human rights fundamentalism’002E Being opposed to women’s 
                                                        
2
 See, e.g., https://www.politicalcompass.org/, or any different version of the site. 
3
 There is abundant literature in political science about the usefulness of this metaphorical approach 
concerning whether it contributes to a better understanding or rather obfuscates important aspects of 
political space. The dimensionality approach being an illustrative example for introducing my 
recognition/redistribution framework, the paper will not go into details about this epistemological and 
methodological debate (see Benoit and Laver, 2012). 
4
 ‘With this shift “from redistribution to recognition” came powerful pressures to transform second-wave 
feminism into a variant of identity politics. A progressive variant, to be sure, but one that tended 
nevertheless to overextend the critique of culture, while downplaying the critique of political economy. In 
practice, the tendency was to subordinate social-economic struggles to struggles for recognition, while in 
the academy, feminist cultural theory began to eclipse feminist social theory’ (Fraser 2009: 108). 
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reproductive rights, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) issues, 
certain administrative policy instruments (such as gender mainstreaming), as well as 
the public financing of gender studies programs, the advocates of these platforms tend 
to depict all political and non-governmental actors, administrative staff, and scientific 
researchers who focus on these issues as a single homogeneous group and an 
organized lobby. This claim partly manifests in grassroots or religiously affiliated 
movements and partly on the agendas of right-wing and populist parties in opposition 
or in government  The simultaneity of the movements, the different triggers in 
countries that differ with respect to political landscape, as well as to gender and LGBT 
policies, indicate that rather than dealing with isolated cases, we are witnessing a 
transnational phenomenon (Hark and Villa, 2015; Kováts and Põim, 2015; Kuhar and 
Paternotte, 2017). Civic, religious, or political-party-affiliated mobilizations against 
‘gender ideology’, ‘political correctness’, or ‘human rights fundamentalism’ are 
frequently understood as a conservative backlash against the achievements related to 
and further progress towards equality between women and men and LGBTQ rights. 
Adopting this perspective of ‘the patriarchy/heteronormativity fighting back’ seems as 
tempting as it is simplifying. 
My paper pursues the goal of expanding my former attempt to refute this 
culturalist interpretation (Kováts, 2018), demonstrating that this interpretation itself 
comes from this very ‘recognition turn’ and I propose, relying on Fraser’s concept of 
‘perspectival dualism’, a potential way to help us escape the false dichotomy of 
interpreting the phenomenon as being for or against equality, and for or against 
human rights. 
The paper proceeds as follows: First, I will describe the ambiguity of the 
concept of gender which is necessary for understanding the following empirical 
material from Hungary, and which moreover illustrates the recognition and 
individualistic turn. Then I describe the Hungarian case: the attacks of the Hungarian 
government on the Istanbul Convention (2017) and Gender Studies MA programs 
(2017–2018). Given the transnational character of the phenomenon,
5
 it cannot be 
explained by national factors only, thus I hope the Hungarian case study will shed light 
on several developments outside Hungary as well. Finally, I recall Fraser’s relevant 
concepts, connect them to the human rights vocabulary, and using them try to give an 
alternative theoretical explanation for the phenomenon of ‘the Right’s attacks on 
human rights’. 
 
2. The polysemy of the concept of gender6 
 
‘If a gender quota is necessary for party lists, then what if I identify as a woman – can I 
run then for a woman’s place? And what happens if I identify as one of those plenty 
of other genders?’ – A male politician from the right-wing opposition party Jobbik 
provocatively asked me this question once, and with this theme we arrived at one of 
the favorite topics of the Right when it comes to women’s rights and gender equality. 
                                                        
5
 This transnational character has been described in the edited volumes I refer to. 
6
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The contradiction raised by the politician points to the fact that the gender definition 
of policy quotas differs from the one necessary for addressing trans and genderqueer 
people’s political claims. 
The controversy around gender is therefore further complicated in relation to 
other human rights issues by the fact that there are different definitions of gender in 
use in policy-making and in social justice activism, born at different times and 
grounded on different ideological bases, partly disconnected from debates within 
gender studies, and partly contradicting each other. 
First, in the English-speaking context, ‘gender’ is widely substituted for 
biological sex in order to avoid associations with sexual intercourse; this started with 
laws about discrimination, now widespread (Case, 1995). For instance, when we speak 
about gender quotas, what is meant is the male-female ratio. The interchangeable use 
of the two terms is exemplified in a debate about the Trump administration’s plan to 
define ‘gender as a biological, immutable condition.’ Some commentators claimed 
that this was a deliberate, ideology-driven attempt to conflate the two terms.
7
 
Second, the term has come to refer to women: e.g., gender analysis in policy-
making is often used to describe how measures affect women – and less, as originally 
intended, gender relations; i.e., the societal relations between men and women. 
Third, it is applied as an analytical category to describe the social quality of 
distinctions based on sex, the power structures in a given society between men and 
women, and the roles, possibilities and constraints in society attributed to being born 
male or female. Such is the gender definition contained in the Istanbul Convention: 
3.c) ‘“gender” shall mean the socially constructed roles, behaviors, activities and 
attributes that a given society considers appropriate for women and men’; and 3.d) 
‘“gender‐based violence against women” shall mean violence that is directed against a 
woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately.’
8
 
Fourth, many use it in trans and genderqueer scholarship and activism to mean 
gender identity: a person’s felt sense of identity (Green, 2006: 247), meaning 
identification (or lack of the former) with being born male or female. This is 
evidenced by the expression ‘gender assigned at birth’ to refer to the fact that the 
former might not correspond to a person’s later-defined gender identity, or the 
practice in core countries with languages with gendered pronouns that when 
introducing oneself, one should specify the ‘preferred pronoun’ on the basis that we 
‘cannot assume one’s gender’ from appearance.
9
 So, in this sense ‘gender’ does not 
mean an analytical category for describing the social components and expectations of 
being a woman or man that are attached by society to our sex (being female or male) 
as expressed, for example, in the idea that ‘girls should do this, boys should do that’. 
Therefore, one must not wonder that people not acquainted with social justice 
activism and gender policy, not to mention with theoretical debates in gender studies, 
cannot make sense of ‘what gender really is.’ This ambiguity of the term within 
activism and policy makes the term vulnerable too, and provides clues for actors who 
                                                        
7
 See for instance https://www.forbes.com/sites/julianvigo/2018/10/26/evil-womxn-the-silencing-of-
biological-reality-and-the-technology-of-obfuscation/#40d0496f18fd 
8
 Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic 
violence, CETS No. 210, signed in Istanbul on May 11, 2011. 
9
 Associated with heated debates among feminist and trans scholars and activists. Scientific accounts of 
these debates from one perspective: Bettcher and Styker, 2016; and from the other: Reilly-Cooper, 2016. 
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are less interested in disentangling complexities and more in creating a homogeneous 
other from the groups of feminists, LGBT activists, gender-studies scholars, liberal, 
green and left-wing politicians. 
As will be shown below, in the context of the Hungarian government’s attacks 
on the Istanbul Convention and gender studies MA programs, reference is made to 
existing activism that uses a gender definition which does not treat biological sex as a 
given fact, while regarding gender as a set of roles, expectations and means assigned to 
biological males and females (the third understanding listed above). Instead, fine-
tuning it to its own political agenda, the government attacks the gender definition 
employed in the kind of activism that regards the separation of sex and gender not as 
an analytical but a practical one, proposing that gender is independent of bodily 
reality; that is, the gender one identifies with (the fourth reading above). The 
government uses this gender definition to denounce feminist claims as harmful; for 
instance, by suggesting that discussion of gender stereotypes in kindergarten could, as 
a next step, lead to children questioning their gender identity. It is necessary to 
understand these nuances to see why the debate in Hungary is not ‘old wine 
(antifeminism, homophobia) in a new bottle, (attacks against the concept of gender)’. 
 
3. The Hungarian government’s attacks on the Istanbul Convention and 
Gender Studies 
 
In contrast to most countries where grassroots and/or religious organizations mobilize 
against so-called progressive bills by referring to ‘gender ideology,’ in Hungary it is the 
government that maintains the perception of danger so that it can pose in the role of 
the protector of Hungary. Here, mobilization does not occur on the streets, but 
through NGOs close to the government or outright government-organized NGOs (so-
called ‘GONGOs’: government-operated/sponsored NGOs) and by using the 
preponderance of government control of the media. Also, compared to other 
countries, the concept of gender became an enemy later on, only in 2017.
10
 
This section analyzes the two main campaigns against what the government calls 
‘gender ideology’ carried out by the former in 2017 in the context of the ‘war of 
independence’ against foreign influence. These two campaigns focused on the 
ratification of the Istanbul Convention and the launch of the Gender Studies MA 
program by Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE). The government, government media 
(Polyák and Urbán, 2016), and civil organizations with links to the government (Metz, 
2015; Varga, 2016) rallied concurrently against these issues. The following empirical 
evidence suggests that the phenomenon is more than a political strategy of defining the 
enemy, and is not just a new form and language of the dismissal of human rights; i.e., 
a backlash against existing and proposed women’s and LGBTQ rights. Government 
propaganda against ‘gender ideology’ and ‘political correctness’ reflects existing 
legislative and activist phenomena in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, 
and Germany, but pretends that all feminist and LGBT political claims and all forms 
of gender studies scholarship are only about these. Current events and trends are used 
and interpreted by government actors to uphold the wartime narrative that serves to 
                                                        
10 
This does not mean that there was formerly no anti-‘gender ideology’ discourse, but that it remained 
quite low-key and sporadic. For a chronology, see Félix (2015) and Kováts and Pető (2017). 
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generate a feeling of being under constant threat, besides other hate campaigns, such 
as those built on the migration crisis (Kováts and Pető, 2017). 
In December 2016, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán announced that 2017 would 
be the year when Hungary would finally settle its accounts with the interests and 
objectives represented by Hungarian-born billionaire philanthropist György Soros. 
Launched soon after, in February 2017, the campaign started with waves of posters 
and ‘national consultations’.
11
 In this context, Central European University (CEU), 
founded by Soros, was also targeted, together with all liberal values, including 
LGBTQ issues. ‘Gender ideology’ fits into a string of issues used by the government 
to distinguish itself from the ‘corrupt West’. The campaign against Soros, based on 
the alleged threat posed by CEU, LGBTQ affairs, NGOs and the wider ‘gender 
ideology’, created a new enemy that could be used as an incentive for continued 
mobilization after the (temporary) attenuation of the migration crisis. 
ELTE’s Gender Studies program was targeted by government propaganda in 
February 2017. First, the Youth Christian Democratic Alliance (IKSZ), the youth 
section of KDNP, the smaller coalition partner, wrote an open letter to the rector of 
the university complaining against Gender Studies. The group urged the rector to stop 
bowing to ‘pressure from the gender and gay lobby’: 
You, the management, have decided to offer a Master’s course that is of 
absolutely no use to Hungarian society, in a misguided topic that is choked by 
political correctness and disguised as science. We believe that Hungary cannot 
afford the same luxury as certain Scandinavian countries, where the signs 
posted on bathroom doors are among the most important points of public 
debate, and effort is made to market as many neutral toys and school books as 
possible, to avoid influencing the belonging of boys and girls to their own sex. It 
must be accepted that there are biological sexes, not social ones,
12
 making even 




From then on, all forms of government media started churning out propaganda 
materials against gender studies. In one of her first television interviews, hosted by the 
government-funded Echo TV, the starting question posed to Ágnes Van-Til Kövér, 
head of the program, was why they had launched a program that affects only 0.3 per 
cent of Hungarian society, by which the reporter was obviously referring to the 
estimated percentage of transgender people in society.
14
 Government-led resistance 
argued that the traditional family model was under threat and referred to international 
phenomena related to transgender and queer activism as the supposed curriculum for 
gender studies, non-binary gender identities, misgendering, but also more broadly 
such things as political correctness and the recent activism concerning the 
individualized understanding of intersectionality (Kováts, 2019). 
                                                        
11
 Additionally, the so-called ‘Stop Soros Act’ had been drafted by February 2018. The Act, which pitched 
an attack against NGOs funded by organizations affiliated with Soros, among others, was adopted in May 
2018 by the new parliament. 
12
 In the Hungarian language there is no distinction between ‘sex’ and ’gender’; the concept is expressed 
using adjectival forms: biological vs. social sex. 
13
 Emphasis added: https://pestisracok.hu/iksz-azelte-kiszolgalja-gender-es-meleglobbi-nyomulasat/  
14
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3auaFOI1N20  
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Initially, the fiery debate and propaganda activities were not followed by 
government action in 2017. ELTE’s MA program was launched as scheduled, with a 
dozen students in September 2017. However, the second wave of debates started in 
August 2018 after PM Orbán declared a culture war in his yearly programmatic 
speech and the final settling of accounts with culture and academia. The terrain thus 
discursively prepared, the threat of ‘gender ideology’ seeded, the debate revolved 
around withdrawing accreditation for the MA program in line with earlier arguments, 
but with higher political stakes. In mid-October it was announced that the program 
would be stripped of accreditation; only those who had started the program in 2017 
and 2018 could finish it by June 2019 and 2020, respectively. 
The Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence 
against women and domestic violence (the ‘Istanbul Convention’) was signed by the 
Hungarian Government in March 2014, but has not yet been ratified. In response to 
inquiries regularly lodged by women’s rights organizations, the government followed a 
pattern of confirmation (‘yes, we will ratify it’) and adjournment, creating the 
impression that the issue was not being followed up within the governmental structure 
or was not being treated as a priority. In light of this, linking the convention with the 
charge of ‘gender ideology’ seems to have come in handy as the ideological anchoring 
for remaining passive; all the more so because the topic was easy to incorporate into 
the new mobilization strategy of the government. While the government was correct in 
expecting that no mass protests would follow if it made a U-turn on the matter of 
ratification, this shift in discourse made it possible to present itself, once again, as the 
guardian of national sovereignty and a tireless warrior in the struggle against foreign 
influence by rejecting yet another international treaty that was incompatible with 
‘Hungarian values’.  
CitizenGO, a transnational conservative organization, published a petition on 
February 23, 2017, timed to coincide with the attacks against CEU’s presence in 
Budapest and the launching of the gender studies program at ELTE. ‘The enactment 
of the Istanbul Convention could prove to be the Trojan horse of gender ideology for 
Hungary.’ This claim, already widely circulated in other countries, was used as the title 
of a text that was brought in front of the Parliamentary Committee of the Judiciary 
together with the then-current status of signatures by representatives of Fidesz, KDNP, 
and Jobbik one month later. The main argument for opposing the ratification of the 
Istanbul Convention is that it uses the non-consensual and ambiguous term ‘gender’. 
This reference to, and fight against, gender stereotypes was based on the claim that it 
might open the way for more radical demands, such as the choosing of one’s own 
gender identity or, as the Human Dignity Center puts it, twisting the above quoted 
definition of the Convention: 
According to the definition, gender is a social construct that may vary and, 
basically, is independent of biological reality (the fact that someone is either a 
man or a woman). Accepting this definition may lead to the denial of natural 








%C3%A9lt%C3%B3s%C3%A1g%20K%C3%B6zpont.pdf pp. 4-5. 
 
LIMITS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS VOCABULARY IN ADDRESSING INEQUALITIES 67 
 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 5(2): 60-80.  
The Center for Fundamental Rights, a government agency posing as an NGO – a 
GONGO, by definition (Varga, 2016: 244–245) – published a resolution on the 
Istanbul Convention entitled ‘No to the Gender Convention’
16
 and recommended that 
the government not submit the Convention to Parliament because: 
Even though it is common sense that there are only two sexes in all creation, 
the Convention aims to go against this fact, to do away with the notion of 
biological sexes and use the concept of gender instead for all legal purposes. 
People would stop being simply men and women, and would belong to one of 
the infinite number of artificially created gender categories. [Emphasis added] 
 
This clearly distorts the gender definition of the Convention, which does not deny the 
biological reality of the two sexes as quoted above.  
However, as we saw, gender and gender-based violence are not clear-cut policy 
concepts. In March 2018, 333 conservative NGOs wrote an open letter to the 
secretary general of the Council of Europe pointing to the ambiguity of the concept of 
gender in EU documents – explaining, for example, that on some occasions the term 
does not mean what is written in the Convention (‘gender‐based violence against 
women shall mean violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman 
or that affects women disproportionately’), but ‘violence that is directed against a 
person of that person’s gender, gender identity or gender expression.’
17
 The shift in 
meaning that the Right identifies is real. The normative evaluation of this differs, but 
as we will see, not along the categories of Left and Right or progressive vs. 
conservative. Also, what we observe in the Hungarian case is that opponents of the 
concept of gender use their abhorrence of the concept of ‘gender identity’ to render 
any gender equality claims suspicious (the ‘Trojan horse’ argument) and use it as a 
justification for the necessity of anti-democratic developments.  
Ratification of the Convention was postponed, and several government 
representatives stated that they would never support or ratify it. In the run-up to the 
parliamentary elections of April 2018, government media repeatedly warned that if 
the opposition came to power, the latter would ratify the ‘Gender Convention’. 
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 http://alapjogokert.hu/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Nem-a-genderegyezm%C3%A9nyre.pdf  
17
 For the letter and the referenced documents see  
https://www.irs.in.ua/files/publications/Letter-to-Secretary-General-of-CoE-Thorbjorn-Jagland.pdf 
 
68  ESZTER KOVÁTS  
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 5(2): 60-80.  
4. An attack on human rights? 
 
When right-wing conservative actors reject the concept of gender, they regard the fight 
against gender stereotyping as a precursor to the advent of ‘choosable gender 
identities’. It may, therefore, seem that they are using new language for the old anti-
feminist aspiration of regarding the sexes as exclusively biological and deriving all 
gender roles from this. Also, it may seem that this new language is materializing in the 
creation of a straw man without any real-world reference. However, as exemplified by 
the italicized parts of the arguments quoted above (in opposition to the Istanbul 
Convention and the first Hungarian gender studies program), the discourse makes 
reference to debates and disputes that are (mainly) going on in Anglo-Saxon countries 
and at the EU-level, primarily about political correctness and the shift in meanings of 
words associated with transgender and non-binary gender identities, most prominently 
the process of the individualized and identity-based reformulation of the previously 
structural category of gender.  
It is especially striking in the Hungarian debates about these two cases that no 
reference is made to women’s rights at all. While the failure to ratify the Convention 
has a negative impact on women in practice by delaying the implementation of 
infrastructure that is necessary for curbing violence,
18
 the discourse against the 
Convention does not define the place of women in society. Perhaps explicitly stating 
that there is no money for stopping violence against women, or that it is not a priority, 
might sound too politically incorrect even for this government, so the newly generated 
discourse might offer an easy way out. As proven by the quotations above, the entire 
phenomenon can be interpreted as the reception process of activism that defines 
gender as identity, in line with the government’s objective of creating the image of an 
enemy that can be used for mobilization and to justify their failure to ratify the 
Istanbul Convention. Obviously, the real political motives behind such communi-
cation operations cannot be inferred from written documents or public speeches. In 
any case, it can be safely established that the phenomenon the government is attacking 
is not a fictive enemy that lacks a real-life reference, but builds upon manifestations of 
actual activism and uses these to serve the goals of furthering polarization and fear-
mongering. However, such manifestations are, at this stage, imported threats in the 
Hungarian context involving a copy-paste alt-right: very few Hungarian feminist and 
LGBT activists have publicly exhibited such views so far. Nevertheless, the 
phenomena they refer to exists, and is being imported to the activist scene that 
presents these issues and social justice language as universal (Bajusz and Feró, 2018). 
Having uncovered this connection, the most common interpretation (i.e., that 
we would be facing a new form of anti-human rights movement, anti-feminism, and 
homophobia) cannot be sustained any more, or must be completed at least, and it 
must also be acknowledged that this phenomenon is not a kind of backlash against 
existing women’s and LGBT rights; at most, it opposes a certain strand of feminism 
and LGBT activism. To what extent the lessons of the Hungarian case study can be 
applied to other contexts and the other forms of right-wing contestations that come 
under the banner of ‘gender ideology’, where transgender and genderqueer issues are 
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 One must note that the government has nevertheless implemented certain supportive measures (e.g. has 
established new crisis centers and shelters) in recent years. 
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not at the forefront of debate, needs to be examined. No generalizations can be made 
here; however, it is clear that this type of social justice activism exists in other 
European countries too and is the target of right-wing critique (e.g. in Germany), so a 
more thorough analysis is needed about these connections. What the Hungarian case 
invites us to do, however, is develop a framework of interpretation that goes beyond 
dichotomic understandings of the phenomenon, as if it involved a fight between 
progressives vs. conservatives, or egalitarians vs. authoritarians (essentialists vs. post-
essentialists; Hark and Villa, 2016). Instead, we need a framework that integrates the 
embeddedness of the struggle for equality into the global power order, together with 
the liberal, Marxist and feminist critiques of the observed trends of activism. This 
framework of interpretation must be suitable for showing how parties that are 
seemingly opposed to each other act and interact according to the same logic to 
produce the same result: culture war. 
I propose to use Nancy Fraser’s conceptual framework for the interpretation. 
My argument is that the recognition framing of injustices leads to a culturalist 
understanding of the phenomenon, as if it involved a fight between values, or camps 
for or against equality. Once we stop cutting the economic axis off the analysis, and 
stop treating gender issues as solely cultural, we can see that what we face is not a mere 
cultural, conservative, anti-feminist, homophobic backlash. Reintegrating the 
redistribution axis with the cultural one (in the sense of perspectival, not substantial 
dualism) helps to see the flaws in the “recognition shift’ and how it has happened that 
the discourse of the Right has gained traction among wider circles of the population in 
Hungary and beyond. 
 
5. Redistribution and recognition19 
 
I will start with the definition of these two key concepts of justice, as set out in Fraser’s 
well-known article ‘From redistribution to recognition? Dilemmas of justice in a “post-
socialist age”’ (1995). Fraser uses the term redistribution to indicate the 
socioeconomic injustice ingrained in the political-economic structure of society. It 
occurs, for example, in cases of exploitation (having the fruits of one’s labor 
appropriated for the benefit of others), economic marginalization (being confined to 
undesirable or poorly paid work or being denied access to income-generating labor 
altogether), or deprivation (being denied an adequate material standard of living) 
(Fraser, 1995: 70–71). Another interpretation of injustice, referred to as recognition 
issues in the relevant philosophical literature, focuses on cultural or symbolic injustice. 
These are rooted, according to Fraser, in general patterns of social representation, 
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 Both concepts have had a long career in political philosophy about justice. I take Nancy Fraser’s dual 
and complementary approach as it seems helpful for addressing the problem the paper aims to tackle. 
Since the publication of her original text Fraser complemented her theory of justice and identified, 
besides the dimensions of redistribution in the economic sphere and recognition in the socio-cultural 
sphere, the dimension of representation in the political sphere. For the sake of the clarity of the argument 
I stick to the original dual theory. Also, I am well aware that she faced substantial criticism (e.g. by Iris 
Marion Young and Judith Butler), but in my view Fraser either convincingly refuted such claims or she 
managed to incorporate them into later writings (2000; 2003). For reasons of space I do not discuss these 
in detai, Fraser’s concepts being not the purpose in this paper, but as a useful instrument for overcoming 
the culture war frame. 
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interpretation and communication (ibid: 71). Fraser considers that the issues of 
gender equality simultaneously touch upon issues of recognition and redistribution 
ingrained in both the political-economic structure of society and its culture. 
‘[Gender] is a basic structuring principle of the political economy. On the one 
hand, gender structures the fundamental division between paid “productive” 
labour and unpaid “reproductive” and domestic labour, assigning women 
primary responsibility for the latter. On the other hand, gender also structures 
the division within paid labour between higher-paid, male-dominated […] 
occupations and lower-paid, female-dominated […] occupations.’ (ibid.: 78) 
 
These occupations include jobs that are often ‘naturally’ held by women, such as 
nursery workers. The political and economic structure continuously reproduces this 
inequality. 
However, gender is an important component of cultural-valuational 
differentiation as well. This is exemplified by those social practices that are rooted in 
the idea that men are superior and women are inferior, and which reproduce this idea 
on the go. Such practices include sexual harassment and violence, the condescending 
treatment of women in everyday life, female objectification in the media, the exclusion 
of women from the public sphere and decision-making bodies, and the disparagement 
of things coded as ‘feminine’. These cannot be considered merely products of the 
political-economic order and remedied by political-economic redistribution only. 
Fraser’s theoretical work on justice begins with the idea that a change took place 
around the end of the twentieth century that turned the struggles for recognition into 
paradigmatic forms of political conflict. As early as 1995, she took a critical position 
with respect to this idea and looked for ways to reconcile the various struggles that 
were sometimes contradictory in their objectives. This remained one of her main 
issues, also with regard to feminism, inasmuch as how ‘the feminist turn to recognition 
has dovetailed all too neatly with a hegemonic neoliberalism’ (2013: 160), and how 
progressive causes could lend assistance to neoliberal logics (2017). 
 
5.1 Recognition yes, identity politics and psychologizing no 
 
Fraser rejects the idea that identity politics and the politics of recognition would be the 
same thing. In  light of the current debate in the Anglo-Saxon sphere of influence 
(Lilla, 2017; Fukuyama, 2018), which has started to infiltrate the Central and Eastern 
European theater as well, it is important to make this distinction, and Fraser’s insights 
from 2000 and 2003 may even seem to have a prophetic character. She lists the 
following four main reasons. 
First, identity politics limits the issue of recognition to reinforcing group 
specificity, thereby reinforcing separatism (according to this logic, for example, the 
main issue for gay people would be the politics behind the recognition of their gay 
identity). Second, this approach makes it difficult to comprehend that people are 
members of several groups at the same time and their identity is much more complex 
than these group identities can describe (meaning that adding up these group identities 
– for example, white + woman + lesbian – does not move us closer to grasping reality). 
Third, this approach obscures the fact that injustice against unrecognized groups, such 
as women, gays or blacks, is partly rooted in the injustice of distribution. And finally, 
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fourth, it conceals the internal (power) struggles within these groups by homogenizing 
them. By way of example, consider what the best course of action is if women are kept 
in an inferior position within a minority group – should this be counteracted, or there 
is nothing to be done, as resisting would undermine group identity and objectives? 
(Fraser, 2000). 
Fraser also rejects the idea of deducing the justification of recognition from the 
individual psyche, and this has several practical ramifications. Certain philosophers 
who deal with similar topics, such as Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth, discuss the 
question of recognition in terms of grounding human integrity in the consent of and 
recognition by other people. According to this view, recognition is needed to avoid 
hurting the self-esteem of a person in order to allow them to regard themselves as a 
person of worth, a full member of society, and the equal of others. Thus, a society that 
regards women as inferior will hurt individuals, which is unjust. As opposed to this, 
Fraser argues that it is wrong to focus on the psyche. First, because such an approach 
may be exposed to empirical refutation (if a person’s self-esteem is not hurt, then 
others may achieve the same thing without external help). Second, because this 
approach entails that any feeling of any individual is a valid claim for justice and, for 
example, racist people may claim that their self-esteem is violated (and it can be) if 
people of other skin colors or cultures are given the same rights. Third, because it 
hampers the focus on social structures and institutions that create and maintain unjust 
practices (Fraser and Honneth, 2003). 
Instead of a grounding in identity politics and psychology, Fraser suggests 
thinking about this issue as an institutionalized relationship of subordination. Injustice 
is not significant because it appears at the level of individual self-esteem, but because 
the institutional models of these cultural values exclude entire groups of people from 
being able to participate in social interaction as equals. That is, the source of the lack 
of recognition is not in the disrespectful attitudes of individuals, but in social 
institutions, and therefore the adequate scale of struggle is changing these institutions. 
She calls this the status model of recognition, as opposed to the identity model 
(Fraser, 2000). It is especially important to highlight Fraser’s thoughts today, when the 
perspective that one’s privileged position in a particular group determines what they 
think and whether they are allowed to speak up in particular cases is getting more and 
more leverage: as if being member of an affected group could override all other 
considerations. This is what German scholar Paula Villa rightly criticizes as ‘positional 
fundamentalism’; that is, equating individuals with their positions within social 
structures (their race, their sex, their sexual preference) and making them personally 




5.2 No economism, no culturalism, no adding up 
 
Following the election of Trump in 2016, there were many wake-up calls on the Left, 
demanding a return to really important issues in order to fight economic inequalities. 
Some of these voices even urged the Left to drop ‘such marginal cultural issues as 
feminism, racism or the representation of LGBT rights’, because, they held, once we 
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get rid of economic inequalities, all inequalities will vanish. Fraser, who has labeled 
this approach ‘economism’, believes – correctly – that it is mistaken.  
However, she also rejects the other extreme, culturalism, represented among 
others by her sparring partner of decades, German philosopher Axel Honneth. This 
approach contends that economic inequalities have either been already dealt with, or, 
if not, they are actually due to a lack of cultural recognition (Fraser and Honneth, 
2003). The starting point for Fraser’s entire theory is criticism of the over-proliferation 
of cultural framing. For instance, when feminists focus on the phenomenon of so-
called ‘body shaming’ or when politicians make suggestions for improving the 
situation of women in the symbolic space (for example, representing women on paper 
money or banning sexist ads), they either neglect the sphere of redistribution 
altogether or disconnect it from recognition issues. 
Fraser rejects the third solution as well; i.e., that economic and cultural issues 
should also be addressed. Central to her argument is the claim that any such 
substantive dualism must be rejected as the injustices experienced in these two areas 
cannot be regarded as separable in essence. Looking at the structure of the labor 
market would make it a question of distribution, while looking at the objectification of 
women in the media, for example, would make it an issue of recognition; Fraser 
rejects this view.  
 
5.3 Correlation instead of either/or 
 
Instead of these three approaches (either one or the other, or both), she proposes 
perspectival dualism, by which issues of justice are considered in terms of their 
connections, since almost all issues have both economic and cultural implications, 
even though it may seem at a certain point that these issues are purely economic or 
purely cultural. 
Consider the example of a widely publicized demand put forward by women’s 
organizations: namely, that men should do a greater share of housework and 
providing care. The difficulty with this is easier to understand when looking beyond 
the cultural framework; that is, the attitudes that essentially regard these tasks as being 
menial and the duty of women. Women typically work in underpaid sectors, and their 
responsibilities as caregivers make it less likely that they will be promoted. 
Furthermore, if they live in a heterosexual relationship, there is a good chance that 
they earn less than their partner. In fact, market competition pushes employers to 
regard male parental leave as a nuisance and works against it. Moreover, the ethos of 
the ‘reliable employee’ is a person who is always available, has no care giving 
responsibilities (no sick child or elderly parent), who is taken care of by others. As 
described by social reproduction theoreticians, the market has an interest in keeping 
up the structure that treats care work, and more broadly, social reproduction, as an 
economic externality. In light of this, it is pointless to try and convince men to do 
more at home or for women to consciously overcome their socialization which acts as 
a restraint if the systemic conditions for a more just division of labor at home are 
missing. The problem has no solution at this individual level, and gender equality 
remains as distant as ever, but the patronizing and to some extent moralizing attitude 
of activists may trigger an adverse response in those whose material reality is not 
compliant with this kind of sensitization, and this provides fertile ground for 
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exclusionary discourses. We must, therefore, consider the issues of redistribution and 
recognition as an interconnected network that goes beyond mere cultural 
interpretation. It is then easy to see that the desired development will not come about 
as a result of changes in the attitudes of individuals. 
Fraser argues that the spheres of culture and economy cannot be separated in 
this respect. The market, for example, relies on cultural patterns that maintain the 
subjection of certain social groups, such as women. The damaging effects of the porn 
industry or the market model of sugar daddy/sugar baby websites cannot be explained 
only through the cultural patterns of contempt towards women. The role of economic 
processes is also evident. Regarding the latter, for instance, in more and more 
countries the state is increasingly withdrawing from paying for participation in higher 
education, thus this option, imported from the United States, is offered as a model 
(see the sites richmeetsbeautiful or seekingarrangement). On the other hand, the wage 
gap between the sexes cannot be eliminated until the cultural patterns which render 
the activities assigned to women less worthy are changed. 
 
6. The limits of human rights vocabulary21  
 
The human rights consensus which formed the basis of the post-World War II order 
in the West is among those things questioned by the forces mobilizing against ‘gender 
ideology’ (Pető, 2016), while in the Hungarian context, the term ‘human rights 
fundamentalism’ is widespread in the right-wing media. This makes it all the more 
difficult to address the limits of human rights language, as it can be easily conflated 
with generally present fear-mongering propaganda. However, human rights as a 
framework for addressing inequalities and assessing current processes is being 
criticized from other angles, too. 
Fraser situates the human rights paradigm within the recognition shift. As she 
noted in 2001 (in English translation, 2013), ‘struggles for recognition have exploded 
everywhere – witness battles over multiculturalism, human rights, and national 
autonomy’ (Fraser, 2013: 160). Based on the previous sections, I argue that the 
human rights paradigm in itself is suitable neither for assessing the nature of gender 
inequality and injustices faced by women, nor for explaining the phenomenon that the 
Right regularly questions gender and LGBT equality (e.g. that they would be anti-
feminist or homophobic, and against human rights).  
A growing body of scholarly literature is criticizing the focus on individual 
rights
22
 and discussing whether human rights and human-rights-committed actors share 
the responsibility for neoliberalism (e.g. in the form of unholy alliances with capital; 
Fraser, 2017) or have simply been a ‘powerless companion’ to market 
                                                        
21
 This section is adapted from Kováts (2018). 
22 
And further: ‘Whatever its potential in theory, the human rights movement adapted in practice to the 
new ambiance. For one thing, the idea of human rights followed the transformation of political economy 
to a global outlook. Further, activists no longer gave priority to the agency of states to launch and manage 
national welfare, but rather to the rights of individuals to be free from harm and to enjoy a rudimentary 
government that averts disaster and abjection. In the economic realm, social equality was forsaken as an 
ideal. In exchange for its cosmopolitanism, and in spite of some initial uncertainty, the new human rights 
movement foreswore any relationship to post-war egalitarianism in both theory and practice’ (Moyn 2017: 
5). 
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fundamentalism (e.g. Moyn, 2014).
23
 What seems to be clear is that the human rights 
framework does not allow for the addressing of systemic questions, including global 
power inequalities, or as Moyn puts it, ‘human rights, even perfectly realized human 
rights, are compatible with inequality, even radical inequality’ (Moyn, 2017: 2). This 
obviously does not mean that human rights are not essential for justice, but rather that 
they are not enough, they are non-exhaustive, and need to be complemented. Also, it 
must be noted that just because certain actors abuse human rights by making some 
problematic claims referring to them, this is not a shortcoming of the human rights 
approach, but rather the problem is with those specific claims and actors who put 
them forward. Still, I would like to highlight three limitations of the human rights 
vocabulary in assessing current injustices and right-wing mobilizations. 
First, as widely discussed in the literature, the universalistic framework of 
human rights covers up the embeddedness of the agenda in the global context. In 
East-Central Europe, for instance, the arrival of the human rights approach coincided 
(in time and partly in terms of actors) with a time of democratic transformations and 
with the call for ‘catching up with the developed West,’ i.e., with what adhesion to 
global capitalism from a semi-peripheric, inferior position required (Gregor and 
Grzebalska, 2016), while the focus of human rights NGOs is currently strongly 
influenced by the agenda of Western donors. 
Second, the paradigm of human rights focuses on individual rights and treats 
the economic order as an independent social sub-system and equality between men 
and women as a cultural issue, severed from its connections with the economic axes. 
This is in line with Fraser’s critique of the recognition turn, and partly explains why 
the Right often accuses the ‘human rights fundamentalism’ of neo-liberal 
individualism. 
That the actors mobilizing against ‘gender ideology’ often identify a connection 
between the term ‘gender’ and individualism/neoliberalism, too, is based, as described 
above, on their idea of gender as freely chosen, not constrained by norms, nature, and 
biological sex. What makes this right-wing critique more complicated is the fact that 
the same criticism is raised by feminist and leftist perspectives as well, especially in the 
Anglo-Saxon countries where the above-mentioned trans/queer identity politics is an 
important strand of feminist and LGBTQ activism. These critics argue that the 
identity politics approach turns emancipatory movements into terrains of individual 
claims for recognition, and that by adopting the logic of neoliberalism instead of 
collectively addressing systemic problems, this strand fosters individual adaptation. To 
provide an example, it is convincingly argued that queer politics encourages 
individuals to reject the categories themselves (man or woman) instead of fighting the 
narrowly defined gender roles expected of men and women and the system which 
                                                        
23
 ‘The real trouble about human rights when historically correlated with market fundamentalism is not 
that they promote it but that they are unambitious in theory and ineffectual in practice in the face of its 
success. Neoliberalism has changed the world, while the human rights movement has posed no threat to 
it. The tragedy of human rights is that they have occupied the global imagination but have so far 
contributed little of note, merely nipping at the heels of the neoliberal giant whose path goes unaltered 
and unresisted. And the critical reason that human rights have been a powerless companion of market 
fundamentalism is that they simply have nothing to say about material inequality.’ (ibid.) 
 
LIMITS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS VOCABULARY IN ADDRESSING INEQUALITIES 75 
 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 5(2): 60-80.  
sustains them, and that if one does not comply with the expected gender roles, then 
one does not belong to that sex (Reilly-Cooper, 2016).
24
 
Third, human rights language hides the fact – for example, in the form of the 
popular call among activists for a ‘rainbow coalition’– that there might be a conflict of 
interest between the different claims formulated in human rights language. More and 
more claims are finding a place under the umbrella of human rights – and if they get 
there, they become morally non-negotiable.  
This is exemplified by the prostitution/sex work debate. The sex-worker 
approach, anything but uncontested among feminists, also attempts to delegitimize the 
abolitionist position from a human rights position. The sex work position states that it 
is a human right to choose your occupation, and that prostitution is nothing more than 
regular wage work (albeit indeed among the exploitative types). This approach 
separates the phenomenon of prostitution from the patriarchy and the context of 
economic and sexual exploitation in which it is embedded. The sex work approach 
posits that the core problem is that sex work is stigmatized and the objective of the 
struggle for justice is to eliminate this stigma and legalize the sex trade (a cultural 
recognition position that takes the economic axis either as irrelevant or as a given, 
impossible to change). In contrast, the abolitionist approach regards prostitution as the 
economic exploitation of the female body and therefore seeks to eradicate it (a 
position uniting the cultural and economic axis in the sense of the Fraserian 
perspectivic dualism).  
For example, Hungary is not just a transit and destination country, but also one 
of the significant supply countries, serving regional demand in terms of human 
trafficking. Many Hungarian women are sold to Germany, Switzerland and the 
Netherlands where there is no local supply to meet the growing demand promoted by 
legalization, therefore human trafficking from the (semi-)peripheries is growing. Also, 
there is such extreme poverty in certain parts of Hungary that there are many women 
who see no other option than prostitution to provide for themselves or their families. 
So, framing the fact that these trafficked or extremely poor women are selling their 
bodies as a choice and their human right ignores the lived reality of these people 
(Katona, 2016). Instead of asking questions such as why the demand for prostitution is 
embedded in the patriarchy, how capitalism is profiting from this, and how the state is 
failing to effectively address the root causes, some people devote their resources to 
mitigating the surface and stick to recognition regarding the claim of ‘destigmatizing 
sex work.’  
Yet another example illustrates another aspect of this tension: the example of 
surrogacy.
25
 As the development of technology is interlinked with the interests of those 
in possession of economic resources, the body of the most vulnerable women may be 
exploited by wealthy heterosexual or homosexual couples as regards the ‘right to a 
                                                        
24
 There are plenty of analyses like this, partly by scholars, partly by activists; see, for example, 
http://bennorton.com/adolph-reed-identity-politics-is-neoliberalism/, 
http://www.feministcurrent.com/2016/09/27/need-braver-feminists-challenge-silencing/, 
and https://fairplayforwomen.com/gender-new-youth-tribe  
25
 For an overview of the legal and ethical dilemmas involving transnational commercial surrogacy, see 
Sándor (2018). 
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child’.
26
 This needs to be addressed in a perspectival dualistic way: by addressing 
patriarchy and economic exploitation at the same time. If we treat it only as a 
recognition issue (e.g. the recognition of infertile or gay couples’ love as having the 
same value as that of heterosexual fertile couples), then we fall into the trap of 
discussing it in terms of openness vs. closedness, progressives vs. the Right. Therefore, 
there are plenty of challenges for those who stand up for human rights and the 
equality of all humans, irrespective of their sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, race, etc. 
Because of the above-mentioned dilemmas and contradictions that have emerged in 
recent years and decades, human-rights-committed actors sometimes (unwittingly) 
contribute to the individualization of structural problems. In this age of culture wars, it 
is time to take stock of what originally emancipative concepts such as human rights, 
intersectionality, empowerment, and choice have become (Budgeon, 2015) in order to 
better understand why the interpretation of a ‘conservative backlash’ is insufficient for 




Conceptual and strategic debates are, of course, nothing new in activism that strives 
for more social justice. However, in the case of the (desired) ‘human rights 
consensus’, certain political positions are labeled illegitimate (exclusionary or phobic) 
on the basis of moral judgments. The same is true of the inflation of the terms ‘racist’, 
‘sexist’, ‘misogynist’, and ‘homophobic’. This labeling renders understanding more 
difficult and obfuscates the debates within progressive movements, including those 
about the recognition shift. 
The strengthening of the demand for populism and anti-politically-correct 
language occurs in connection with political claims easily labeled and stigmatized. 
Obviously, human rights are not apolitical in the sense that it is a substantive political 
claim that there are undeniable rights that cannot be put to the plenum of majority 
rule. However, it requires a more accurate analysis to decide which rights and how 
these can become a part of this framework, and what should be put up for debate 
instead. Also, the disconnectedness of human rights from economic claims should be 
remedied in order to better understand the structural root causes of injustices, 
including in the field of recognition, and to better meet people’s lived reality and 
justice claims (Moyn, 2018). 
‘None of this is to say that human rights activism is irrelevant, any more than it 
would indict a hammer to say it is useless when another tool is needed’ (Moyn, 2017: 
6). Moyn also attributes the rise of populist rage to the downplaying of economic 
                                                        
26
 ‘People who seek a surrogate have a very specific desire. It is not enough for them to get to know a 
child or to help to raise a child who is already alive. Nor is it enough to adopt an orphaned child or to 
have a child with a woman who also wants a child. No, it has to be their own genetic offspring, a newborn 
baby of whom the buyer has sole custody. This is always concealed in discussions about surrogacy—that it 
is not only a desire to raise a child, but also a demand that the mother be absent. The surrogacy story 
follows a slippery logic. It begins by stating that this desire exists and when the people in question have 
money, it becomes a demand. This demand is reformulated according to suitable argumentation and thus 
lands in the realm of being a “right”. (…) the need becomes a right: suddenly, we are talking about 
“everyone’s right to have a child”—this very specific desire has thus been transformed into a human right.’ 
(Ekman, 2013: 151–152) 
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inequalities. And, he claims, doubling down on efforts to defend human rights against 
growing populism is just denouncing the symptoms and ignoring the disease (ibid: 7). 
By narrowing the debate around human rights to cultural values, we fail to 
consider the broader economic and political processes in which they are embedded. 
Even within the ranks of researchers of social movements, critical voices have begun 
to appear, saying that there are more than two camps and that the current debates 
cannot be interpreted simply as a clash between movement and counter-movement, 
or groups that are for and against progressive social change (Roggeband, 2018). The 
antagonism is not between progressives and conservatives, open and closed-minded 
people, libertarians and authoritarians, those who are tolerant and those who are 
oppressive, racists and anti-racists, populists and democrats – and all this does not 
even add up to a spectrum. As long as the issues of recognition are separated from the 
context of economic justice, this binary thinking about human rights issues – the claim 
that one must be either for or against equality – is inevitably reproduced. The same is 
true of the interpretation of a one-dimensional backlash with respect to understanding 
attacks against human rights. Moreover, by claiming the former we actively contribute 
to the rhetoric of a culture war and cannot offer an emancipatory option for gender 
equality that is in contact with the material reality of the people of East-Central 
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US-based public and private foundations have actively shaped and promoted Roma 
rights since 1989. The most prominent ones are the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the Open Society Foundations (OSF). After 
the fall of the Berlin wall, USAID disbursed considerable funds for non-governmental 
organizations (NGO) working for/with the Roma and organized study visits to the US 
for scores of Roma activists. OSF, on its part has not only funded NGOs in Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) where the bulk of Europe’s ten million Roma live but also 
established international NGOs (INGO) and itself operates as a ‘meta-NGO’ 
advocating for Roma rights.
1
 
 For American executives within OSF ‘the Roma issue [was] a rights issue’ from 
the very beginning and the fight against segregated education the vehicle of social 
integration.
2
 Their priorities served as a blueprint for European funders – first and 
foremost the European Union – while profoundly impacting on the international 
Romani movement that is highly dependent on these funders. In exceptional cases 
Roma political leaders successfully forged coalitions with domestic agents (political 
parties), gaining access to considerable resources and opportunities to shape domestic 
policies in meaningful ways. 
 The two volumes reviewed here naturally apply the US-inspired prescriptions 
in their quest for making sense of the ‘Roma issue’. They narrate the deeds of 
progressives in the CEE from a US perspective for an interested (US) public in 
different, but equally intriguing ways. Andria D. Timmer offers a bottom-up view, 
which is essential to ethnographic research based on participatory observation, the 
methodology she chooses to map what NGOs do to as much as for the Roma in the 
field of education.
3
 Her empirical research on the role of NGOs facilitating Hungarian 
                                                          
1
 The primary purpose of a ‘meta-NGO’ is to provide support to other NGOs but it can also come to 
‘govern’ the NGOs it funds, cf. Stubbs (2005: 81). 
2
 Harding (2006). 
3
 For a recent account of NGO anthropology see Lashaw et al (2017). 
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desegregation policies between 2002 and 2010 is particularly interesting, because 
uniquely in the regional and issue context these policies resulted from an alliance of 
progressive Roma leaders and the liberal party in a coalition government with the 
socialists. Since then, the former has been obliterated from national politics while the 
latter is struggling to stay afloat in an increasingly authoritarian political environment. 
 Timmer focuses on Hungary, because this country was considered to be a 
forerunner in guaranteeing minority rights, adopting and implementing a school 
desegregation policy. As the author notes, this sadly came to an end following a 
change in government in 2010. While the choice of Hungary and education is 
interesting particularly because of the governmental commitment, the book would 
have benefitted from a more detailed discussion of the research tenets. As it is, the 
methodological chapter is in want of better-grounded comparative analysis across at 
least the Roma-dense CEE countries. That could support the research design and the 
findings more than the anecdotal reference to pure luck and circumstance in 
ethnography. By delving into education, Timmer bets on everybody’s favorite horse. 
Had she pursued research as originally intended, i.e. in the field of health, she may 
have found a road less travelled but full of surprising insights. 
 In contrast, Jacqueline Bhabha, Andrzej Mirga and Margareta Matache take a 
top-down approach, asking their collaborators to analyze Roma policies and projects, 
standard setting and litigation over the course of the last three decades. They focus on 
the regional level and only seldom magnify domestic or local processes and events. 
This is surprising, because the chapters lead to a proposal seeking to prioritize 
community organizing. That this proposal is based on critical insights into other social 
change strategies and tools, rather than into what really works at the community level 
indicates not a lack of empirical research but an oversight on the part of the editors, 
who could have dedicated a section to scholarship such as Timmer’s. That certain 
tools have not worked well in a given city or country is not a good enough reason to 
quickly revert to others. In any case, the authors propose a rather limited overhaul of 
the Roma rights toolbox, essentially to scale down on legal mobilization.
4
 
 The pieces assembled in Realizing Roma Rights take stock of the efforts of 
European and US-based actors directed at key international organizations: the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe 
and the European Union (EU). Whether writing as a representative of the US foreign 
policy establishment or an US-dominated voice in world polity, OSF the authors are 
personally vested in the processes they describe and analyze, which is why their 
positionality matters. Individual experience and participation make their accounts 
comparable to Timmer’s work. Still, most contributors are more than simple 
observers. They are or have been key figures in policy making and litigation, which 
implicates their own agency in ways very different from Timmer’s, an English teacher 
in a Roma-only high school. Bearing this in mind, the editors should have perhaps 
encouraged a more reflexive narrative. As it is, the general lack of auto-critique 
                                                          
4
 Legal mobilization was coined by Scheingold (1974) who inquired into the political uses of the law. 
While generally understood as a process driven by public interest law organizations in the United States 
(Handler, 1978) and non-governmental organizations (including trade unions) in Europe (Anagnostou, 
ed., 2014), in an important contribution Francis Zemans (1983) demonstrated that the use of the law by 
individuals should also be seen as an important modality of legal mobilization. 
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undermines the findings of the collective volume and stands in contrast with Timmer’s 
account that becomes the most captivating when up close and personal. 
 The book that is her doctoral dissertation is structured into five substantive 
chapters, a preface and conclusions. The Preface introduces the subject matter and 
the methodology. The title ‘Providing Education for Europe’s Most Disadvantaged 
Minority’ suggests a much broader scope than what is finally taken. Chapter 1, ‘Én 
Cigány Vagyok!: On Who Is (And Who Should Be) Considered Roma’ begins with a 
story that naturally lends the author in the actual site of inquiry, foregrounding the 
protagonists of the narrative, the Roma themselves. It enables Timmer to showcase 
the discrepancy between self-perceived and attributed ethnic identity, a phenomenon 
she associates with racialization and coins as the ‘Gypsy trope’ without however 
adequately situating her discussion in the broader field of nationalism studies. 
 Chapter 2 ‘The Roma in Europe and Hungary’ seems insufficient to enable the 
reader to form an informed opinion about the legal, policy and political salience of 
the Roma issue at the domestic and European levels. Importantly, the focus on 
minority rights and the disregard for other frames is not adequately explained. This is 
unfortunate, because in the field of education the minority rights frame is not the most 
significant one, especially not for the Roma. Rather, non-discrimination and equal 
treatment provide the backbone of Hungarian desegregation legislation and 
enforcement, while social inclusion serve(d) as the basis of policy measures. 
 Similarly, Chapter 3 showcasing the interventions of educational NGOs seems 
somewhat impressionistic, far from exhaustive or indeed congruent with the research 
design: the categories of NGOs introduced in the Preface and the variables on which 
the analysis is allegedly based. More importantly however, Timmer’s hypothesis, 
namely that the dominant approach educational NGOs adopt is ‘to empower a group 
of individuals who proudly proclaim themselves as Roma or Gypsy and who, once 
educated, can (1) change negative perceptions of the Roma, (2) fight for Roma rights, 
(3) increase self-esteem and pride in Roma identity, and (4) increase the visibility of 
positive examples in the public’ (p. 45) is simply unsubstantiated and possibly very far 
from the truth. Quite the contrary, these objectives characterize very few educational 
NGOs. The claim that the ‘overarching goal of all educational NGOs is to combat 
segregation [by fighting] against assimilation and negative segregation or support 
positive segregation and integration’ (p. 63) is similarly out of tune with empiria. 
While in funding applications NGOs may invoke these goals, in reality – as Timmer 
herself repeatedly notes – they often go the opposite direction as they come to face 
massive resistance from the majority population and local institutions. 
 Chapter 4 looks at the way NGOs construct the Roma and critically but not 
surprisingly from an anthropologist-ethnographer finds civil society approaches 
stigmatizing and/or victim-blaming. The gist of the findings is that: ‘in their 
intervention a large majority of these organizations treat the Roma as a group who are 
in actuality a problem themselves. […] they engage in activities that attempt to change 
the way their beneficiaries perceive and behave in the world. In essence, the Roma 
have a problem and must change accordingly’ (p. 94). A contrary example is 
described in Chapter 5 that details the author’s experiences and observations during 
participatory research as a faculty member at the Előrelépés (‘A step ahead’) High 
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School in a segregated Roma village in an impoverished area close to the Croatian 
border. 
 Timmer’s conclusion, namely that the Roma are a heterogeneous ethnic 
minority racialized on the basis of proxies such as poverty, delinquent cultural 
practices and inferior mental and intellectual abilities is a basic tenet of social science 
research on racism and well exposed in the Hungarian academic and NGO context.
5
 
This would deserve more thorough acknowledgement of sources in both realms. 
Ascribing novelty value to a spin-off of this conclusion, namely that the Roma ethnic 
group is constructed by Eurocrats, NGOs – and Roma politicians one must add – is 
also problematic. The constructed and contested nature of a politicized Roma identity 
has been studied by others before, starting with Nicolae Gheorghe who coined the 
political process of Roma identity construction as the Roma ethnogenesis and ending 




 In the Conclusion Timmer proposes to change and expand the frames of 
desegregation not through the lens of ethnic identity/culture, as that inevitably leads to 
mis-recognition and the reification of standardized identities. Following Nancy 
Fraser’s theoretical model
7
 she concludes that the segregation and lower quality 
education of the Roma ‘should be treated as a question of social status’. In other 
words, class, rather than race should be ‘recognized as the basis of social 
subordination and the denial of the status of a full partner’ (p. 136). Even if not 
revolutionary, Timmer makes an important point from a US perspective, but she is 
far from revolutionary in the Hungarian/European context. Her failure to properly 
reflect on the function of race (ethnic identity) in the US where Fraser’s insights 
originate is unfortunate. Engaging more profoundly with nationalism studies – 
Brubaker and other social scientist referenced in the book – or tapping into 
observations made by Wacquant on the ‘formidable epistemological obstacle’ that ‘de-
emphasizes class and euphemizes ethno-racial domination’ as a cornerstone of the 
‘academic doxa’ in the US, where it typically goes ‘unargued and unquestioned’ would 
have benefitted the argument and the intended public.
8
 
 Timmer rightly reminds the reader that Hungarian sociologist Júlia – not Judit! 
– Szalai takes a social class-based approach or rather, she is one of many Hungarian 
sociologists who made such proposals preceding Fraser. The overlapping nature of 
class, race and gender-based subordination is a basic tenet of structuralist, left-leaning 
sociology that dominates the field in Hungary.
9
 From István Kemény through János 
Ladányi – not Ládanyi as he is repeatedly referred to in the book – and Iván Szelényi, 
to Ilona Liskó, Gábor Havas, Gábor Kertesi and many more. Due to their 
contribution, Hungarian legislation prohibited segregation based on social class, as 
well as race and ethnic origin, while desegregation policy was from the start based on 
                                                          
5
 See, most importantly, the debate on ‘Who is a Roma’, Ladányi and Szelényi (1997), Havas, Kemény 
and Kertesi (1998), Kertesi (1998), Ladányi and Szelényi (2011). See also Csepeli and Simon (2004) and 
Krizsán (ed.) (2001). 
6
 Gheorghe (1991), Marsh and Strand (eds.) (2006), Simhandl (2006), Surdu and Kovats (2015). 
7
 Fraser (2000). 
8
 Wacquant (1997). 
9
 See, for instance, Balibar and Wallerstein (1991). 
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social status, not race or ethnic origin, a fact that seriously questions the adequacy of 
Timmer’s diagnosis and proposals. Her factual blunder in this respect is unfortunate, 
because otherwise her insights into the extremely rare practice of genuine ‘positive 
segregation’ are unique and also because according to the bibliography she actually 
read the work of Hungarian social scientists. 
 On the flipside, Realizing Roma Rights takes a view of Roma rights that is 
biased towards the equality and non-discrimination frame (Part I is entitled ‘The Long 
Shadow of Anti-Roma Discrimination’), also perhaps because this facilitates the 
accessibility of the issue for the US audience. Chapter 1 by Elena Rozzi describes the 
enduring discrimination of Roma children in Italian schools, while Chapter 2 by 
Alexandra Oprea analyses forced sterilization from the perspective of Critical Race 
Theory, a paradigm developed by progressive minority academics in the US. The 
choice of countries, authors and topics in this introductory section is important for 
several reasons. First and foremost, both papers deal with groups marginalized not 
only by majority societies but also by Roma ethno-politics. It is very much in keeping 
with the basic tenets of CRT that their problems should serve as the lens through 
which the first glimpse into a truly complex field is provided. Other topics could have 
been selected equally legitimately. For instance, the denial of equal status – 
citizenship, residence permits, identity documents and the sort – and racial profiling 
are salient issues both in Italy and Romania, the authors’ homelands. However, these 
general concerns would have glossed over the intersecting axis of discrimination within 
the Roma community. A second and interesting point is that segregated education and 
Roma women’s rights also happen to be topics prioritized by OSF. Thirdly, the two 
pieces bridge the geographic divide between Western and Eastern European Roma, a 
divide artificially created in the 1990s as a political project seeking to limit liability for 
anti-Romani racism to the countries of the former Soviet bloc. 
 Part II carries two chapters on US foreign policy as concerns the Roma. Erika 
Schlager, the liaison officer between the US Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (the Helsinki Commission) created by Congress in 1976 to 
monitor and encourage compliance with the Helsinki Final Act (p. 59) and Roma 
rights NGOs provides a historic overview about her country’s long term engagement 
with standard setting and diplomatic interventions that at times yielded swift and 
meaningful results in countries as distant as the Czech Republic and Kosovo. David 
Meyer and Michael Uyehara inventorize US policy interventions promoting the 
human rights of the Roma. The portfolio is broad, but the main rationale for 
interventions is simple. Whether earmarked for projects bolstering Roma political 
participation or the prevention and punishment of hate crimes the principle objective 
of funding is to stem Roma migration and human trafficking that could upset regional 
and international peace and stability (p. 86). 
 Part III is dedicated to taking stock of European inclusion policies. Andrzej 
Mirga complements Schlager’s contribution in a sobering yet hopeful tone. Mirga, a 
former expert for the Stanford University based Project on Ethnic Relations and 
director of the OSCE Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues embodies the 
‘institutional’ memory of the Roma political movement. This background makes his 
conclusions puzzling. Rather than claiming a more accentuated role for Roma NGOs 
and political organizations Mirga believes that despite its shortcomings, there is ‘no 
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alternative to the central role’ of the EU (most prominently the European 
Commission) and member states (p. 126). 
 Margareta Matache and Krista Oehlke’s piece on Romanian Roma policies 
counterbalances Meyer and Uyehara’s assessment, providing insights critical vis-à-vis 
international organizations, donors, target countries, and NGOs. A former executive 
director of Romani Criss, Romania’s flagship Roma rights and social intervention 
NGO, Matache is exceptionally well-placed to make this assessment. At the same 
time, her pivotal role in the NGO-led policy initiatives makes her role as a critic 
complex and challenging. She identifies non-implementation, the inadequacy of 
universal measures for Roma needs, short term donor focus, the lack of domestic 
political will and a thrift between NGOs and Roma communities as factors of policy 
failure. As with her previous assessment of the impact of desegregation policies 
(Matache and Dougherty, 2015), here too the reader is left to wonder ‘so what’. What 
if NGOs had done better or connected more to grassroots and measured the impact 
of their own projects at least? Given that the Roma population in Romania is the most 
sizable (2 million), that there is a well-established system of minority political 
representation and given the experience with community outreach the paper could 
perhaps have provided more nuanced insights for a reform agenda. In light of Criss’ 
financial difficulties, it would have been useful to flag the need for stable resources at 
the domestic level. 
 Kálmán Mizsei’s paper adds a global perspective to Matache’s domestic and 
Mirga’s regional focus. It stands out for other reasons as well. Mizsei writes as a 
former high-ranking employee of OSF, hired as an outsider to the Roma rights field 
but an insider to the United Nations’ development activities. His task was to review, 
reform and if necessary shift the gear of the meta-NGO’s Roma policy endeavors. 
Parallel to his proposals to strengthen commitment and develop infrastructure in EU 
member states for the use of EU funds, Mizsei relies on widely used strategies and 
tools, such as grassroots engagements and strategic litigation. Portraying the Decade of 
Roma Inclusion as a precursor of deeper EU engagement in Roma policies, Mizsei’s 
call for reform stops short of proposals that seek to avoid the reification of 
race/ethnicity and marginalized social status, an objective that integration policies have 
so far failed to achieve.
10
 
 Part IV promises a comparative analysis of institutional racism against the 
Roma in contemporary Europe. Interestingly neither chapter is authored by a 
European/Roma lawyer, although hate crimes/speech and school desegregation – the 
issues explored in the book – have been the subject of extensive litigation and 
scholarly research on the old continent.
11
 Will Guy’s inquiry into anti-Roma violence 
and hate speech provides a sociological perspective, which means that important legal 
debates, reforms and institutions go unnoticed. His focus on the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, and Hungary leaves out the bulk of regional jurisprudence on anti-Roma 
violence, because it emanates from Romania and Bulgaria. Untold are the strategies of 
Romanian and Bulgarian Roma rights NGOs and lawyers who successfully mobilized 
domestic anti-discrimination law against hate speech. Europeanization played a crucial 
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 Law and Kovats (2018). 
11
 See for instance Rostas (ed.) (2012), Gergely (2009), and O’Nions (2010). For a valuable comparative 
study of remedies and enforcement concerning desegregation see Bowman and Nantl (2014). 
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role in ensuring access to justice in these cases thus the expansion of the domestic 
legal opportunity structures should have merited more thorough inquiry. 
 The formidable Roma rights advocate, James A. Goldston provides a soul-
searching, sincere and apologetic account of desegregation litigation just as institutional 
changes are finally taking place in the Czech Republic. As a mastermind behind the 
iconic D.H. and Others v the Czech Republic case, the ‘European Brown’ he is well-
placed to compare strategic litigation and other social change tools, as well as massive 
resistance against desegregation in the US and the CEE.12 His piece stands out in 
terms of auto-critique, apexing in the acknowledgment that ‘litigation alone is not the 
answer’ (p. 184) and that social change is in fact up to the Roma themselves. It is hard 
to disagree with this, but the reader wonders whether the predominantly regional 
perspective does in fact allow for a thorough discussion of what goes on at the 
domestic level, which is the site of genuine social change as born out in Timmer’s 
research and the reform proposal inherent in Realizing Roma Rights. 
 The focus on the ‘Roma education cases’ handled by the European Court of 
Human Rights and more specifically, on regional litigation spearheaded by the 
European Roma Rights Center may conceal the fact that in the CEE school 
desegregation was not triggered by classic litigation. Thus, while it may be true in the 
case of D.H. and particularly from the perspective of INGOs that ‘[o]versimplified 
accounts of Brown’s impact may have encouraged some to rely excessively on court-
centric advocacy at the cost of other routes to change’ (p. 183), a more holistic view 
could show that litigation played a complementary even though highly visible, 
sensationalist role in the CEE. Gerald Rosenberg’s claim on which Goldston relies 
that the impact of legal mobilization should or could be measured by looking at 
judgments and courts alone is controversial enough in the US without the difficulty of 
transplanting it to the regional level in (Central and Eastern) Europe.
13
 It would make 
the piece more balanced if Goldston embraced a critical perspective not only vis-à-vis 
the US transplant of lawyer/INGO-led desegregation litigation
14
 but also of the 
revisionist critique of reform lawyering and the role of the international legal elite in 
it.
15
 Tapping into critical scholarship on legal globalization that cautions against US 
legal transplants in transnational private, as well as human rights law could have 




 Matache’s contribution attests to the complementary nature of legal action that 
undergirded NGO-led advocacy, project based institutional reform, community action 
and agency enforcement in Romania. Indeed, litigation is not the only social change 
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 Goodwin (2009). 
13
 The famous Rosenberg–McCann debate touched upon quantitative versus qualitative research 
methodologies, as well as the question of what to measure when measuring the impact of public interest 
litigation. See Rosenberg (1991), McCann (1992), Rosenberg (1992), McCann (1996). Others propose a 
synergistic model, arguing that both legal and direct political action contributed to social change in equal 
measure. See Coleman et al. (2005). The same point has been made about Kurdish mobilization in 
Europe, see Kurban (2014). 
14
 This would also set his piece apart from an earlier, European critique of transplanting public interest 
litigation. Goodwin (2004). 
15
 Dezalay and Garth (2006). 
16
 Dezalay and Garth (2011–2012). 
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tool desegregationist use even in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where the 
governments have so far failed to adopt desegregation policies and NGOs have not 
launched large-scale desegregation programs. In Hungary, the government policy 
triggered institutional reform and relied heavily on ‘development’ NGOs to facilitate 
the process as Timmer reminds us. Legal action in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria 
buttressed desegregation spearheaded by Roma NGOs, Roma activists and policy 
makers.
17
 Even within INGOs the advocacy and client care budget far exceeded that 
earmarked for actual litigation. Against this backdrop, one wonders whether 
Goldston’s apologetic tone is in fact warranted and whether it adequately reflects 
sentiments and experiences at the national level. 
 Part V is the key section of the book, where aspirations expressed in previous 
chapters should ideally take their final shape. After almost three decades the ‘Roma 
rights movement’ returns to the point where it originally started: ‘The Imperative of 
Roma Community Mobilization and Leadership’. The focus of mobilization is now 
on the grassroots level, rather than national politics, but this is only a semantic 
difference, because it is plainly obvious that without gaining political leverage on 
national and European politics, no lasting change can be achieved locally. Indeed, 
despite the title of the Chapter, only one of the three papers actually deals with 
community organizing and even that – the Spanish case study coauthored by Teresa 
Sordé Marti and Fernando Macias – covers a project funded by the EU. 
 The continuum between local, domestic and EU level action – even if not 
direct action so eagerly awaited by many
18
 – weaves together the insights of the Spanish 
activists with David Mark’s, a Romanian activist with experience both at the domestic 
and European level. Political scientist Peter Vermeersch’ state of the art account of the 
political opportunities of Roma activism complete the picture. Missing from this 
chapter is an account by a seasoned activist who lived through paradigm shifts over the 
last thirty years and can speak of the long durée. Given the lack of such insight, 
nothing bridges the gap between these pieces and Mirga’s and Matache’s contributions 
in the previous sections. In their descriptive accounts political opportunities in reality 
play out a very different course from the normative aspirations of Mark and 
Vermeersch. 
 It is not specific to Roma rights that old tools, frames and paradigms come to 
be reinvented every few decades – enough to think of the law and development 
movement from the 1960s onwards and its successor, the rule of law movement after 
1989 – where desegregation litigation originated from.
19
 Un-reflexive of these broader 
debates Realizing Roma Rights proposes an empowerment tool that has been with us 
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 Panayotova (2002), Kanev and Vassileva (2004), Russinov (2011), and Torchin (2008). 
18
 See, most recently, McGarry (2017). 
19
 See Kennedy (2003). In the early 1970s law and development came to an impasse, because it equated 
the ‘core conception of modern law’ with ‘that found in the West’. Without recognizing its own 
limitations, its ‘ethnocentric and evolutionist generalizations from Western history’ it was imposed as 
‘essential for economic, political, and social development in the Third World’ (Trubek, 1972: 2). 
Merryman puts it more bluntly: ‘The law and development movement has declined because it was, for 
the most part, an attempt to impose U.S. ideas and attitudes on the third world’ (Merryman, 1977: 483). 
However, in ‘the 1990s, law and development, now renamed ‘rule of law’, became big business. Many 
agencies began to support legal reform’ notes Trubek (2016: 312), reviewing law and development as an 
academic field of study. 
BOOK REVIEW  89 
 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 5(2): 81-97. 
all along. The Spanish case study lays the ground for optimism, but similar efforts 
have been made before with initial success dissipating and impact proving to be short 
lived and limited to the few Roma who stood a realistic chance of social progress 
anyway – because they had had the social and cultural capital needed for a leap 
forward. It is enough to conjure up Matache’s account of desegregation tools in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Croatia, Bulgaria and Greece or NGO-led 
desegregation in Bulgaria – whose full history remains untold – to see that in reality 
tools complement each other and that mobilizing communities is as resource-intensive 
and complicated as any other method. 
 Local mobilization is no different in that it cannot succeed on the long run 
without adequate resources. Resources within the community are as or more 
important than resources from the EU, national governments or foreign donors, 
because once the project team leaves, locals ought to sustain achievements. An 
important difference between political and legal tools in the CEE context is the lack of 
legal resources indigenous to the community. It remains unreflected in this volume 
that the participation of Roma activists in legal mobilization is scarce, which inspires 
criticism about the lack of Roma participation. While desegregation litigation follows a 
path set by Roma policy makers, this alleged lack of participation is an important 
driving force behind soul searching. Both the public and academic debate would have 
benefitted from the book’s openness in this regard. 
 The call for a focus on community organizing is also a call to funders and 
professionals to invest more in political, rather than legal mobilization. Two important 
questions remain unanswered in this regard. The first is this: would more intense 
investment into local political processes be able to deliver change at other levels to the 
degree expected? The second is this: if political mobilization is preferred and funding 
for legal mobilization diminishes, is there a risk that the human rights discourse so 
central to Roma political mobilization is ultimately weakened? A logical step in the 
direction of more political, emancipatory mobilization would entail questioning the 
role of human rights in the movement, but that clearly is off limits. 
 Given these self-imposed constraints, it would perhaps be more useful to 
advocate for a holistic and complex approach that retains legal mobilization as a 
significant, if not central tool. This is proposed by donors that also pursue 
programmatic activities at the local level, such as the OSF Public Health Program, 
which implemented a successful and long-term access to health program for 




 Why would one want to pick these books up from the shelf? Both are 
intriguing, particularly because neither Timmer, nor the editors of the collective 
volume are lawyers themselves. Their social science background promises a 
perspective on Roma rights that deviates from the dominant approach, methodology 
and language in European Roma related, jurisprudence-centric legal scholarship. 
What a shame then that this promise is not fully realized this time and the reader is 
left hoping that in the future a sound methodology, more thorough field research, 
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analysis and finally, more tightly formulated research questions will bring the authors 
closer to the original goal of their worthwhile projects. 
 Ever wondered what Roma rights actually mean? Both volumes take this key 
concept for granted. Mirga provides a studious overview of standard setting, suggesting 
that the edited volume applies a wide interpretation of Roma rights, conceptualizing 
them as any and every human right that may pertain to the Roma as a collective and as 
individuals. The OSCE receives more attention than its contribution would perhaps 
merit. While not being justiciable, OSCE standards are central to the discussion also 
because the United States is a member of this international organization and has direct 
influence on its decision-making processes, a fact that may invoke particular interest in 
readers based in the US. Second, the OSCE plays a pioneering role in standard 
setting on Roma rights. Since the time of the political transition, it has functioned as a 
role model for both the Council of Europe and the EU, even though its mandate has 
been narrower than the other organizations that replicated reports, soft law 
instruments and enforcement tools first adopted by the OSCE. This chain of US 
influence and the centrality of legal mobilization to US perspectives should perhaps 
have invited reflections. As it is, proposing less legal action for making Roma rights 
real seems somewhat contradictory. 
 Timmer is far less meticulous in mapping the legal context of her research. 
Consequently, her choice of the minority rights framework remains unaccounted for. 
That she mis-cites the source of the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities as the European Union, rather than the Council of Europe is a 
small problem. A graver concern is that the study of the very real and troublesome 
discrepancy between the self-identification of the Roma and the stigmatization of 
population groups labelled as Roma leads her away from asking whether majoritarian 
assumptions and presumptions are addressed under domestic and EU law prohibiting 
racial/ethnic discrimination.
21
 Given her disinterest in assimilation the astounding 
degree of which has occupied Hungarian sociologists since the first national Roma 
survey (1971), Timmer limits the study of the discrepancy between self and third party 
identification – what she terms the ‘Gypsy trope’ – to ethnic data collection. The 
permissibility and methodology of such data collection has been the subject of 
perhaps the most intense debate in this country as compared to other European 
states. Given the centrality of the ‘Gypsy trope’ to the thesis, it is regrettable that this 
debate and more particularly, its legal aspects receive a very light touch.
22
 It is equally 
regrettable that the ‘Gypsy trope’ is far from being a Rom-specific problem. The 
discrepancy between the two poles of race/ethnicity as a ‘category of practice’ is a 
central dilemma of social science research.
23
 
 Timmer focuses on minority rights and institutions, suggesting that although this 
frame is a result of Europeanization, it remains inadequate and unimplemented. 
There are two problematic aspects of this analysis. First, Europeanization imposed 
minority rights as the first of many Roma-relevant conditionalities prior to accession. 
The literature dealing with this aspect also canvassed other conditionalities, such as 
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 On which these are, see for instance Lahuerta (2016). 
22
 See, for instance, Ladányi and Szelényi (2001). More recently, see Krizsán (2013). 
23
 For a literature review, see Loveman (1999). 
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non-discrimination and social inclusion.
24
 The consensus seems to be that taken alone 
or combined they could not successfully balance out the dangers and risks inherent in 
the EU’s neoliberal economic policies. As Matache notes in the edited volume, 
although Europeanization inspired the adoption of policies, neither the EU nor 
national governments saw to the implementation of laws and policies. Timmer echoes 
this by underlining that NGOs substitute the state and public institutions in the 
educational sector. 
 Another aspect of Europeanization on which views converge is that neither 
ethnic, nor class-based measures are in and of themselves adequate or efficient to 
achieve social justice for the Roma. While this throws into doubt Timmer’s 
conclusion, it is left regrettably unreflected in the edited volume. Whether discussing 
social status-based measures or interventions based on racial or ethnic origin the 
papers do not step out of the dominant policy frames and question whether their class 
and race based logic does in fact reify class and race based domination, thus becoming 
part of the problem, rather than a solution.
25
 
 The implementation of legal standards and policies occupies the authors of 
both books. Partnering with powerful states in international organizations (IO) and 
collaborating with Roma-dense countries NGOs are important actors at the local, 
national and international levels. Whether engaged in standard setting, policy making, 
the provision of basic services, humanitarian and community work or litigation, they 
are dependent on IOs and IOs are dependent on them. Timmer presents this 
cooptation and co-dependency as a key finding, but fails to reference the work of 
those who had reached identical conclusions before her in relation to domestic NGOs 
and the EU on the one hand and OSF, its donor organized NGOs and the US/EU on 
the other.
26
 Timmer takes for granted that legally focused NGOs should be key actors 
at the domestic level, an assumption that is subjected to critical review in Realizing 
Roma Rights. 
 In comparison to the edited volume, Timmer maintains a more or less evenly 
critical and analytical approach to her subject matter. This is the strength of her 
research even if she does not properly follow up on her analytical scheme. For 
instance, it would have been interesting to find out whether the Chance for Children 
Foundation, a legally focused Hungarian NGO that inhabits a category on its own 
became coopted by donors and promoted an image of the Roma as the needy 
subjects, the victims of marginalization or delinquent cultural others on a par with 
humanitarian NGOs and projects, such as the ‘Gypsy camp run by Zsuzsa’ (p. 97). It 
would be crucial to find out how the case study of the Előrelépés Vocational School in 
Erdőtelek became the centerpiece of the research when the school is maintained by 
the Buddhist Church, rather than an NGO. If anything, the shortcomings in this 
school show that not only NGOs, but also more resourceful civil society organizations 
are limited by pervasive Romaphobia in Hungarian society. Timmer’s focus on the 
civil sector sidelines the question of whether the Hungarian state is complacent in 
massive resistance on a par with the Southern states in the US – a phenomenon 
Goldston brings up in the other volume. 
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 See, for instance, Vermeersch (2004). 
25
 Law and Kovats (2018). 
26
 Ram (2011) and Sigona and Trehan (2009). 
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 While Timmer does not meticulously adhere to her categorization of NGOs 
throughout the analysis, an indiscriminate treatment of NGOs characterizes the 
contributions in Realizing Roma Rights. Still, the protagonists are very different not 
only because of the venues in which they work, the fields on which they focus or the 
methods and tools of intervention they use. The resources meta-NGOs, DONGOs, 
INGOs and domestic NGOs
27
 can mobilize varies to a considerable degree even 
though they all belong to a transnational network advocating for Roma rights.
28
 Even 
though all tap into the rights discourse, few use legal tools (litigation, legal advocacy), 
but these and other differences remain a black box. 
 Both books grapple with measuring the outcome, a question that has been the 
subject of fierce methodological debate in US law and society literature. Recently, 
actors in the Roma rights movement researched the impact of legal mobilization, 
particularly in the field of education.
29
 The edited volume builds on these initiatives, 
but given that it fails to define the key term ’realizing rights’, the reader is left to 
assume that the choice of word denotes the lack of rigorous methodology whose 
undeniable advantage is that it is a ‘catch-all’ as concerns impact. 
 Curiously, without promising to or applying a sound methodology to measure 
the impact of NGO interventions, Timmer provides a convincing case study of 
changing attitudes among Roma children and adults who come into contact with a 
school that strives to open up educational opportunities higher than they had 
originally hoped for. To Timmer, as for radical educationalists and anthropologists, 
this is the only objective that can justify segregated education (positive segregation).
30
 
Incidentally, this is also an objective for which international law unequivocally permits 
segregated education.
31
 Timmer’s findings lay bare the emptiness or actual harm of 
positive action measures that ostensibly promote Roma culture but more often than 
not lead to substandard education. These findings can trigger criticism from both 
ethnic majority and minority politicians. While the former may see them as 
undermining the most effective argument for segregated education (negative 
segregation), the latter may perceive them as threatening the political project of 
building a positive ethnic identity – an undertaking Timmer is vociferously opposed 
to. She ends on an acutely politicized note that is as critical of (ethno-)political projects 
essentializing Roma identity as her academic mentors. 
 While her argument could be perceived as supporting assimilation, it does in 
fact build on the ethnic heterogeneity of the Roma and the centrality of their 
experiences of social marginalization – a byproduct of systematic, institutional racism 
or ‘misrecognition’. These insights are echoed by Alexandra Oprea who – writing for 
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 For NGO categorization, see Weiss and Gordenker (eds.) (1996). 
28
 Keck and Sikkink (1998) describe transnational advocacy networks as arising around international 
treaties at transnational conferences, particularly in the human rights field. Networks include not only 
NGOs, but also public officials, journalists, etc., both at the national and international level. Linkages 
between national and international organizations enable network members to promote legal and policy 
change vis-a-vis their governments through the so-called boomerang effect. See Klímová-Alexander 
(2005), Vermeersch (2006), Ram (2003) and McGarry (2008). 
29
 See Zimová (2016) and Matache and Dougherty (2015). 
30
 See Miskovic (ed.) (2013). 
31
 Farkas (2014). Thornberry (2016: 378) argues that the UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in 
Education does in fact favor a ‘majoritarian view’ of integration over ethnic separation in schools. 
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the edited volume – reminds us that the Roma are not only heterogeneous in terms of 
ethnic identity, but also experience discrimination in diverse manners at the 
intersections of race, gender, sexual orientation, etc. By constructing the Roma along 
the vector of race or ethnicity only, identity politics disempowers Roma women, 
Roma LGBTQI and various other subgroups. Thus, issues such as the forced 
sterilization of Roma women serve not only to open a debate about intersectional 
discrimination, but also to voice political claims by Romani feminists. 
 Rather than presenting benchmarks, indicators and data sets about the 
improvement or deterioration of the situation of the Roma, Realizing Roma Rights 
posits a mixed picture of diplomatic, political, legal and community efforts. The 
reader suspects that the term ‘realizing’ rights is deliberately chosen to capture even 
the most miniscule change. Blame for knowing so little about the reality is attributed 
to European states and the European Union. This conclusion is different from 
Timmer’s only inasmuch as the edited volume works with the assumption that 
critiquing NGO approaches would be counter-effective. In the end, both books 
conclude that NGOs are the conditio sine qua non for social change and this is what 




 The books discuss Roma rights without much attention to law, lawyers and legal 
proceedings. This suggests that the rights discourse can meaningfully benefit the Roma 
without actual recourse to legal proceedings. Whether Roma communities and 
individuals use the law on their own volition is not investigated. A closer look at 
available complaint statistics suggests that rather than fighting for school desegregation, 
the Roma stand up for their rights when they have no other choice, in other words 
when the harm directly threatening their livelihood is impending or has already 
occurred. The Roma take legal action against forced evictions, hate crimes (including 
forced sterilization) and hate speech. An important difference between these cases 
and emblematic judgments is that the latter arise from carefully designed litigation led 
by the international legal elite, whose achievements are better documented.
33
 
 In light of the rift Charlottesville wrought between US civil rights activists as 
concerns free speech
34
 the example of Roma rights activism in the CEE – where local, 
rather than international NGOs have advocated for effective protection against 
Romaphobic hate speech – may provide an interesting case study to explore in the 
future. It may paint a very different picture about the relationship between the 
European and US actors than these two books suggest – a picture where domestic 
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33
 For instance, between 1990 and 2005 approximately two dozen complaints were filed with the 
Strasbourg Court by Travellers evicted from their caravans by the authorities in the United Kingdom. 
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legally focused NGOs yield to Roma community needs rather than the frames, 
agendas and funding priorities of foreign donors and international organizations. That 
would be a story of local Roma and local NGOs, whose empowerment is the ultimate 
objective, according to both books. 
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Fábián, Katalin and Korolczuk, Elżbieta (eds.) (2017) Rebellious Parents: 
Parental Movements in Central-Eastern Europe and Russia. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press. 376 pages. 
 
While we are told not to judge books by their covers, this edited volume clearly 
invites the potential readers to spend a few seconds wondering about the main title, 
Rebellious Parents, and the cover photo: we see decent-looking middle-aged women 
and men participating at an apparently peaceful street demonstration, with charts 
hanging from their necks. On the charts, there are the words ‘Danger’ and ‘Gender’ 
on a pictogram of a bunch of dynamite. 
Those who followed the media news or the academic publications about social 
movements in Europe in the last five years will most likely suppose that the book is 
about the emerging ‘anti-gender’ discourse and mobilisations. But by looking at the 
table of contents, it becomes clear that besides those movements opposing ‘gender 
ideology’, numerous other issues and related civil society initiatives from Central-
Eastern Europe and Russia are discussed in this book. While reading through the 
eleven case studies in the volume, we can make an inventory, and by the time we 
reach the concluding part, we will have a list of eight causes: i) parents’ claim for 
political support of traditional family roles, while rejecting the constructivist 
conceptualization of gender (in Russia and in Ukraine); ii) artificial reproductive 
technology (ART) patients’ claims for recognition, including increased health 
insurance sources (in Bulgaria); iii) divorced fathers’ child custody and visitation 
claims (in Poland and in the Czech Republic); iv) young fathers’ (peer) learning needs 
about involved parenting (in Poland, in Russia and in Ukraine); v) single (and 
disabled) fathers’ social and welfare support claims of (in Ukraine); vi) parents’ claims 
against mandatory vaccination of children (in the Czech Republic); vii) mentally 
disabled children’s parents’ social support and recognition needs (in Estonia, in Latvia 
and in Lithuania); vii) claims against the (over)medicalization of childbirth (in the 
Czech Republic and in Hungary). 
Both of the editors of the volume, Katalin Fábián (originally from Hungary, 
currently a professor at Lafayette College in the USA) and Elżbieta Korolczuk (from 
Poland, currently working at Södertörn University in Stockholm and teaching at 
Warsaw University) have already provided significant contributions to the academic 
literature on civil society movements in Central-Eastern Europe, and have a wide 
regional network among actors in this field.  
In the introduction chapter, the editors provide an explanation regarding the 
title of the volume: ‘We use the term “parental movements” because in contrast to 
parents’ movements, which concentrate mostly on legal changes concerning custody, 
welfare, and health care, the movements examined in this book have broader agendas’ 
(p. 2). They add that in some cases the activists themselves prefer the term ‘parental 
movement’, in order to ‘stress that they fight on behalf of the family’, or because they 
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intend to ‘appear as gender-neutral’ (p. 13), or maybe they want to ‘obscure the fact 
that activists are nearly all men (as fathers) or nearly exclusively female (as mothers or 
those who wish to be mothers)’ (p. 13–14). Moreover, the editors offer a series of 
ways to categorize the wide range of relevant initiatives, and they share numerous 
highly insightful thoughts about the nature of different parental movements. Curiously, 
one of the editors’ most significant introduction statement is – the reader will realize 
when reading some of the case studies, how significant it is! – hidden in an endnote (p. 
23, endnote 2): ‘The emergence and increasing capacity of parental movements 
worldwide stem also from developments in new information and communication 
technologies. Following Benedict Anderson’s (1983) analysis of reading circles in the 
early days of the printing press, we can conceptualize some online groups as 
contemporary imagined political communities.’ 
The first chapter, by Tova Hojdestrand, presents the grassroots mobilization in 
defence of traditional and family values in Russia, in the early 2010s. According to the 
rhetoric of this nationalist movement, international child rights standards (expressed 
by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and manifested by UNICEF) 
implied ‘a disruption of child-parent relations, of social ties and of the entire Russian 
way of life’ (p. 46.) 
In the second chapter, Olena Strelnyk presents the results of her research, 
implemented in 2011–2014, about conservative parents’ mobilization in Ukraine, 
organized by an NGO, The Parents Committee of Ukraine (Roditel’skiy komitet 
Ukrainy). This movement, just like the similar one in Russia (presented in the 
previous chapter) is against ‘YuYu’ (the abbreviated form of the phrase ‘juvenile 
justice’ in Ukrainian), i.e. the international children’s rights norms, in the name of 
defending traditional family values – which includes, in their interpretation, the 
entitlement of parents to apply mild corporal punishment as well.  
The third chapter, written by Ina Dimitrova, provides an insight into the online 
activism of patients of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) in Bulgaria. The 
claims of this movement are, sometimes implicitly, based on the concept of 
‘deservedness’ – which is a disturbing feature from the aspect of equal dignity of 
humans. In this discourse, the well-educated and well-off majority Bulgarians, who are 
seeking medical solutions for their infertility, ‘deserve’ to become parents, and their 
babies are much needed for the sake of the nation as well, given the ‘threat’ that ethnic 
Turks and Roma will outnumber the ethnic Bulgarians in the country. 
Elżbieta Korolczuk and Renata E. Hryciuk, in the fourth chapter of the 
volume, categorize and present a wide range of fathers’ initiatives in Poland. The 
authors identify three main strands: the ‘angry fathers’ are attempting to enforce their 
interests in child custody and visitation issues after divorce in a fierce way; the ‘fathers’ 
advocates’ are supporting divorced fathers in a consolidated way; while ‘engaged 
fathers’ are concentrating ‘on increasing and deepening the quality of fathering’ (p. 
125). 
The fifth chapter, co-authored by Pelle Aberg and Johnny Rodin, introduce the 
concept and the history (from 2008) of ‘daddy schools’ in Saint Petersburg, initiated 
by progressive middle-class men, aimed at providing seminars for fathers and fathers-
to-be to discuss parenting issues. The ‘daddy schools’ attracted positive attention not 
just from the media, but also from the regional and local authorities; these grassroots 
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civil society actors apparently ‘succeeded in framing their activities and ambitions as 
being in line with state interests’ (p. 161).  
Iman Karzabi, in the sixth chapter of the volume, takes an approach to present 
fathers’ activism in Ukraine which is like Korolczuk’s and Hryciuk’s in their case study 
on Poland: she categorizes a broad range of initiatives, and identifies also three 
strands. Firstly, there is a ‘pro-marriage’ movement, represented by the International 
Center of Fatherhood (Mezhdunarodnyj Centr Otsovstva), an Evangelical Christian 
organisation that promotes the view that fathers have a key role in transmitting the 
‘traditional family values’ to their children. Secondly, there are NGOs aimed at 
advocating the interests of ‘vulnerable families’, namely single-father and disabled-and-
single-father families – indeed, given the absence of general gender equality norms 
(promoted e.g. by the EU), single fathers are excluded from certain welfare provisions 
which are guaranteed for single mothers. Thirdly, there are ‘daddy school’ initiatives 
in Ukraine as well; similar to the ones in Russia, presented by Aberg and Rodin in the 
previous chapter of the volume.  
While, according to the findings of Karzabi, there are no post-divorce fathers’ 
initiatives in Ukraine, this is not the case in the Czech Republic. Steven Saxonberg’s 
chapter (the seventh in the volume) provides a critical discourse analysis of the 
messages posted to the online discussion forum of the website ‘Daddy Info’ 
(Tatove.info), in 2010–2012. According to Saxonberg’s conclusion, the male 
participants of this forum apparently ‘want to keep all the factors that give them a 
competitive advantage over women in the labour market, but they want to eliminate 
the one main area in which they feel disadvantaged: that of child custody.’ 
The eighth chapter, by Jaroslava Hasmanova Marhankova, addresses a 
particularly controversial issue: the anti-vaccination movement of parents, as 
manifested in the Czech Republic. (Notably, resistance towards mandatory vaccination 
is mentioned in Strelnyk’s case study on Ukraine, too; as one of the features of the 
conservative parents’ movement.) Hasmanova Marhankova links this movement the 
ideology of ‘intensive mothering’ (Hays, 1996), given the gendered nature of 
parenting, and the fact that women (mothers) bear the burden and responsibility of 
decision making regarding their children’s health. She highlights the aspect of social 
class as well, by claiming that vaccine refusal ‘serves as a mechanism through which 
educated, middle-class parents reinforce their privileged position as informed 
consumers with enough resources to make informed choices and successfully 
negotiate with health and state authorities’ (pp. 243–244). 
Egle Sumskiene, in the ninth chapter, introduces the advocacy initiatives of 
parents of intellectually disabled children (and adults) in the Baltic States. In these 
countries, the issue of intellectual disability was surrounded by hostile attitudes 
inherited from the Soviet era, when it was considered as ‘a serious threat to the myth 
of a healthy and productive Soviet society’ (p. 255). In the case of parent activism, 
Sumskiene identifies the ‘collective identity of being caregivers’ (p. 271) of the 
founders of relevant NGOs as a key feature which results in emotional synergy and 
contributes significantly to the strength and political success of this movement.  
The topics of last two case studies in the volume are closely connected. The 
tenth chapter, written by Ema Hresanova, is about the ‘natural birth’ movement in the 
Czech Republic, in the early 2010s. (Notably, the Czech natural birth movement is 
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mentioned also in Hamanova Marhankova’s chapter on the Czech anti-vaccination 
movement, by pointing to conceptual links and to cases of personal overlap regarding 
the key figures of the two movements.) In the case of the Czech natural birth 
movement, the issue of planned homebirth is promoted just by a small fraction of 
radical activists, while there is broad range of claims opposing over-medicalization of 
childbirth. Katalin Fábián’s chapter (the eleventh) aims to analyse a specific aspect, the 
visual self-representation of the Hungarian home birth activism, with a special focus 
on the actions organized in relation to the criminal procedure against the protagonist 
figure of the movement, Dr. Ágnes Geréb, starting from 2010, when she was accused 
of negligent malpractice. By analysing a set of sensitization campaign posters, Fábián 
makes an important remark about a group picture of men (apparently, fathers), by 
highlighting that they are ‘diverse in appearance, allowing the viewer to ascribe 
different economic status and political affiliations (by appearance, such as hairstyle 
and clothes) to each carrier of the message that asks the reader to consider home-birth 
an honorable choice.’ Apparently, this is relevant regarding the actual composition of 
home births activists in Hungary, given the ideologically overarching nature of the 
issue. 
Reading through the eleven case studies of the volume is a set of stimulating 
journeys in nine countries: some scenes visited resemble to other scenes in other 
countries, while a few sites seem to be rather unique and exotic. And by now, it is a 
journey back in time, an opportunity to witness the eve of the huge current ‘anti-
gender’ movements (Kováts and Põim, 2015). 
Then, after the trip (in the concluding chapter), the editors aim to draw 
‘Regional and Theoretical Lessons’. This seems to be a challenging and somewhat 
frustrating endeavour. Firstly, the reader of the volume may still not be convinced that 
all these movements, just because the participants are (or want to be) parents, should 
be discussed together or compared to each other; moreover, the territorial scope may 
seem also seem questionable as a ground for analysis, given the significant differences 
in the history of these societies before, during and after the era of state socialism. 
Secondly, the composition of the volume gives the impression of being supply-driven. 
The most visible aspect of this is the apparent lack of balanced geographical 
representation within the region: the relevant developments in the Czech Republic are 
analysed in three chapters; in the cases of Russia and Ukraine in two chapters each; in 
a single chapter in each of the cases of Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland, while the three 
Baltic states are mentioned within the framework of a single case study. However, 
everybody with some practical experience of organizing a conference, or just a 
conference panel, should know the limits of enforcing a concept. So instead of asking 
‘why mix all these case studies into one edited volume’, we may ask: ‘why not?’  
Some ethical concerns may be raised at this point. As we have seen, the 
movements presented in the volume are diverse – for example, from the aspect of 
democratic and human rights values. In some cases, the case studies’ authors did not 
try to cover their (positive or negative) feelings and judgements towards the claims and 
arguments of the different movements. As the authors of the chapter presenting the 
diversity of fathers’ movements in Poland reflect on their positions, they ‘faced a 
number of political, moral and epistemological challenges’ when they were studying 
activist groups with whose values they did not sympathise. As for the potential readers 
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of the book, they would also feel uncomfortable to lean over this collection of 
movements, and to see some, which are dear to their hearts, to be pinned among 
movements with disturbing claims. (Presumably, many of the prospective readers 
identify as feminist and sympathise with the birth movement; moreover, in the specific 
case of the prospective Hungarian readers, they may recognize friends and familiar 
faces on the photos in the respective chapter). Finally, the subjects of the case studies, 
the activists, may also feel that they are in bad company in the volume. However, 
there is maybe something which would unite the representatives of the presented 
movements: they would, for very different reasons, reject the label of ‘rebellious’. 
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Offering a decent database easily applicable to cross–country 
comparison, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI) has been widely used as a variable for showing the level 
of corruption. However, surveys of its sources are based on 
presumptions which mainly apply to bottom–up forms of corruption, 
namely free market corruption and bottom–up state capture, and 
therefore it is insufficient for assessing the state of a country plagued 
by top–down types of the former. We provide an analytical 
framework that distinguishes four levels of corruption and draws on 
the experience of the post–communist region. Using this framework 
to analyze the CPI’s survey questions, we explain why the index 
provides a blurred picture of the region. ‘Big data’ evidence for top–
down corruption in Hungary is also presented, signifying the need for 
a more refined index. 
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Should one want to study the variety of corrupt practices, few regions can 
offer examples as amply as the post–communist one. Indeed, these more than two 
dozen countries, from Eastern Europe to East Asia, provide particularly fertile ground 
for corruption due to their difficult past. Communist regimes that rose to power in 
1917 and after 1945 halted – and, where it had begun or been developed, reversed – a 
process which could have resulted in an essential feature of Western societies: the 
separation of the three types of social action. Political action, ‘embedded in a state 
structure and […] legitimate authority [as well as] rule–bound power for giving orders 
and extracting resources’; market action, ‘recognized by the contract–based pursuit of 
acquisitive interests within the framework of legal rules that specify’; and communal 
action, ‘defined by a sense of reciprocal obligation among persons who share 
significant markers of identity and cultural belonging [such as] family, religious group, 
locality, and so on’ – these types, delineated by Offe (2004) and having become 
separated in a long evolutive process in the West, were united in a single neo–archaic 
form by communist regimes that abolished private property, the private sphere, and 
autonomous communities. And, where the separation of social activities is 
rudimentary, one typically sees, instead of formalized, impersonal networks, informal 
and personal relations coming to dominate (Ledeneva, 2018; Zhu, 2018). 
Informality being a norm does not simply imply endemic corruption vis–à–vis 
the situation in the more or less democratic states which have been developed since 
the regime change. It means we have to rethink a basic presumption of corruption 
research: that corruption is to be understood as a form of deviance which 
governments and formal institutions attempt to eliminate in pursuit of effective and 
more rational governmentality (Baumann, 2017; Fougner, 2008) – for the former 
implicitly assumes the supremacy of the formal over the informal; that is, that public 
officials act and think primarily in accordance with their legal position and illegal 
‘abuses of power’ happen only secondarily. In an environment of informality, the 
situation can be reversed: primarily informal networks can take over formal 
institutions and operate them as façades for power and wealth accumulation (Baez–
Camargo and Ledeneva, 2017; Hale, 2015; Jancsics, 2017). This way, corruption may 
become not a deviance but a constituting element of a particular system (Magyar, 
2016). 
This whole new level of corruption surpasses both free market (everyday or 
petty) corruption and state capture, for it conforms to a top–down, rather than a 
bottom–up, fashion. No wonder global corruption indicators like Transparency 
International’s (TI) highly popular Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) are unable to 
assess it. The CPI is a good example of a corruption index, which we chose to 
evaluate especially because it is a composite index that aggregates data from several 
other indexes, all of which dominantly assume the principle of corruption–as–
deviance. This can be seen, as we will show, from their survey questions. The former 
usually refer to either corruption in general, which blurs everything from occasional 
bottom–up to systemic top–down cases, or corruption in the form of private bribes, 
which appear only with bottom–up corruption. Consequently, while the CPI is an 
extraordinarily important tool and has been of good use to scholars and decision 
makers, it inaccurately measures the situation in countries where corruption has 
developed to higher levels than the authors of the survey questions presume. 
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Our main research aim is to point out the weaknesses of the CPI and of the 
Western mainstream corruption research it represents.
1
 Accordingly, we first review 
the CPI and the related literature, after which we present our own typology of 
corruption, developed with the help of a new analytical framework. This is used to 
point out the structural differences between (1) the bottom–up phenomena TI regards 
as corruption, and (2) top–down corruption patterns. Big data evidence for a top–
down pattern, namely the existence of a criminal state, is presented for the case of 
Hungary. Finally, the paper concludes by making a couple of suggestions for future 
corruption research. 
We should introduce two caveats before we begin. First, what we present for 
post–communism in general and Hungary in particular is a objective sociological 
description. It intends to make no ethical judgment, and we presume that some 
governments are actually led by informal, private interests, not some peculiar vision of 
the public good, because this perspective has greater explanatory power (that is, it 
enables us to create models which can explain more of the known phenomena than 
some vague rationale for the former such as ‘building a national bourgeoisie’).
2
 
Second, we do not expect the CPI to present a detailed sociological account in a single 
variable. Rather, we believe that the scholars who develop the CPI should pay 
attention to higher level forms of corruption too, to improve the validity of both its 
ratings and relative country rankings. 
 
1. Transparency and corruption: The hidden presumptions of the CPI 
 
The CPI measures not corruption itself but the perception of corruption; that 
is, whether survey respondents believe that the corrupt phenomena they are asked 
about are prevalent in their country. However, to construct such a survey, one must 
first define corruption to know what phenomena one should ask about. Transparency 
International
3
 starts from the following general definition of corruption: ‘the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain’ involving ‘public officials, civil servants or politicians’ 
(TI, 2012). More specifically, TI (2018a) lists the phenomena the CPI attempts to 
capture. These may be divided into three groups. First, there are general instances of 
corruption where it is not specified who initiates the abuse or whose private gain is 
served. These include ‘diversion of public funds,’ and ‘prevalence of officials using 
public office for private gain.’ Second, there are specific instances like ‘bribery,’ 
‘meritocratic versus nepotistic appointments in the civil service’ and ‘state capture by 
narrow vested interests.’ Finally, the largest group of features the CPI focuses on is 
institutional guarantees: ‘ability of governments to contain corruption,’ ‘adequate laws 
                                                        
1
 For a mainstream typology of corruption, see Vargas–Hernández (2010). 
2
 While lecturing, we have been criticized by TI’s scholars on the basis that we should not claim that the 
Hungarian government aims primarily at power and wealth accumulation because the prime minister has 
provided loftier explanations, including the one we quote here (and which we rule out in favor of stronger 
models). Yet we do not deny the importance of ideology in political communication; that is, in winning 
over the support of people for such schemes. 
3
 Indeed, TI is a very decentralized organization and there are many different views among TI’s 
researchers and organizations in each of its countries of operation. When we talk about ‘TI’ in the paper, 
we refer to that part of Transparency’s research team which develops and publishes the CPI. 
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on financial disclosure,’ ‘legal protection for whistleblowers [and] journalists,’ or 
‘access of civil society to information on public affairs.’ 
What these three categories have in common is the above–mentioned 
presumption of corruption as a form of deviance. The approach understands the state 
by its formal identity: as dominantly an institution for the public good, with some 
subordinates who deviate from that goal and abuse their position by requesting or 
accepting bribes and appoint cronies without a legitimate basis. Accordingly, private 
influence over the content of laws and rules, which is ‘state capture,’ and influence 
over their implementation, which is ‘administrative corruption,’ are the two forms of 
abuse considered therein (Knack 2007: 2). Also, the questions in the third category 
imply that the state actually wants to persecute corruption – only it may not have the 
‘ability’ to do so, or it lacks the formal rules which otherwise would overrule informal 
impacts in general. 
It is in accordance with this view that TI makes recommendations for countries, 
suggesting that formal rules should be tightened for public officials and loosened for 
civil society (TI, 2018d).
4
 Besides focusing on what is formal, it is also typical that 
these recommendations are directed toward the government. By all means, the idea is 
less that politicians will take on the recommendations as a form of help in fighting 
corruption, but it is rather believed they will need to implement them because, if they 
do not, international actors, countries and global investors will not cooperate with the 
regime in question (Davis, Kingsbury and Merry, 2012; Fougner, 2008; Hansen, 2012; 
Löwenheim, 2008). Indeed, the CPI has been a major force for putting corruption on 
the political agenda, and international actors do take it seriously and anti–corruption 
measures have been implemented in several countries since TI started to raise its 
voice (Andersson and Heywood, 2009; TI, 2018c). Yet, whether the recommended 
changes in formal rules are efficient depends on, first, whether the law indeed has 
supremacy and, second, whether the recommendations tackle the forms of corruption 
actually prevailing in the given country. It should also be mentioned that there have 
been countermeasures against TI as well: in certain places, like Putin’s Russia and 
Orbán’s Hungary in the post–communist region, the NGO was identified as a foreign 
agent and its activity has been openly dismissed by the government as interfering with 
national sovereignty (Novak, 2017; TI, 2013). 
Despite clarity about how TI views the relationship between corruption and the 
state, it is dubious whether the CPI actually measures factors according to those 
presumptions. There are two reasons for such skepticism. First, there is no obvious 
consistency between the definitions of corruption used by the CPI’s sources 
(Andersson and Heywood, 2009: 753–754). Although some of them make it rather 
clear what experts should assess when they are asked about corruption, many contain 
only one or two questions about the subject and use more vague or unclear wording. 
One can argue that this is actually useful since respondents can thereby include in 
their general assessment a variety of local corrupt practices that TI does not explicitly 
consider (Ledeneva, Bratu and Köker, 2017: 4). Indeed, the approach is likely to 
contribute to the plausibility of the suggestive picture the CPI offers about the overall 
                                                        
4
 Indeed, as a reviewer pointed out, TI also gives suggestions to private actors such as NGOs and 
journalists. Yet we focus on TI’s notion of formality in general and of the state in particular. 
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corruption level of the target under investigation. But, at the same time, the lack of 
consistency introduces uncertainty into the CPI’s results. 
The second reason why the CPI might not be commensurate with TI’s 
intentions relates to the methodology it applies for addressing perceptions. One 
popular claim has been that the CPI indeed inaccurately measures corruption 
because, instead of using hard data about actual cases of corruption, it relies on 
perceptions of corruption, which depend on the subjective views and knowledge of 
respondents (Andersson and Heywood, 2009: 752–753; Campbell, 2013; Charron, 
2016; Kenny, 2006; Lambsdorff, 2006; Olken, 2006). However, TI (2012) is right to 
argue that official sources about reported bribes or the number of prosecutions 
implemented cannot say anything about successful instances of corruption (that is, 
cases when law enforcement did not react). Alternatively, the CPI could also build on 
case studies and legal analyses of institutions. Although there is utility in such models 
composed of a mosaic of such pieces of research, country experts as well as 
businessmen who are in a position to notice corruption should have sufficient 
knowledge about their countries, so surveying them should give a more realistic 
picture about the corruption level than hard data (cf. Hamilton and Hammer, 2018). 
Still, it is important to keep in mind the limitations posed by the survey method; 
namely, that what we want to ask in the surveys and from whom depends on our 
sociological understanding of corruption. 
 
2. Corruption in post–communist countries: An analytical framework 
 
When assessing the status of corruption in the post–communist region, it can be 
highly beneficial to break with the underlying presumptions of the CPI. The most 
misleading of all these is the a priori treatment of formal institutions as the norm. It 
should neither be thought that the state is necessarily a victim of corruption, nor that 
informal influence over formal institutions is only occasional and/or linked to the 
action of particular individuals or groups within the state. Indeed, as we shall show in 
the fourth part of this paper, none of these presumptions hold in the case of Hungary, 
which indicates they should not be taken for granted. 
To create an analytical framework which can be used as basis for cross–country 
comparison in general and the CPI in particular, we must keep in mind the global 
range of this index. For even if it is created for the proper analysis of post–communist 
regimes, the framework must be able to encompass corruption in Western countries 
as well. Such a wide scope is essential also for clarifying the differences between 
Western types of corruption, which the CPI generally measures, and the types of 
corruption which are more common in the post–communist region. 
An analytical framework must conceptually delimit the range of phenomena it 
aims at capturing. For this purpose, we need not change TI’s well–established 
definition of corrupt practices (that is, ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.’) 
This means we are solely interested in how the public sector, i.e. political power, is 
used to attain illegitimate gains. The inclusion of purely private phenomena, as some 
have suggested (Hough, 2016), is logically possible but unnecessary in the post–
communist region, where the rudimentary separation of the spheres of social action 
has resulted in a high number of government–enmeshed private sectors by Western 
standards (Karklins, 2005; Lane, 2007). 
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Next, we need to undertake sociological disaggregation of the general definition 
to isolate its structural elements, which can then be used as the dimensions of the 
analytical framework. As corruption is, above all, a form of action and cooperation 
between people, the structural elements can be found by focusing on, first, the actors 
who take part in corruption and, second, the type of connections between these 
actors. 
As for the former, we may differentiate three general levels of actors: private 
sector–, public administration–, and governmental actors. The latter two levels are 
both part of the public sector, yet their differentiation is crucial. Public administration 
(bureaucracy) only implements the law, enforces it, and takes part in the regular 
operation of state institutions, whereas governmental actors make the law and regulate 
public administration. All three general levels can be further disaggregated into 
sublevels but here the only distinction we shall make is between low– and high–level 
actors. In the private sector, low level means the ordinary citizen, or small– and 
medium–sized enterprises, while high level means major entrepreneurs. (If a major 
entrepreneur routinely colludes with governmental actors, they may also be called an 
oligarch, cf. Magyar, 2016: 75–77.) In public administration, we define low–level 
actors as administrators whose task is to be in direct, day–to–day contact with private 
citizens. High–level actors are the bosses of these administrators; i.e., the heads of 
governmental departments or leaders of state enterprises who regularly remain in the 
background from the citizens’ point of view. Finally, among governmental actors low 
level refers to regular members of the legislation or the regulatory bodies of local 
governments who are not part of the executive branch. The executive, in turn, 
includes the high–level actors of national or local government, like mayors, the prime 
minister, or the head of state. (Governmental actors include elected officials or people 
appointed by them, such as non–partisan ministers or under–secretaries.) 
Turning to the types of connections between these actors, there are three 
dimensions by which we can classify the former. First, the actor’s role in corruption: 
they can be the demander, who initiates the corrupt transaction; the supplier, who 
abuses their public position; or the server, who is a subordinate with the task of 
carrying out or facilitating the corrupt transaction (cf. Gambetta, 2002). The second 
dimension is the regularity of connection; that is, whether such transactions between 
certain actors are made routinely or only occasionally. Finally, every connection 
between people is either voluntary, between equal parties, or takes the form of 
subordination, where the will of one party dominates that of the other in the 
transaction. 
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Figure 1 Schematic depiction of bottom–up corruption patterns. 
 
 
Having defined both the actors and the types of connections between them, we can 
draw up the analytical framework. In Figure 1, the set of circles represent the actors in 
an ideal–type regime and, with shading and arrows, we have attempted to capture two 
ideal–type corruption patterns – that is, identify which actors from which level have 
what connection to each other. These schematic depictions should not be understood 
in an exclusive manner (for instance, by imagining that free market corruption must 
involve an elite private actor who is connected to two non–elite public administrators; 
the case that is depicted). Rather, the relationships are to be seen as examples of 
corruption patterns that demonstrate the associated typical structure and forms of 
transactions. 
While it is logically possible to delineate a high number of different corruption 
patterns in our analytical framework, here we define only four. These are the most 
prevalent types in, first, TI’s Western–based understanding of corruption and, 
second, the countries of the post–communist region.
5
 The first pattern we depict is 
free market corruption, which is the form TI is mostly concerned with. Here, private 
interests hold illegitimate sway in state and local government decisions concerning the 
allocation of resources, procurements, concessions, and entitlements. As a result, 
illegal barter deals are concluded between discrete private actors and members of 
public administration at various levels of seniority. Free market corruption consists of 
a series of individual phenomenon: an official responsible for a decision accepts or 
requests financial or other benefits for handling a case in a manner advantageous to 
the private actor. A regime may be considered corrupt if there is a high occurrence of 
such incidents or if civil administrative or business matters can only be managed 
through bribes. However, it must be noted that these actions classified under the 
                                                        
5
 In our forthcoming book on post–communist regimes, six forms are differentiated, two of which are 
now excluded for the sake of brevity. 
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pattern of free market corruption are occasional; that is, happen case–by–case when 
one decides to take part in a corrupt transaction, and are not organized as a group 
function on either side. Also, instances of free market corruption are voluntary on 
both sides of the deal. From this perspective it is indifferent whether bribes are 
requested by members of the public administration or the latter are simply willing to 
accept them. The corrupt service is supplied by members of the public administration 
who abuse their position, whereas the private actors who accept it have a demand for 
such transactions. Both parties are free to reject the offer of a corrupt service, 
although an honest private actor may find themselves in a disadvantaged position vis–
à–vis corrupt private actors if they do so. 
The term ‘free market’ as specified in the name for this pattern refers to the 
fact, first, that it contains voluntary transactions and, second, that it is also competitive. 
As for the latter, where both corrupt supply and demand are widespread, private 
actors can compete in terms of the size of bribe they offer, and public actors in the 
amount they ask for (Diaby and Sylwester, 2015). In more monopolistic examples, 
like that of a public procurement tender, only private actors can compete and the 
public actor can reap higher rents. Naturally, the illegal nature of such transactions 
constitutes a structural gap between corrupt supply and demand which often 
necessitates the existence of a so–called corruption broker, who makes a functioning 
corruption market possible (Jancsics, 2015). 
Bottom–up state capture means what TI as well as corruption literature simply 
refer to as ‘state capture’ (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2003). In this case, 
corruption vertically reaches the higher layers of the public sector, namely 
governmental actors, and begins to show signs of a regular nature. The collusion of 
actors becomes more complex, not only on the side of the corruption supply but also 
on the side of corruption demand, given that the partners in corruption from the 
private sector are in many cases oligarchs or criminals from the organized underworld. 
We need to distinguish between these two groups: while criminal organizations carry 
out illegal ‘economic’ activities supported by illegitimate access, oligarchs, on the 
contrary, are usually engaged in lawful economic activities, but mostly with illegitimate 
access.  
In spite of its regular nature, bottom–up state capture can be rightfully 
diagnosed when only some segments of public authority are captured, not the 
governmental structure in its entirety. Also, at this level, political competition may still 
continue. The transfer of political power is still possible under constitutional 
circumstances, and oligarchs still maintain their relative autonomy as they are not 
irrevocably tied to specific political actors. In fact, the relationship between these two 
actors can be described as one of subordination (Figure 1) for the will of the oligarch 




During bottom–up state capture, servers of the corrupt transaction enter at both 
the private and the public administration level. As for the former, servers are 
subcontractors or suppliers of the oligarch who enter into occasional and voluntary 
business relations with the latter (and are beneficiaries of the oligarch’s illegitimate 
                                                        
6
 For more on such dependence using the example of the anomalies of party financing in Hungary, see 
Magyar (2016: 6–10). 
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market position). People in public administrations are in a subordinate position to 
governmental actors for they are state employees and can be removed if they fail to 
comply with the formal rules (laws) or the informal commands of politicians. 
Both free market corruption and bottom–up state capture contain bottom–up 
forms of corruption. In such cases, the demander of the corrupt service is situated in 
the private sector whereas the supplier is either in government or the public 
administration. In turn, we now depict two top–down forms of corruption in Figure 2; 
namely top–down state capture, and the criminal state. In these forms, the roles of 
supplier and demander are merged: it is the governmental actor who abuses their 
office and this is done for their own gain. Other beneficiaries, namely those in friendly 
or (quasi) kinship relation with the actor, are sometimes dubbed ‘cronies,’ the 
relationship constituting so–called ‘crony capitalism’ (Djankov, 2015; Sharafutdinova, 
2010; CRCB, 2016b). TI itself used this latter term for Viktor Orbán’s Hungary in the 
2016 CPI report (TI, 2017). However, in the post–communist region, such corrupt 
relationships are not voluntary and without subordinate relations, as the term ‘crony’ 
(‘friend’ or ‘pal’) would typically imply. Instead, these informal ties of relationship 
tend to be organized into patron–client patterns of subservience; that is, patronal 
networks (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1980; Hale, 2015). As opposed to traditional 
networks of patronage where actors, in spite of their great disparity in wealth, are 
engaged in a fundamentally voluntary and mutually beneficial relationship with each 
other (Boissevain, 1966), in patronal politics the governmental actor is dominant and 
subordinates actors on the levels below them creating informal networks which take 
over formal institutions and use them as façades. 
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In the case of top–down state capture, patronal subordination extends mainly to 
people in the public administration. Similarly to bottom–up state capture, this form is 
also partial: one ministry or a subdivision of a local government is turned into a racket 
by its leader who, as a patron, fills up the hierarchy of his domain with his clients. This 
process may be called patronalization, which leads to the captured part of the state 
apparatus beginning to be operated by the informal network which systemically 
operates through informal rules instead of formal ones. Also, the top–down nature 
changes the medium of corrupt exchange: while in the case of bribery we can speak of 
kickback money offered by a private actor to a public one to abuse their position, now 
we can speak of protection money requested from the subordinated servers of the 
patronal network. 
Still, top–down state capture faces several limitations due to the fact that the 
patron does not possess the monopoly of political power (Wedeman, 2018). The 
ability of the former to use the government is limited: they rule over only a certain part 
of the state and cannot patronalize other parts. First, this makes linked corruption 
activity, in which the cooperation of several state institutions would be necessary, less 
attainable. Second, the patron’s position is dependent on political events. An 
opposition victory can easily remove them, making it practically impossible to further 
sustain their patronal network. This is particularly true in post–communist countries 
where competition between political parties is indeed often a façade for competition 
between patronal networks (Hale, 2015: 66–76). Finally, the lack of a power 
monopoly means that the patron can hardly disable institutional checks. 
Constitutional limits on power concentration as well as effective law enforcement have 
the ability to contain informal networks and prevent the patron from yielding exclusive 
political power and making the entire state their private domain (Hale, 2011; Zhu, 
2017, 36–39). 
The final type of corruption we identify is the criminal state. Our terminology is 
similar to that of Friedrich’s (2009), although he narrows the meaning of ‘criminal 
state’ to states which commit crimes against humanity. In contrast, we call a state 
criminal if it features a pattern of top–down corruption based on, first, informality and 
patron–client relations, just like top–down corruption and, second, the possession of 
unconstrained political power. The latter enables the head of the executive, the chief 
patron, to disable checks and balances and turn the state into the business venture of 
their patronal network, managed through the instruments of public authority.
7
 
This pattern of systemic corruption, while not included in the scope of the CPI 
per se, has been noted by local TI organizations. TI Hungary, for instance, uses the 
terms ‘reverse’ or ‘political’ state capture to describe this phenomenon (TI, 2018e). 
We reject this conceptualization for two reasons. First, use of the terms ‘reverse’ or 
‘political’ are applicable to any top–down form of corruption, and we may 
differentiate two of these on the basis of a qualitative (as well as quantitative) change in 
the pattern of corruption. Second, ‘capture’ in our understanding is always partial, for 
if we did not understand capture this way, and claimed that state capture can be partial 
                                                        
7
 The definition of criminal state is similar to that of the ‘mafia state’ of Magyar (2016), but it is not 
identical to it. As we explain in a forthcoming book, there can be criminal states which are not mafia 
states, as the  corruption pattern of a criminal state is only one of the four components of a mafia state. 
To mention just one other component now, to be a mafia state a country also needs to be a clan state. Cf. 
Wedel (2003). 
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as well as total, this would lead to a confusing situation in which almost any autocracy 
or dictatorship that replaces a democratic establishment could be described as a 
situation of state capture.
8
 Also, we want to avoid conflating the case when oligarchs 
capture certain parts of the state – a bottom–up corruption pattern – with the case 
when it is the ruling elite that turns the entire state into a criminal organization – a 
top–down pattern of corruption. Such conflation has been typical in the literature (e.g. 
Innes, 2014) but we believe that, practically, if the definition of capture is narrowed 
down to partial cases beforehand, this should result in a clearer and firmer distinction 
between the two situations in general and Western and post–communist forms of 
corruption in particular. 
The criminal state is built by the development of a so–called single–pyramid 
patronal network. First, actors from the public administration are deprived of their 
autonomy to make corrupt offers to private actors or accept bribes in exchange for 
favorable treatment. Rather, they are subordinated to the chief patron’s will and treat 
favorably those who are appointed from above; i.e. the clients of the chief patron. 
Second, a single pyramid means that the multi–pyramid scheme which characterizes 
the politically competitive landscape of party state corruption comes to an end. When 
a regime may be described as having the criminal state pattern of corruption, this 
implies that political opposition, including formal parties and NGOs, have been 
repressed and essentially turned into what all formal institutions are to the informal 
network: façades. 
Third, the building of the single pyramid network extends to the private sector 
as well, as subjugated by the legislative and regulatory means the chief patron now 
disposes of. Drawing upon their monopoly of power, the chief patron breaks down 
the relative autonomy of major entrepreneurs and oligarchs, aiming to discipline, 
domesticate and settle them into their own chain of command (Lanskoy and Myles–
Primakoff, 2018). As opposed to state capture, when the oligarch is the capturer and 
the politician is captured, the term ‘oligarch capture’ would be a more fitting 
description for this reversed situation in the criminal state. A network of 
subcontractors and suppliers extends this patron–client relationship to the lower 
reaches of the private sector as well, which also means that protection monies are 
collected from both high– and low–level private actors. 
A summary of the main characteristics of the four types can be seen in Table 1. 
The main point we want to make is that corruption may take a top–down form in 
post–communist countries. Such cases are not characterized by the bottom–up 
process of private actors approaching the political sphere with their claims, but rather 
it is the political regime that milks private actors as well as taxpayers by way of 
contracts and, in the case of a criminal state, by privileges obtained from its subjugated 
oligarchs. Furthermore, we have added the dimension of the nature of corruption to 
the table, extending a continuum from the small–scale, low–value transactions of 
private actors and low–level members of state bureaucracy in free market corruption – 
                                                        
8
 True, capture must also be informal/illegal by definition because it involves collusion, but even this 
criterion is met by several cases of autocratic turnover which overrode much of the existing legal corpus. 
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that is, petty corruption – to the large–scale, high–value transactions of governmental 
actors in a criminal state – that is, grand corruption (Moody–Stuart, 1997).9 
 




































































































Alternatively, the concept of ‘kleptocracy’ has been offered to describe the pattern we 
define as the criminal state (Walker and Aten, 2018; Lanskoy and Myles–Primakoff, 
2018). However, as Wedeman (2018: 89) explains, kleptocracy in the recent literature 
has been dominantly used to define a ‘more decentralized and oligopolistic’ system of 
corruption wherein ‘[the] chief of state and his inner circle do not control […] 
oligarchs […] but instead run their own shadowy “business” empire while playing 
oligarchs against one another and taking a cut of their gains.’ This model does not fit 
the criminal state pattern we describe. Rather, kleptocracy refers to a specific form of 
top–down state capture where the head of state wants to abuse state power for his 
private gain but is limited in opportunities. Also, we would argue that etymologically 
the term ‘kleptocracy’ is broader than the ‘criminal state,’ for the latter more obviously 
refers to the case when the entire state is subjugated and run as a criminal 
organization, whereas a kleptocracy only means that elected leaders are primarily 
interested in stealing. 
Describing the state of affairs when the entire public sphere is treated as a 
private dominion, scholars have also offered the Weberian term ‘neopatrimonialism,’ 
or ‘sultanism’ (Fisun, 2012; Guliyev, 2011; Szelényi, 2016). However, the use of such 
                                                        
9
 We are indebted to József Péter Martin from TI Hungary for calling our attention to this distinction. 
Also, see Transparency International’s definition of ‘grand corruption’ in TI (2016b). 
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terms confuses openly admitted, legitimate lordships with essentially informal and 
illegal systems which operate among the façades of democratic institutions. As 
opposed to a traditional patrimonial regime in which political power ‘indeed operates 
primarily on the basis of discretion,’ without formal limits and not requiring 
reaffirmation from its subjects (Weber, 1978: 229), a democratic system has an 
elected leader whose tasks and authority are strictly delimited by the constitution. 
When the chief patron builds a single–pyramid patronal network and informal rules 
are respected over formal ones, lawfulness is violated – which is the reason why the 
former disables institutional checks and neutralizes law enforcement bodies, such as 
the office of the public prosecutor (Magyar, 2016: 50–51). 
Second, constitutions usually declare the supremacy of law, and authoritarian 
governance is sometimes explicitly forbidden. For example, Article (C) Section (2) of 
Hungary’s Fundamental Law reads as follows: ‘No one shall act with the aim of 
acquiring or exercising power by force, and/or of exclusively possessing it.’ A criminal 
state clearly fails to meet such a constitutional criterion, for the chief patron acts with 
the aim of possessing power exclusively (Vörös, 2017). 
Third, besides using the bloodless means of public authority, a criminal state 
also commits isolated violations of the law which take the form of linked actions of 
corruption (Magyar, 2016: 260–267). Linked actions combine acts that are unlawful in 
and of themselves (extortion, fraud and financial fraud, embezzlement, 
misappropriation, money laundering, insider trading, agreements that limit 
competition in a public procurement or concession procedure, etc.) with acts that are 
not unlawful in and of themselves (motions submitted by independent parliamentary 
representatives, instigation of tax audits, etc.). Thus, accusations of criminality may be 
made not from an external moral position but according to existing criminal law. This 
legitimizes, first, calling such state of affairs illegal and, second, treating it as a form of 
corruption instead of just a peculiar means of governance. 
 
3. The detuned detector: The limited scope of the CPI’s sources 
 
The fact that TI views corruption as a form of deviance limits the CPI’s ability to 
generate a reliable picture regarding the prevalence of the various types of corruption, 
particularly top–down forms. These data sets still offer partial insight into the extent of 
corrupt transactions that are initiated by private actors, possibly under coercion, and 
indicate whether these grow into the stage of partial state capture on a systemic basis. 
But they do not provide a picture of the situation when the initiator of a corrupt 
transaction is neither a company, nor a low– or mid–level actor in a public authority 
with the potential to extort, but the criminal state itself. In an environment dominated 
by the single–pyramid patronal network, it is rather politically–controlled enterprises 
than oligarchs who hold the state captive, and then collect tax and protection money 
from private actors and the public authority that they have designated. To offer an 
example: the CPI surveys entrepreneurs about whether they have to bribe officials to 
‘get things done’; for example, to win a public procurement tender. But this way the 
survey disregards situations such as when the entrepreneur does not even have the 
chance to bribe anyone for the winners of public procurement processes are already 
decided at the top and public officials must simply ratify the chief patron’s chosen 
client as winner. Indeed, such cases are a blind spot for surveys based on the principle 
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of deviance, such as the CPI. To substantiate our point, we analyzed the 
questionnaires from the independent surveys of 2017 that the CPI was composed of 
(TI, 2018b). What we were interested in was seeing, for each survey, which questions 
referred to which corruption pattern according to our analytical framework. We 
excluded one survey, that of the African Development Bank Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (AFDB) for this only examined African countries outside of 
the post–communist region we speak about. The results for the remaining 12 sources 




Table 2: CPI sources with corruption types in focus.  

























Experts 1 1 – – – – 
BF (TI) Experts 2 1 1 – – 
EIU Experts 8 6 1 – 1 
FH Experts 10 8 1 1 
GI Experts 1 – 1 – – – 
IMD Businessmen 1 1 – – – – 
PERC Businessmen 1 1 – – – – 
PRS Experts 1 – 1 – – – 
WB Experts 3 2 – 1 – – 
WEF Businessmen 6 – 6 – – – 
WJP Experts 4** – 2 2 
VDEM Experts 4*** – 2 2 
*We use the abbreviations used by TI (2018b). 
** The source description mentions 53 questions but specifies only the four categories into 
which they were grouped. 
                                                        
10
 There is no need to elaborate on the intricate method TI uses to aggregate these indexes at this point, 
for we are interested in how raw data is collected, not how it is used. On the latter, see TI (2018b). 
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*** The source description mentions that there were more questions but their results are 
aggregated into four indexes. 
 
As TI’s sources did not base their surveys on our analytical framework, it is 
understandable that some items do not clearly refer to one certain pattern of 
corruption but rather to elements which may appear in, or institutional checks which 
may be effective against, more than one pattern. Consequently, we pigeonholed the 
questions as follows: 
• Corruption in general. We included questions here in two cases. First, when 
the wording was very vague, not specifying the meaning of corruption (any more 
than the general definition). Examples: ‘To what extent are public officeholders 
prevented from abusing their position for private interests?’ (BF (TI)), ‘Is the 
country’s economy free of excessive state involvement?’ (FH), ‘How do you 
grade the problem of corruption in the country in which you are working?’ 
(PERC). Second, we included here the questions which referred to phenomena 
which may exist in various (bottom–up as well as top–down) patterns of 
corruption. Examples: ‘Are public funds misappropriated by ministers/public 
officials for private or party political purposes?’ (EIU), ‘Is the government free 
from excessive bureaucratic regulations, registration requirements, and other 
controls that increase opportunities for corruption?’ (FH), ‘Bribery and 
corruption: Exist or do not exist’ (IMD). 
• Free market corruption. Here, we counted questions which referred 
specifically to bribes required by, or given to, public officials by private actors. 
Examples: ‘Is there a tradition of a payment of bribes to secure contracts and 
gain favours?’ (EIU), ‘Experts are asked to assess: The risk that 
individuals/companies will face bribery or other corrupt practices to carry out 
business’ (GI), ‘In your country, how common is it for firms to make 
undocumented extra payments or bribes’ (WEF). 
• Free market corruption and bottom–up state capture. We counted 
questions as referring to these two types if they did not specify the structure of 
corruption but made it clear they perceive the phenomenon as bottom–up. 
Examples: ‘To what extent does the government successfully contain 
corruption?’ (BF (TI)), ‘Has the government implemented effective anti–
corruption initiatives?’ (FH). 
• Bottom–up state capture. The question we included here referred 
specifically to large entrepreneurs (oligarchs) who buy influence in the 
governmental sphere. Example: ‘Each of three dimensions should be rated 
separately: […] (c) state capture by narrow vested interests’ (WB). 
• Bottom–up and top–down state capture and criminal state. Here we 
included survey items which asked experts to assess whether governmental 
actors in the executive or legislative branch use their office for private gain. 
Examples are the expert assessments asked by WJP and VDEM. 
• Top–down state capture and criminal state. Questions were put into this 
category if they referred to top–down forms of corruption, or at least inquired 
about circumstances which would increase the probability of this. Examples: ‘Is 
there a professional civil service or are large numbers of officials directly 
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appointed by the government?’ (EIU) and ‘Does the government advertise jobs 
and contracts?’ (FH). 
 
The results substantiate our claims about the limitations of the CPI. On the one hand, 
there is inconsistency in the definition of corruption and the scope of the surveys, 
ranging from asking one general question about corruption to a whole host of 
questions referring to specific phenomena or actors. On the other hand, the strongest 
emphasis is put on corruption in general as well as bottom–up versions of corruption, 
particularly bribes given by firms to public actors. In terms of numbers, we can see 
that 8 out of 12 surveys dealt with such cases only. Also, in the remaining four surveys, 
the average proportion of items which may have yielded specific answers to whether 
corruption involves top–down state capture or the criminal state level was only 37.5 
per cent – and even those questions focused either only on jobs and contracts offered 
by the state or the presence of corrupt executive/legislative actors which makes it 
impossible to distinguish between the two top–down types (and, in some cases, 
between them and bottom–up state capture). The idea of top–down patterns of 
corruption, and specifically of patron–client networks, is entirely missing from the 
surveys. 
One can argue that the emphasis on ‘corruption in general’ is indeed a solution 
to this issue, for country experts can include top–down patterns in their country 
assessment. However, the problem is not that the CPI does not capture these patterns 
per se, but that this method blurs different corruption types, or rather countries which 
are plagued by top–down and bottom–up patterns of corruption. Indeed, our findings 
suggest the existence of an uncomfortable situation whereby, for instance, a country 
with endemic free market corruption can be given the same CPI score as one with 
top–down state capture, or a country with bottom–up state capture the same as a 
criminal state. Moreover, as a matter of fact, criminal states such as Russia or the 
post–communist nations of Soviet Central Asia are located at the bottom in terms of 
TI’s country rankings, while Hungary, which is also a criminal state, is ranked as mid–
range, in front of Bulgaria or China which are not criminal states in the above–
explained sense.
11
 Such outcomes that result from unsophisticated inquiries into 
corruption undermine the validity of TI’s country rankings, which do not give the 
different corruption patterns different weights according to their level of development. 
 
4. The unseen face of a criminal state: Evidence from Hungary (2009–
2015) 
 
To show the relevance of the detuned nature of the CPI, we offer evidence from 
post–communist Hungary of a top–down pattern of corruption: a criminal state. We 
claim this situation has been mismeasured by the CPI, along with that of countries like 
Russia and those in Central Asia which are too contaminated by corruption to be 
analytically fitted into top–down patterns. We focus on a specific period in Hungary, 
                                                        
11
 In Bulgaria, there is no single–pyramid patronal network (but rather competing patronal networks), 
whereas the Chinese state is led by a formal, bureaucratic patronal network legally, not an informal, 
corrupt one illegally (Wedeman, 2018). 
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between 2009 and 2015, using big data analysis of phenomena which points to 
symptoms particular to the presence of a single–pyramid patronal network. 
The reason we choose Hungary as a case study is twofold. First, Hungary is a 
post–communist country which underwent, in the above–mentioned period, an 
autocratic turn (Kornai, 2015; Krasztev and Til, 2015; Bozóki and Hegedűs, 2018). 
This is important because it meant that the country’s leadership met the most 
important prerequisite of a criminal state: a monopoly on political power. No actor 
had such power in 2009 but this was obtained by Viktor Orbán after he won a 
constitutional majority in 2010. We hypothesized as early as 2011 that Orbán used 
this power to build a single–pyramid patronal network (Magyar, 2011), and now we 
intend to verify this statement through empirical analysis. This leads us to the second 
reason we selected Hungary as a case; namely, that unlike in Russia or countries in 
post–Soviet Central Asia, big data about public procurements in Hungary is available. 
The big data research done by István János Tóth of the Corruption Research Center 
Budapest CRCB (2016a) offers a unique opportunity within the post–communist 
region to detect signs of a top–down pattern of corruption in the form of a database 
that analyzes over 120,000 public procurement procedures between 2009 and 2015. 
In Hungary, along with the end of the shortage economy following the change of 
regime in 1989, the common corruption typical of the ‘third economy’ (Juhász, 1981) 
became less prominent and also decreased in matters of public administration. The 
terrain for corruption was mostly concentrated in areas regarding decisions about 
privatization, state procurement, and the disbursement of EU funds from 2004 
onwards. It was here that the centralization of the decentralized system of corrupt 
transactions and expropriation through a politically–controlled enterprise witnessed 
significant change after 2010, when Viktor Orbán and his party Fidesz won a two–
thirds supermajority in the Hungarian parliament. It is no longer economic actors who 
bid against each other in corrupt transactions, but the new political elite, the single–
pyramid network that designates in advance on different levels those who are eligible 
to win government and EU tenders. The lower level of the apparatus is paid for in 
positions, not by ‘corrupt concession rights’ (Magyar, 2016: 143–149 and passim). 
Elaborating on this point, we can see that municipal institutions and 
authorizations have undergone state centralization and become subject to political 
monitoring from higher–up to such an extent that the freedom of low–level corruption 
has been appropriated from them, and the right to exercise it granted instead to the 
central authority (Hegedüs and Péteri, 2015; Magyar, 2016: 131–132). For major 
investments, however, the government has nearly unlimited power to officially 
designate investments of economically–strategic importance, or prioritize them for 
national security reasons. These priority projects are exempted from regular public 
procurement procedures, and in 2016 the government gave itself the direct authority 
to approve tenders exceeding 300 million forints. 
Assessing CRCB’s data for the 2009–2015 period, we can first see a drastic 
increase in the corruption risk after 2010.
12
 As can be seen from Figure 3, the risk 
indicator for public procurements related to EU funds which was 0.21 in 2009 had 
                                                        
12
 ‘Corruption risk’ is a proxy measure that refers to the prevalence of conditions which make corruption 
possible or likely. According to CRCB, these conditions are a lack of competition and a lack of public 
notice. 
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grown to 0.4 by 2011, and peaked at 0.54 in 2014. However, though this fact in itself 
permits the assumption of a systemic, qualitative change in public procurement, in 
theory it could also be explained simply by the extent of the occurrence of common 
corruption or state capture, both centrally directed and non–organized. 
 
Figure 3: Corruption risk in public procurement, 2009–2015 (N = 118.843).  
(Source: CRBC, 2016a) 
Explanation: The value of the corruption risk indicator is ‘0’ if there has been some 
type of strong competition during the public procurement process, and the latter was 
preceded by notification, and ‘1’ if the public procurement was implemented without 
notice and without competition. A value of 0.5 was assigned if only one factor – either 
competition or notice – was lacking. 
 
Second, the change in the proportion of non–advertised invitations to tender appears 
to be disproved by the existence of individual offenders, which supports the theory of 
a corruption service provider that is not centrally directed. CRCB data shows that 
while less than one–fifth of all invitations to tender were unadvertised in 2009, the 
proportion had become more than four–fifths by 2015 (Figure 4). Such a dramatic 
increase in the rate of unadvertised tenders would necessitate decisions from the mid–
level of public administration apparatus at a minimum. At the very least, it can be 
understood as an evolutionary phase of state capture, since the bulk of non–advertised 
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Figure 4: Proportion of public procurement lacking advertised tenders as a percentage 
of all public procurement, 2009–2015 (N = 121.849).  
(Source: CRBC, 2016a) 
 
On the economic side, an examination of overpriced public tender bids suggests a 
difference between bottom–up state capture and the criminal state in relation to 
advertised and non–advertised public procurement. Indeed, the decision as to 
whether tenders should be advertised or non–advertised, or whether open, negotiated, 
or restricted tenders should be specified for EU or state funds, are decisions made at 
the level of governmental actors. If the government finds that certain types of public 
procurement result in significant overpricing and partial deals, then it theoretically 
possesses all the necessary means to be able to steer tenders in the direction of an 
open and advertised application process. Considering that submission deadlines can 
be unrealistically short even for advertised tenders, it can be concluded that some 
mechanism has allowed the eventual winners to receive regular information required 
for the tender submission before notification of the former is posted. This could even 
be called ‘tender shorting.’ Moreover, this situation exists even before a discussion 
about invitations to tender and technicalities that are tailor–made for individuals or 
companies. The technicalities are in fact nothing more than tender personalization, 
involving use of the technical requirements of a tender to outline the specifics of a bid 
that has already been selected to win. This involves not a series of isolated incidents, 
but a wide–scale practice approved from the top. 
However, this phenomenon might still fit the pattern of bottom–up state 
capture, as the collusion of the tender writer and assessor on the one hand and the 
applicant on the other could be sufficient. Yet out–of–control overpricing, as 
demonstrated in Figure 5, which has raised the proportion of overpriced bids by 140–
320 per cent in the bulk of the cases examined, cannot be explained through the 
concept of partial, bottom–up state capture. 
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Figure 5: Price distortion in Hungarian public procurement, 2009–2015.  
(Source: CRCB, 2016a) 
Explanation: Mean squared error (MSE) of contract prices of Hungarian Public 
Procurements according to the theoretical (Benford) distribution by year, first digits, 
2009–2015, N = 123,224. 
 
Prices for public procurement contracts show a much stronger level of distortion in 
2015 than at any time prior. This process so greatly distorts bids from normal market 
prices that it cannot be explained simply by qualitative improvements or just the extent 
of corruption. Its scale likewise cannot be explained by an increase in the role of 
inherently more corrupt product markets within all public tenders. The increase in 
corruption is thus not the result of a spontaneous process. 
Indeed, we argue that out–of–control overpricing can only occur under certain 
conditions. A centralized guiding hand and resolve are required to monitor and 
coordinate the stages of tailoring project planning, invitations to tender, and 
assessment by a specific person/company. It must also ensure that those eliminated 
from the tender are unable to win appeals, while also guaranteeing that inspection and 
law enforcement agencies are unable to levy sanctions on the writers and assessors of 
the tenders because of their biased decisions. This also means that the managing and 
supervising public authorities must go beyond actively coordinating the activity of the 
actors in public administration in a way that guarantees the private use of the funds 
obtained through the tenders. In this case, they simultaneously also eliminate free 
market corruption: after all, it is not the assessor, but the review and managing 
agencies in their totality that award the winner of the tender. The assessor is no longer 
bought off, but rewarded by being able to retain his or her status. 
This type and size of rent collection is only possible with a centrally–controlled, 
state–run criminal organization, namely the operation of a criminal state. Thus, while 
earlier data about corruption risk or non–advertised tenders involved only proxies and 
were not evidence of corruption, the scale of overpricing can serve as an indicator of 
the functioning of this top–down pattern. Using this method, we can already 
distinguish – in a way that would be impossible from looking at the CPI data – this 
regime from other, more ordinary, corrupt regimes. For the former, corruption is an 
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In its content, the CPI index of Transparency International shows a clear Western 
bias. It is based on the presumption that corruption involves deviance from formal 
state functioning, or the good governance of Western–type liberal democracies (cf. 
Andersson and Heywood, 2009: 750–752). Taking a closer look at related surveys 
reveals that they mainly focus on private bribes and give a general picture of the level 
of corruption which aggregates different understandings – and, indeed, different 
patterns – of corruption in a unsystematic, uncontrolled manner. Not considering the 
possibility of top–down patterns of corruption or informal patronal networks using 
formal state institutions as a façade results in the mismeasurement of countries where 
such patterns are prevalent, such as in Hungary and other countries in the post–
communist region. 
In words, TI’s officials have noticed that corruption can also take a top–down 
pattern. In 2015, the executive director of Transparency International Hungary said 
that ‘a centralised form of corruption has been developed and systematically pursued’ 
(TI, 2016a) and TI scholars have used the terms ‘crony capitalism’ and ‘political state 
capture’ to conceptualize this situation. While this is an important step forward in the 
apperception of the operation of a criminal state, it still perpetuates misunderstanding. 
The term ‘crony’ in the context of corrupt transactions assumes parties or partners of 
equal rank (even if acting in different roles) and implies voluntary transactions – 
occasional, though repeatable – that can be terminated or continued by either party at 
their convenience. The term ‘political,’ on the other hand, overgeneralizes and does 
not distinguish between two top–down corruption patterns, namely top–down state 
capture, and the criminal state. Also, in both cases the approach misses the most 
important feature of top–down patterns of corruption in the post–communist region: 
the presence of involuntary, patron–client relations. 
The implications of our paper can be divided into three areas. In the first place, 
there are implications concerning the CPI as such. We argue that, while we do regard 
the CPI an important measure and a good proxy for the corruption climate in general, 
it could be improved in the following ways. First, its validity would increase if the 
definitions of corruption used in its surveys were consistent. This is important, first, to 
be able to tell what the index measures exactly, and second, to be able to give specific 
recommendations for reducing corruption on the basis of the specific patterns 
prevalent in the country in question. Second, the surveys could be based on the 
analytical framework we have proposed if they included items about phenomena 
particular to top–down corruption patterns. For example, the existence of top–down 
state capture and the criminal state could be better assessed by inquiring about the 
presence of competition among corrupt actors, or about the autonomy of oligarchs 
and public actors in making corrupt offers. Also, it could be asked explicitly who 
initiates the corrupt exchange; that is, whether the demander is situated in the private 
or the public (administrative or governmental) sector. Finally, an end should be put to 
the emphasis on bribery and ‘corruption in general’ in the CPI’s source surveys. 
Instead, inquiries about bottom–up and top–down cases should be balanced. This 
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would be instrumental for better measuring the level of all forms of corruption in the 
post–communist region, as well as other regions where patronalism as well as top–
down patterns of corruption are presumably prevalent (Hale, 2015: 466–471). 
The second group of implications is related to more general corruption 
research. We believe that our analytical framework and corruption typology could be 
used for comparative analyses as well as case studies, and corruption researchers 
should be able to assess in countries other than Hungary the bottom–up and top–
down forms we have distinguished. Finally, the third group includes implications for 
anti–corruption measures. As we mentioned in the literature review, one of TI’s 
recommendations for countries with a bad ranking is the tightening of the formal rules 
for public officials. However, while this may be of use if there is endemic free market 
corruption in a polity – that is, when corruption indeed involves deviance in state 
functioning – such a measure would either make no change or even reinforce a 
criminal state – that is, when corruption is a constitutive element of the system. For 
cases of the latter kind, such as in Hungary, recommendations should not be made 
that concern the ruling elite but rather (a) toward private actors and civil society, who 
can perform the function of watchdog within the country, and (b) toward non–
criminal governments which can develop outside the country more targeted ways to 
attack single–pyramid patronal networks. One example of an effective targeted attack 
mechanism is the famous Magnitsky Act, by which the US government is authorized 
to deny visas and freeze the foreign assets of certain people who belong to criminal 
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The Netherlands is a relatively new, attractive, but less researched 
destination for Central East European migrants, who compete on the 
Dutch labor market with more established migrant groups. Relying on 
data from the European Social Survey, the present article addresses 
the following questions: What is the employment status of CEE 
migrants in the Netherlands? How likely is it that CEE migrants will 
be satisfied with their income in the Netherlands? Does the region of 
origin influence the likelihood of having a comfortable income in the 
Netherlands? To this end, the article compares CEE migrants with 
the dominant migrant groups found in the Netherlands. Findings 
show that CEE migrants are likely to be satisfied with their income 
levels in their new host country. Education levels but also region of 
origin have an impact on the likelihood of living comfortably with the 
current income level. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Labor migration in Europe has gradually increased after the progressive integration of 
more countries into the EU, with a strong East-to-West trend. The Netherlands 
became an attractive destination for CEE migrants thanks to high income levels, but a 
more discouraging destination (when compared to older destination countries such as 
Italy, Spain, the UK etc.) due also to the difficulty of learning the Dutch language. 
Speaking Dutch increases the chances of being hired (admittedly, there are certain 
sectors where this is not necessary, such as in agriculture), as competition on the labor 
market, both with natives and other emigrants, is strong. 
As a distinct migration destination for CEE migrants, the Netherlands has been 
less researched due to several reasons: it is a relatively new destination for this migrant 
group; absolute numbers from each country of origin remain relatively small (in 
comparison with other destination countries and with the exception of Polish 
migrants), and many CEE migrants remain undocumented and therefore are not 
counted in official statistics. Available survey data is somewhat biased, as most of the 
time questionnaires from national representative samples are administered in the 
official language of the country, thus limiting the participation of migrants with poor 
language skills and leading to the possible overrepresentation of better integrated 
immigrants in such samples (Andre and Dronkers, 2017; Dronkers and Fleischmann, 
2010). These elements should be taken into consideration when looking at the 
number of registered citizens of four CEE origin countries presented in Figure 1, 
which is based on data from the Dutch Bureau of Statistics (CBS). As Snel et al. 
(2015) also suggest, the actual number of CEE migrants could be greater.  
 
Figure 1: Trend in number of migrants from Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland 
in the Netherlands 
 
Data source: Dutch Bureau of Statistics (CBS) 
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According to Eurostat data, the largest group of migrants from the EU in the 
Netherlands were Polish citizens. The number of Poles has risen constantly and 
sharply after the accession of Poland to the EU in 2004 (Figure 1). However, as 
Engbersen et al. (2010) noted, a significant increase in the influx of Polish workers was 
also recorded in the years prior to the 2004 EU enlargement, especially of Poles 
holding German passports. Being a larger group who stayed longer in the 
Netherlands, the group of Polish migrants also received much more attention in 
scientific research. 
For all four countries presented in Figure 1, the two age groups with most 
members are 30–40 and 20–30, in this order. In the case of Poland and Bulgaria, 15 
per cent of registered individuals are children of up to 10 years old. In the case of 
Romania, this group represents 14 per cent of the total, and in the case of Hungary, 
10 per cent. This shows that those who migrate are in the middle of their working 
careers and have young children who they either bring to the host country, or who are 
born there. In all four countries, first-generation foreigners (eerstegeneratieallochtoon) 
represent the largest group. 
The Netherlands now constantly attracts a diverse range of labor migrants. In 
the period 1955–1973 it did so through systematic government programs. Considering 
also individuals with a background in the former Dutch colonies, a highly diverse and 
multicultural landscape has begun to form. Central East Europeans (CEE) began to 
migrate to the Netherlands on a regular basis a few years after the accession of their 
respective countries to the EU and the consequent obtaining of formal access to the 
labor market. 
The elimination of work restrictions for Hungarians, Bulgarians and 
Romanians did lead to an increase in the number of migrants, but not as much as 
anticipated by Dutch mass media or by Dutch politicians, as Snel et al. (2019) report. 
As in the case of previous migrant groups, both the public and scientists wondered if 
CEE migrants would be settlers or temporary guests in their new country (i.e. guest 
workers1). Trying to answer the question ‘Will they stay or go?’ social scientists now 
look at circular or liquid migration patterns – the transit of individuals who move from 
county to country in an attempt to optimize benefits thanks to an open market and 
border policies (Engbersen et al., 2013). The issue of the settlement or temporary stay 
of specific immigrant groups in specific host countries should therefore not be 
analyzed in a vacuum, but in relation to general satisfaction with life in the host 
country and with employment status and income satisfaction; elements which are in 
turn influenced by (perceived) competition (on the job market) with other migrant 
groups and with the natives, and according to each migrant group’s chances on 
another host counties’ labor market. If general life satisfaction in a specific destination 
country and income satisfaction are high for a certain migrant group, it can be 
expected that the migrants in question will quite likely settle.  
Satisfaction is influenced by objective and subjective factors (Veenhoven, 1991; 
Arpino and de Valk, 2017; Verkuyten, 2016). Regarding the satisfaction levels of East 
European migrants, a recent study (Popa, 2018) showed that East European migrants 
                                                        
1
 This expression was popular between 1955 and 1973 and indicates the assumed temporariness of 
labour migrants’ presence (Minnaard, 2008). It was used in the Netherlands to distinguish new labour 
migrants from ones originating from the former colonies (Minnaard, 2008). 
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(from Bulgaria, Poland and Romania) living in the cluster of Protestant countries 
(Inglehart, 2015) are happier than their counterparts living in countries from the 
English-speaking cluster or the Catholic cluster. The present article develops this 
finding and investigates the subjective wellbeing prospects of the larger group of 
Central East European migrants in one of the countries from the Protestant cluster, 
namely the Netherlands, in comparison with that of local, more established migrant 
groups. If East European migrants living in the Netherlands are happier than those 
living in Italy or Spain (Popa, 2018), how do they compare with the other migrant 
groups from the Netherlands in terms of prospects for life satisfaction? More 
specifically, the present article looks at the satisfaction of different migrant groups with 
their income and the factors influencing this satisfaction.  
The research questions addressed by the present article are the following: What 
is the employment status of CEE migrants in the Netherlands? How likely is it that 
CEE migrants will be satisfied with their income in the Netherlands? Does the region 
of origin influence the likelihood of having a comfortable income in the Netherlands? 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the 
factors likely to influence satisfaction with income: education and employment status; 
Section 3 presents a comparative analysis of the main migrant groups in the 
Netherlands together with interpretations that connect the former results to other 
studies, and Section 4 presents the paper’s conclusions.  
 
2. Level of education and job status of Central East European migrants 
in the Netherlands  
 
Level of education has been used as an indicator of the integration chances of 
migrants. Comparative studies about migration take into account the educational level 
of migrants in relation to their fit with the population of the host country, with highly 
educated migrants being seen as more likely to easily integrate and less educated 
migrants having a smaller chance of integrating, as human capital theory suggests. 
However, in relation to employment, research into the relationship between education 
level and job status still finds contradictory results, as the relation between the two 
variables is not always that straightforward.  
In the Netherlands, Dutch politicians also consider education to be a key 
predictor of the successful integration of migrants into Dutch society, a low level of 
education being the often-mentioned characteristic of ‘migrant[s] with poor prospects’ 
(Bonjour and Duyvendak, 2017). A high level of education sometimes makes up for a 
‘poorer’ cultural background in terms of the reference values of the host country 
(Bonjour and Duyvendak, 2017). However, Fleischmann and Dronkers (2010) found 
no linear relationship between level of education and employment rates as not all 
education is directly transferable, and sometimes migrants from less developed 
regions give up jobs in their country of origin in favor of a higher income from jobs 
with lower status (Lubbers and Gijsberts, 2016), resulting in a downgrading of job 
status. This also seems to be the case of East European migrants in the Netherlands, a 
highly skilled economy – previous research has shown that East Europeans found 
here often register a decline in job-related socio-economic status; a ‘de-qualification 
after immigration’ (Snel et al., 2019) and an increase in income satisfaction (Lubbers 
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and Gijsberts, 2016). In general, this decrease is sharper in the case of migrants with 
economic motives when compared to migrants with family-relative motives, and this 
happens due to a mismatch between the human capital migrants obtain in their origin 
country and the required skills in the host country (Chiswick et al., 2005). Moreover, 
Chiswick et al. (2005) suggest there is a U-shaped curve showing a downgrade in job 
status immediately after migration, and a rise after a certain number of years of 
residing in the host country, with the U-curve being most pronounced in the case of 
highly skilled migrants. However, a more recent study (Lubbers and Gijsberts, 2016) 
found a less sharp decline in the case of highly skilled East European migrants and for 
those who invested time into learning Dutch pre-departure. The authors also found 
no upward movement in the U-curve among the migrants they studied, perhaps due 
to the short period of time the respondents had spent in the Netherlands.  
Comparing three groups of Central East European migrants – Polish, 
Romanian and Bulgarian – Snel et al. (2015) found that the Romanian group had the 
largest share of high-occupational-status individuals and the lowest share of low-
occupational-status individuals. The Romanian group also had the largest share of 
individuals with a high educational level. As the authors conclude, ‘in contrast to a 
previous generation of labor migrants (“guest workers”) from the 1960s and 1970s – 
they are generally well educated’ (Snel et al., 2015: 14). Another piece of research on 
East European migrants in the Netherlands showed that Bulgarians are on average less 
well educated and considerably less liable to speak English than Polish migrants 
(Lubbers and Gijsberts, 2016). There is also a gender difference, as the same study 
found that in the Netherlands, when compared to migrant men, considerably fewer 
migrant women were employed, and that Polish and Bulgarian women also had lower 
socioeconomic occupational status than men (Lubbers and Gijsberts, 2016). These 
results indicate that, given more data about CEE migrants, specific group-level analysis 
should be conducted, as there are significant differences between individuals from 
countries of different origin.   
The migration of highly skilled individuals could go unnoticed in developed 
countries because it is not seen as a threat to the economic and social system of the 
receiving country (Findlay, 2003), but even if the human capital of better educated 
individuals is more internationally transferable, yielding lower transaction costs tied to 
migration (Dalen and Henkens, 2009) and the market for professions such as 
managers, IT specialists, scientists, etc. is global, there are still national regulations in 
place that in some cases become barriers to the recognition of foreign obtained 
diplomas and qualifications Faist (2009). Furthermore, the global work force does not 
develop at the same pace as the global economy, still being ‘highly constrained [...] for 
the foreseeable future, by institutions, culture, borders, police and xenophobia’ 
(Castells, 2000: 247).  
As mentioned earlier, research results are still contradictory regarding the 
relationship between a high level of education and job market success in the case of 
migrants. Fleischmann and Dronkers (2010) showed that for both first and second-
generation immigrants, a high level of education does not influence unemployment 
rates. Regarding the parent’s level of education and unemployment, the two 
researchers found a connection between having only one native parent and a higher 
rate of unemployment in the case of men with low educational attainments 
(Fleischmann and Dronkers, 2010) due to the higher expectations of the latter (who 
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do not accept jobs that would be taken on by respondents with two migrant parents) 
(Fleischmann and Dronkers, 2010). Also, a higher educational level (obtained in the 
origin country) of parents has been shown to have no effect on the unemployment 
rates of children in the destination country (Fleischmann and Dronkers, 2010) due to 
the non-transferability of human capital. Another study found that better educated 
respondents perceive in-group discrimination more often, probably as a consequence 
of having more contact with natives and a clearer understanding of the disadvantages 
that their group face (André and Dronkers, 2017); findings which are in line with the 
integration paradox (Verkuyten, 2016). 
 
3. An analysis of competing migrants in the Netherlands 
 
The discussion about people with a migration background in the Netherlands is 
especially complex. Having seen how there are now more generations of people with a 
migration background in the Netherlands from different migration waves, social 
scientists have begun to wonder who should be seen as a native, and who as a person 
with a migration background.
2
  The four non-Western groups traditionally identified 
in the Netherlands are of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, and Antillean origin 
(Gijsberts and Dagevos, 2010) while according to the former authors, migrants from 
the Surinamese group are in the best position of all the non-Western groups, all 
having a good command of the Dutch language, with a high proportion of mixed 
couples. East European countries, Morocco and Turkey are considered countries of 
emigration (Dronkers and Fleischmann, 2010) which suggests that migrants from 
these countries come into competition on different local labor markets.  
 In order to answer the research questions presented above, I make use of 
data from the European Social Survey, a large-scale cross-national survey based on 
country representative samples that has been conducted since 2002 every two years in 
ESS member countries. In total, 37 countries have participated in at least one round 
of the ESS (according to the ESS website). The data thereby gathered is extremely 
valuable thanks to the core questions that are addressed in all countries about various 
topics which facilitate country comparisons. Data can be analyzed for research 
purposes either longitudinally at country level, cross-sectionally, or in aggregated form 
for several countries.  
The sample described here was selected from the aggregated file of 
respondents from the Netherlands from the first seven waves of the ESS, conducted 
between 2002 and 2014. As the article looks at first-generation migrants, respondents 
who were born outside the Netherlands whose father and mother were also born 
outside the Netherlands were selected. Respondents born in Aruba, Bonaire, Sint 
Eustatius and Saba, Curacao and the Netherlands Antilles were not included in the 
analysis. The resulting sample included 868 cases. Based on their country of birth, 
respondents were grouped into specific regions of origin: Western Europe; Eastern 
Europe; Indonesia and Suriname (former colonies); Africa; Asia; USA, Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand; Turkey and Morocco; Other. The largest groups of 
respondents in the sample are: Former Colonies – 22.1 per cent, Western Europe – 
                                                        
2
 In the following analysis I use a general classification of migrants, also considering the data that is 
available. 
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21 per cent, Turkey and Morocco – 19.4 per cent. These three migrant groups were 
compared with migrant respondents from Central Eastern Europe (10 per cent of 
respondents in the sample). The four main groups for comparison include 629 cases. 
The composition of the regions is as follows:  
• Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, 
Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden;  
• Central- Eastern Europe: Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Ukraine, Serbia and Montenegro;  
• Turkey and Morocco;  
• Indonesia and Suriname (Former colonies). 
 
There are statistically significant differences (p<0.01) between the age averages of 
individuals in the four migrant groups, with the East European group having the 
lowest age average of 40.2 years and members of the Former Colonies group having 
the highest average age, at 53.9 years.
3
 Previous research (Gijsberts and Dagevos, 
2010) about migrant groups in the Netherlands also confirmed that East European 
migrants are on average younger than other migrant groups and than the natives. The 
gender distribution is similar for the Western Europe, Former Colonies and CEE 
groups, with female respondents being in the majority (62.1 per cent, 58.9 per cent 
and 52.9 per cent, respectively) while in the group of migrants from Turkey and 
Morocco 58.9 per cent of respondents were male.  
 
3.1 Duration of stay 
 
At the time of questioning, 48.9 per cent of migrants from Western Europe, 81.7 per 
cent of migrants from the former colonies, 64.7 per cent migrants from Turkey and 
Morocco and 27.6 per cent of CEE migrants had been living in the country for more 
than 20 years. As time passes, this amount of time will increase for all migrants who 
remain in the Netherlands. However, looking at the specific times that these migrant 
groups first came to the Netherlands in large numbers, we claim that CEE migrants 
are the newest arrivals as a distinct group.   
As mentioned earlier, research has often focused on the settling intentions of 
different migrant groups. From an analysis of studies published so far about migrants 
from the East European region, a complex picture begins to form regarding the 
settling intentions and trends of this migrant group, with more between-group 
similarities based on level of education than in-group similarities. In the data of 
Karpinska, Fokkema, Conkova and Dykstra (2016), 60.8 per cent of Polish migrant 
respondents claimed that they intended to remain in the Netherlands. Other studies 
show that CEE settlers tend to be young(er) and highly educated (Engbersen et al., 
2013; Snel et al., 2011). This trend could also be explained by selectivity, in the sense 
                                                        
3
 It must be noted that the results presented here are based on aggregated data and mirror answers that 
emerged at certain time points. The grammatical present tense is used in the text to mirror a data set 
aggregated over great period of time. This specific aspect of the present research is also discussed in the 
conclusion.  
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that ‘those who really want to live in the country of destination will probably get 
citizenship faster, might marry a native, speak the national language more often and 
ignore or not encounter in-group discrimination’ (Andre and Dronkers, 2017: 124). 
This selectivity issue also applies to the pre-departure moment, as previous research 
about Romanian migrants (Sandu, 2017) showed that highly educated Romanian 
migrants tend to migrate to the North and West of Europe, while less educated ones 
migrate to Southern Europe. 
These studies indicate that the level of education can have an influence on 
settlement intention, but this relation, as we will see in the following section, is not that 
straightforward.   
 
3.2 Education levels and employment status 
 
From the group under analysis, the largest share of respondents with a higher-level 
education (some form of BA, MA or higher) were from Western Europe. 
Comparison of level of education between the migrant groups, expressed as the 
number of years of completed full-time education, shows that there are statistically 
significant differences (p<0.05) between migrants from Turkey and Morocco and the 
other three groups, with a difference of -2.9/-2.8 years when compared with migrants 
from Central Eastern and Western Europe, respectively.   
The answer to the first research question – What is the employment status of 
CEE migrants in the Netherlands? – is indicated by the data presented in Table 1. 
Half of the CEE migrants had a paying job at the time of questioning, and out of the 
four migrant groups they had the largest share of unemployed-but-actively-looking-for-
work respondents (Table 1). The group with the largest share of respondents involved 
in paid work was that from Western Europe, confirming earlier studies that have also 
shown that immigrants from Western Europe are less likely to be unemployed 
(Fleischmann and Dronkers, 2010). Regarding the employment rates of immigrants in 
different destination countries, researchers found that immigrants from wealthy, more 
politically free and stable countries, and immigrants from neighboring countries have 
lower unemployment rates than immigrants from poorer countries or from 
prevalently Islamic countries (Fleischmann and Dronkers, 2010). The data in Table 1 
is in line with these results, as migrants from Western Europe and the Former 
Colonies were found to have lower unemployment rates than migrants from Eastern 
Europe, Turkey and Morocco. 
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Paid work 55.8% 44.3% 50.0% 47.0% 
Education 3.9% 0.0% 2.3% 3.0% 
Unemployed, looking for job 3.9% 4.2% 11.5% 4.8% 
Unemployed, not looking for 
job 
2.2% 2.1% 2.3% 4.8% 
Permanently sick or disabled 4.4% 5.8% 4.6% 13.1% 
Retired 12.7% 22.0% 4.6% 4.2% 
Housework, looking after 
children, others 
15.5% 19.9% 20.7% 22.6% 
Other 1.7% 2.1% 3.4% 0.6% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 
Data Source: ESS. Aggregated file for the Netherlands.  Waves 1–7 
 
The unemployment rate has been seen as an indicator of economic competition, as 
reported by Savelkoul et al. (2011). The unemployment rate in the Netherlands in 
2018 was 3.7 per cent (OECD, 2018). Following this line of reasoning, the higher 
unemployment rate observed in Table 1 in the case of CEE migrants (13.7 per cent) 
could be explained by the fact that they entered a labor market in which labor 
competition from other groups was strong. Questions remain about with whom they 
compete, and in which occupational segment. More data with a focus on the 
occupational segment is needed in this respect. Based on other data from 2009, of all 
the four large non-Western groups in the Netherlands, those of Moroccan origin were 
most often unemployed (Gijsberts and Dagevos, 2010). This finding is not supported 
by the data in Table 1, but there is an observable difference in the proportion of 
migrant groups engaged in the fifth category of main activity, which could be linked to 
this difference between this and more recent data.  
Researchers who previously looked at the employment and job status of 
migrants in Europe talk about the ‘deviant selectivity’ of ‘guest workers’ in the case of 
migrants from Morocco, Algeria and Turkey:  
The selection of these ‘guest workers’ deviated from that of other immigrants 
from different countries  of origin: they came from the poorest and most 
underdeveloped regions of these countries and were specifically selected [due 
to their] low [level of] skills in order to avoid competition [with] native skilled 
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workers in a number of European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Sweden). (Dronkers and Fleischmann, 2010: 200–201)  
 
The researchers also suggest that the higher unemployment rate of migrants who 
come from a Muslim majority country could also partially be explained by direct or 
indirect discrimination against Muslims on labor markets (Fleischmann and Dronkers, 
2010). Returning to Table 1, a large share (22 per cent) of migrants from the former 
colonies were retired at the time of questioning, in accordance with the higher age 
average of this group. The proportions of Central East European and Turkish and 
Moroccan migrants who had household work or looking after children as main activity 
were similar.     
CEE migrants were the group with the largest share of respondents (37.7 per 
cent) working according to temporary contracts (often through temporary 
employment agencies – uitzendingbureaus) at the time of questioning, or without a 
contract (9.8 per cent), while migrants from the former colonies had the largest share 
of respondents (83.4 per cent) working with a permanent contract (n=446). This 
observation is in line with findings from other studies: from the 654 East European 
migrants investigated by Engbersen et al. (2013), 41 per cent of Bulgarians had a 
verbal contract while 35 per cent of Romanians and 65 per cent of Bulgarians were 
residing in the Netherlands without a work permit. Having a temporary work contract 
can be seen as very stressful for migrants from the two East European countries, as the 
former come from a culture which is highly risk adverse and rather values safety, as 
Hofstede (2001) shows. In the Netherlands, more and more employment contracts 
are of a temporary nature (bepalde tijd) for both native and migrant groups, and the 
same is true in the UK (Mcdowell et al, 2009) but this situation might not be seen as 
being that stressful by natives who come from a culture more in favor of taking risks 
(Hofstede, 2001), while the latter also have other advantages on the job market 
compared with migrants, such as their native language and acknowledgment of their 
education in the Netherlands. However, we must consider the fact that the decision to 
migrate suggests taking on a certain level of uncertainty and therefore may be 
associated with less risk-adverse people.   
The main activity of respondents (Table 1) is often reflected in the income 
level of their household. Figure 2 presents the perceptions of respondents about their 
household income at the time of questioning compared between the four migrant 
groups.  
 
Figure. 2: Feeling about managing on household income nowadays * Region 
Crosstabulation 
 Data Source: ESS. Aggregated file for the Netherlands.  Waves 1–7 
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Migrants from Western Europe were most satisfied with the income of their 
household at the time of questioning, and migrants from Turkey and Morocco were 
least satisfied with their present net income, saying that it was very difficult or difficult 
for them to live on their present income. 
Regarding the second research question How likely is it that CEE migrants 
will be satisfied with their income in the Netherlands? we first need to know the 
general satisfaction level. Based on data from Figure 2, CEE migrants were rather 
satisfied with their income, with three-quarters of respondents from the CEE group 
saying they were living comfortably or coping on their present income. The fact that 
some migrants were living in a family with a Dutch partner could have influenced the 
net income of the household. The language most often spoken at home can be used 
as proxy for this: 74.7 per cent of respondents from Western Europe, 90.6 per cent 
from the former colonies, 59.8 per cent of CEE migrants and 48.2 per cent of 
migrants from Turkey and Morocco mentioned that Dutch is the language most often 
spoken at home at the time of questioning.   
Looking at respondents’ household income level of the four migrant groups 
shown in Figure 3, we can see again that migrants from Western Europe had the 
highest share (as a group) of the top two quintiles of income category, meaning that 
they contained the largest share of members with the highest income. In accordance 
with the level of dissatisfaction with their income, migrants from Turkey and Morocco 
were the group with the smallest share of members in the two top quintiles of income. 
Of the four migrant groups, the one from Western Europe on average had the highest 
share of high-income members, while the group of migrants from Turkish and 
Morocco had the highest share of low-income members.  
 





Data Source: ESS. Aggregated file for the Netherlands.  Waves 1–7 
                                                        
4
 The smaller number of responses is due to the fact that many respondents refuse to answer questions 
regarding income.   
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Migrants from Central Eastern Europe had a similar income level to migrants from 
the former colonies (Figure 3), but they were slightly more satisfied with this income 
than the latter (Figure 2) at the time of questioning. This situation may be related to 
the expectation levels of the two migrant groups in relation to the time spent by the 
two categories in the Netherlands. Migrants belonging to more established (older) 
migrant groups presumably expect a smaller gap between the incomes of natives and 
their own. This conclusion is also in line with the results of Lubbers and Gijsberts 
(2016) that confirms the satisfaction of CEE migrants in the Netherlands with their 
present income level, despite possible job-status downgrading (which it is not possible 
to investigate here). However, as CEE migrants will become an established migrant 
group in the Netherlands, their expectations about a comfortable living style could 
change.  
The third research question Does the region of origin influence the likelihood 
of having a comfortable income in the Netherlands? is addressed by a regression 
model that was run to predict income satisfaction  for the four migrant groups, taking 
the time spent in the country and the education level into account. In Table 2 we see 
that both education and region of origin had a significant impact on the probability of 
living comfortably on the present income: respondents with a higher-level education 
were more likely to be satisfied with their income, with respondents from Western 
Europe most liable to declare that they were living comfortably on their present 
income (Table 2). The length of stay in the Netherlands had no significant impact on 
the chance of being satisfied with income.  
 
Table 2: Factors influencing chances of living comfortably on present income 
 
Parameter Estimates 


















Intercept 0.11 0.304 0.132 1 0.717       
[Came to country = 
Last 5 years] 
0.444 0.359 1.526 1 0.217 1.559 0.771 3.151 
[Came to country = 
Between 6-10 years 
ago] 
0.009 0.352 0.001 1 0.98 1.009 0.506 2.013 
[Came to country = 
Between 11 and 20 
years ago] 
0.195 0.275 0.503 1 0.478 1.215 0.709 2.082 
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Parameter Estimates 














[Came to country = 




 . . 0 . . . . 
[Region = Western 
Europe] 
-0.92 0.305 9.028 1 0.003 0.4 0.22 0.727 
[Region = Former 
colonies] 
-0.28 0.309 0.845 1 0.358 0.753 0.411 1.379 
[Region = Central 
Eastern Europe] 





 . . 0 . . . . 
[Education=ISCED 
0-1] 
1.739 0.457 14.48 1 0 5.694 2.324 13.95 
[Education = 
ISCED 2] 
1.185 0.276 18.4 1 0 3.271 1.903 5.622 
[Education = 
ISCED 3] 
0.865 0.256 11.44 1 0.001 2.375 1.439 3.92 
[Education = 
ISCED 4] 












Intercept -0.59 0.359 2.663 1 0.103       
[Came to country = 
Last 5 years] 
0.344 0.433 0.632 1 0.427 1.411 0.604 3.294 
[Came to country = 
Between 6-10 years 
ago] 
-0.08 0.407 0.042 1 0.838 0.92 0.414 2.045 
[Came to country = 0.167 0.31 0.289 1 0.591 1.182 0.643 2.171 
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Parameter Estimates 














Between 11 and 20 
years ago] 
[Came to country = 




 . . 0 . . . . 
[Region = Western 
Europe] 
-1.46 0.337 18.63 1 0 0.233 0.121 0.452 
[Region = Former 
colonies] 
-0.91 0.331 7.454 1 0.006 0.405 0.211 0.775 
[Region = Central 
Eastern Europe] 





 . . 0 . . . . 
[Education=ISCED 
0-1] 
3.135 0.485 41.71 1 0 22.993 8.879 59.54 
[Education = 
ISCED 2] 
2.045 0.34 36.19 1 0 7.727 3.969 15.04 
[Education = 
ISCED 3] 
1.431 0.331 18.67 1 0 4.183 2.186 8.006 
[Education = 
ISCED 4] 





 . . 0 . . . . 
a. The reference category is: Living comfortably on present income. 
b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
 
Confirming circular migration patterns, 35.1 per cent of Central East Europeans in the 
sample claimed to have had paid work in another country for more than six months in 
the previous ten years, making them the group with the largest share of respondents 
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having given a positive answer to this question. Even if Central East Europeans were 
newcomers on the Dutch job market, they had other international work experience, 
being part of transnational migration flows (Mcdowell et al., 2009) in constant search 
of better job opportunities. However, in a survey conducted by Karpinska et al. 
(2016), only 24.2 per cent of Polish respondents stated that they had ever lived in 
another country before moving to the Netherlands, while Snel et al. (2019) report that 
CEE migrants who started as circular migrants eventually settled there. Again, this 
indicates that Central East European migrants should not be investigated as a 
homogenous group (an observation also made by Engbersen et al. 2013 and Snel et al. 
2019) and that, given the necessary data, comparison of the situation according to 
different countries of origin would prove valuable.  
Related to job opportunities for East European migrants in the Netherlands, a 
previous study showed that Romanian work migrants had found their jobs in the 
Netherlands via the internet or via ‘an explicit work-campaign conducted in Romania 
by Dutch companies’ (Snel et al., 2011: 22). The Romanian community in the 
Netherlands also has both offline and online opportunities for interaction such as the 
forum ‘Romanians.nl’ which also serves as a contact/information point for potential 
newcomers. Dutch job websites periodically advertise job openings for Romanian- 
and/or Polish-speaking recruiters or HR specialists who wish to work in technical, 
construction, or agricultural businesses in the Netherlands. Candidates are required to 
be able to speak Dutch and English and another language such as Romanian, Polish 
or Hungarian. The job advertisements are in Dutch, thus indirectly selecting from the 
get-go those candidates who are able to understand the job advertisements and 
deterring candidates who do not possess at least a conversational level of Dutch. 
These jobs include the task of selecting and recruiting Polish- or Romanian-speaking 
personnel and the administrative and legal work of facilitating the hiring of such 
personnel by contractors. Many of these advertisements explicitly refer to work 
migrants (arbeidsmigranten). Despite statistics showing that East European migrants 
are mostly concentrated in the Randstad area (Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam, 
and Utrecht), the jobs that are advertised are in companies located outside this area, 
either in the north or the south of the country. What these advertisements show is the 
dynamic and liquid/circular migration (Snel et al., 2015; Engbersen et al., 2010) of 
East European migrants.  
 
3.3 Overall levels of satisfaction  
 
When compared to Western migrants, those from the former colonies and from 
Turkey and Morocco were less satisfied with the state of the economy in the country 
at the time of questioning, while Central East Europeans were more satisfied than 
migrants from Turkey and Morocco when compared with them (one-way ANOVA, 
p<0.05). Regarding satisfaction with life as a whole, there was a statistically significant 
difference (one-way ANOVA, p <0.05) of 0.615 between migrants from Western 
Europe and migrants from Turkey and Morocco. Another factor that should be 
considered here is that satisfaction is also influenced by subjective factors, and scholars 
classify countries as happy or unhappy, or as cultures of dissatisfaction (Bartram, 
2013; Polgreen and Simpson, 2011). Satisfaction can be the result of comparison with 
the first reference group from the host country, but in time this can change because 
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the reference group changes, and satisfaction may also be influenced by a culture of 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction.   
Asked whether they feel part of a group that is discriminated against in the 
country in which they are living, migrants from Turkey and Morocco more often gave 
a positive answer (40 per cent) than did migrants from the former colonies of Central 
Eastern Europe (about 20 per cent each). This trend was also noted by Gijsberts and 
Dagevos: ‘relatively few [people of Turkish or Moroccan origin] think that the 
Netherlands is a hospitable country for migrants and a country in which people are 
given every opportunity’ (Gijsberts and Dagevos, 2010: 16). Andre and Dronkers 
(2017) also found that immigrants from poorer countries perceive in-group 
discrimination more often than immigrants from wealthier countries.  
The findings presented above have limitations that should also be considered 
in connection with the characteristics of the data. As the analysis is based on 
aggregated data from seven waves of ESS, it means that some respondents interviewed 
more than 10 years apart were brought together in the sample. Different historical 
moments could have had different impacts on respondents’ answers regarding 
satisfaction, income levels, etc. Also, the length of time spent by respondents in a 
certain country at the time of the interview could also have influenced the results. 
There is also the question of delimiting natives from non-natives, seeing that Dutch 
nationality law is based on jus sanguinis, not on jus soli, a discussion I have elaborated 
upon elsewhere (Popa, 2019). This detail is of particular importance in the case of 




This article looked at previous studies about CEE migrants in the Netherlands and at 
data about this same group found in the ESS. As studies and first-hand targeted data 
still remain scarce, conclusions are still contradictory. Further research about specific 
Central East European migrant groups in less studied destinations, as in the case of 
the Netherlands, would be of substantial value to the field of migration studies.  
Based on data from the ESS, (registered) CEE migrants were younger than 
migrants from other groups. Slightly more women than men had migrated from 
Central Eastern Europe to the Netherlands. Migrants from East Europe did not feel 
as discriminated against as migrants from Turkey and Morocco at the time of 
questioning. 
CEE migrants were on average better educated than the guest migrants from the 
1960s and 1970s although they still made up the largest share of respondents who 
were unemployed and looking for a job. Many CEE migrants were working according 
to limited contracts or were used to working without a contract. They were relatively 
satisfied with their income level.  
Many CEE migrants have so far been a part of the circular migration 
phenomenon, having worked in other host countries before arriving in the 
Netherlands (the Polish group may be an exception, as previous studies have shown). 
However, because it was very likely that they had an income on which they could live 
comfortably, as the analysis above has shown, it is also probable that they were likely 
to settle in the Netherlands. Another reason why settling is likely is that the reasons for 
the migration of Central East Europeans are beginning to change. While in the early 
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days of the emigration phenomenon being a migrant was often a means of obtaining 
higher social status back home (due to higher living standards when returning to the 
origin country after time working abroad and saving money), people have now started 
to emigrate for reasons other than financial ones, often related to social values and 
political and economic predictability. As a previous study (Popa, 2018) has shown, for 
East European migrants satisfaction with how democracy works in the host country 
has a significant positive impact on declared subjective wellbeing.  
Satisfaction with income could also change over time for this new migrant 
group in the Netherlands, as their perspective about what represents a comfortable 
lifestyle could change. While in the first stages of migration migrants compare their 
new situation with the one back home, in time the reference comparison will become 
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